Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

53. Backchannel Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in Saigon¹

Washington, October 22, 1972, 2000Z.

Tohak 85/WHS 2284. Urgent immediate delivery.

I must emphasize that my Tohak 84 was generated entirely from reading your Hakto 41.² After reading Hakto 42,³ however, I am beginning to get the gist of the direction in which you are proposing to move. As of this writing, Hakto 42 is the last message we hold here from you.

As I see it, what you are now contemplating would be to move promptly with Hanoi and finalize the agreement along the lines that we have already essentially completed; to make this agreement public, noting probably that Phnom Penh, Vientiane and Bangkok are also fully on board; and then to publicly invite Thieu to join with us in settling the conflict along the lines cited. This has many obvious advantages. Most of them are short-term and would probably carry us through November 7 in a fairly stong position, but we must carefully consider what such an approach would ultimately result in.

First, Thieu would be totally isolated as the sole remaining obstacle to peace which is, in fact, what he is. In the short term, it is possible that the South Vietnamese will rally strongly to support him as the nationalist leader who is dedicated to stand up against all odds against the Communist threat. In the long term—and we are probably speaking of a matter of weeks or months until the other effects of our decision are felt in South Vietnam—his position will erode and he will either be couped out of office, murdered or shunted aside. It is not likely that he would succumb to the international and domestic public pressure which the course of action would generate. That decision he has already made.

A second consequence of this course of action would be that the United States could no longer provide the economic and military support necessary to sustain South Vietnam. Thus, we would see an erosion of Thieu’s viability in a political sense and a concurrent weakening of South Vietnam’s real strength on the battlefield and in its economy. It is inconceivable to me that we could ask the Congress to fund $700 million of aid to a government which has refused to accept the most reasonable of peace terms. Thus, we will have in the long run set upon a course which gives Thieu two options: either personal or national suicide. The outcome of either, as our best analyses have already confirmed, would be to ease a way for a Communist takeover. It appears to me that we are focusing too intensely on not losing the achievements that we have made at the negotiating table and on the immediate requirement to maintain an essential credibility and trust between ourselves, Hanoi, Peking and Moscow. The solution that you have hinted at in Hakto 42 would, indeed, do that. In the final analysis, however, I am afraid the outcome could only be a collapse of the GVN and a Communist takeover in the worst case.

The course you have outlined will isolate Thieu as the culprit, result in the termination of all future support for his government, both military and probably economic, and cannot but result in his and perhaps even the GVN’s collapse. In my humble view, this is too big a price to pay for the short-term advantages of keeping Hanoi’s confidence. After all, it is Hanoi who has been the culprit up to now, who has stonewalled every reasonable effort to get a negotiated settlement over the past three and one-half years, and who has suddenly—because it can no longer weather the pressures we have so expensively applied to them—decided to sue for peace. Now, we find ourselves in a position of scrambling frantically not to allow this fragile plant to wither.

I have just received and read Hakto 43⁴ in which the assumptions I fleshed out in the preceding part of this message are confirmed. I agree that we should not single Thieu out as the culprit before the election. On the other hand, the course of action you have outlined will have this ultimate effect. Whether or not he would fold in the face of public pressure is problematic at best and, in any event, in testing the thesis we cannot but deprive ourselves of the ability to support South Vietnam in the future. I am not so sure that a bilateral deal is not far better.

Please consider the following. We inform Dobrynin, the PRC, and Hanoi that we cannot bring Thieu aboard. We have always insisted that we cannot move unilaterally. Thus, it is essential that we reassess the framework of a possible settlement and urge another meeting in Paris between yourself and Le Duc Tho. At this meeting, we should discuss a combination of a military solution which would provide for immediate U.S. withdrawal, the termination of bombing, removal of mines, and the provision of long-term support to help rebuild North Vietnam—all this in return for our prisoners. We should then negotiate on a mutual basis the levels of support that both sides would be willing to provide in the South. We could not, of course, initially provide assistance to Hanoi but the assurance could be made. Concurrently, we could maintain pressure on Thieu to come around. It is in this context that we should address the bombing issue in the North. I agree with you completely that it is very difficult to continue to strike North Vietnam when they have met all of our demands. On the other hand, I disagree that we should unilaterally terminate that bombing without reciprocal concessions from Hanoi. I would suggest the following:

(A) That we agree to a cessation of the bombing north of 20 deg (the mines, of course, would remain in) while we continue our discussions but only under the provisions that Hanoi not break with us publicly and not take flagrant advantage of the respite this would provide north of 20 deg.

(B) That we preserve the right to resume the bombing if an alternate workable arrangement is not provided for. This, in itself, is a high-risk operation and it will probably prove almost impossible to crank the bombing up again, but at least we should have extracted some short-term advantages which would hold the thing together between now and November 7. It is only in this context that we should consider a unilateral bombing halt. This way the decision can be sustained by the fact of additional meetings with the other side and their agreement to continue negotiations and not go into public polemic. Until we convey this to the other and get their agreement, we should hold to the 20 deg restriction which, based on your telephone call,⁵ will be in effect as of 0700 Monday morning Saigon time.

Until you return tomorrow, we will hold firmly to the guidance you provided in paragraph three,⁶ and I will be guided rigidly in my discussions with Dobrynin this afternoon by your telephonic counsel which included modifying our talking points to soften somewhat the bleeding about Hanoi’s going public but, more importantly, I will avoid fingering Thieu as the culprit and place greater emphasis on the difficulty resulting from the continued presence of North Vietnamese forces in the South. Once we have gotten Dobrynin postured, we then have a breather to think more carefully about how we should proceed on the negotiating wicket.

I remain concerned, however, that a public revelation of what we have negotiated thus far and an invitation to Thieu to join with us can only have one outcome—that being the fall of Thieu and perhaps even the collapse of the GVN and the termination of all U.S. assistance, economic and military, to the remnants.

The President just called and asked that you not return before 11:00 p.m. tomorrow. He is due in from New York around 10:00 p.m.⁷ This would mean that you would have to delay your departure until 3:00 p.m. from Saigon or delay longer enroute.

Warm regards.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 59, Geopolitical File, Vietnam, Trips, Kissinger, Henry, 1972, October, Chronological File. Top Secret; Flash; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2. Documents 50 and 43.
3. Document 46.
4. Document 48.
5. No record of this call has been found.
6. Of Hakto 43, Document 48.
7. Nixon spent October 23 campaigning in New York state. According to the President’s Daily Diary, he returned to the White House at 11:16 p.m and met with Kissinger for a half hour beginning at 11:35 p.m. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, While House Central Files)