Office of the Historian

62. Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)1

Washington, October 23, 1972, 1531Z.

Tohak 94/WH 29641. Reference Hakto 52,2 message was conveyed to Dobrynin at 0915 this morning Washington time. He stated that he was relieved that we are talking primarily about cosmetics but remains somewhat concerned about the difficulties of the troops in the South problem and repeated several times that this was most difficult. On balance, he was in good spirits and said he understood that we could not impose a settlement. He stated he looks forward to meeting with you Tuesday afternoon.

Reference Hakto 51,3 message was transmitted upon receipt to Habib.

Reference Hakto 50,4 the President agrees that it would be appropriate for you to give press briefing which would be governed by North Vietnamese reaction. There is no doubt here that such a briefing will do much to put the entire situation in focus and to serve to reassure both parties in Vietnam. Press here is rampant with rumors of pending settlement but with comfortable split between those who indicate cease-fire is imminent before election and those who see this as impossibility. General thrust of all the press is positive with obvious consensus that much is going on and that real progress has been made. Thieu [Page 287] has not yet surfaced as culprit, primarily due to helpful posturing from Palace.

Reference paragraph 3 Hakto 50, all here agree that course outlined is best possible. President stated this morning that the two options you have outlined are excellent and consistent with his thinking. Reference paragraph 4 Hakto 50, it is obvious that President is comfortable with the time schedule you outline. He hopes the talks can continue through election so that there is no decisive action taken before that time and that we can maintain aura of progress through November 7th. Reference paragraph 5, we worked all day yesterday on turning off equipment in order to keep from appearance of major kneejerk bureaucratic reaction. We will let about ten percent of the total in, all of which was scheduled for delivery in any event. The rest has been wound down. With respect to the F–5s, we ran into major complications in Korea and have, of course, backed off. We are doing the same with respect to China and Iran who were far more cooperative to the initial approach. There has been some leakage about massive assembly of airlift and strong suspicion in press that this represented assembly of assets to extricate POWs. We have quietly denied such stories, one of which included a call to me from Warnke on behalf of McGovern at 11:00 pm last night. I told him that we were aware of no imminent action on the POWs.

Reference Hakto 49,5 message was transmitted to Guay upon receipt and Guay was alerted telephonically. He has appointment at 1500 hours today and we are awaiting confirmation that message was delivered.

Your message to customer is precisely the line I took with Dobrynin. Consequently, no inconsistencies can develop there.

Reference Hakto 48,6 President has been informed and is very pleased. He noted that Saigon Palace is playing constructive press line which suggests Thieu will not blow and may, in fact, be posturing himself for ultimate acceptance.

Warm regards.

  1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 59, Geopolitical File, Vietnam, Trips, Kissinger, Henry, 1972, October, Chronological File. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent via Lord. Kissinger was en route to Washington.↩
  2. In this backchannel message to Haig, October 23, 0527Z, Kissinger directed him to tell Dobrynin: “We will give the most solemn undertaking that the changes, most of which are purely cosmetic, will be our final changes, and are intended to save face all around. With respect to the North Vietnamese forces a de facto solution is possible. I will make a concrete proposal.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 25, HAK Trip Files, HAK Paris/Saigon Trip Hakto, October 16–23, 1972)↩
  3. Not found.↩
  4. Document 59.↩
  5. Document 60.↩
  6. See footnote 3, Document 58.↩