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  3. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973
  4. Document 61

61. Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)1

October 23, 1972, 0930Z.

Hakto 53. 1. Thank you for your Tohak 90.2 If you read Hakto 413 again you will find the following final sentence: Quote. Obviously I favor the second course, but have offered the first one for intellectual completeness. Unquote. It is hard for me to see how I could have been more explicit regarding my preference for the Soviet route.

2. For someone associated with me for four years in which no major rash action was taken to leave the President with the impression that I was even entertaining going to Hanoi in these circumstances is hard to comprehend.

3. It is true I gave no time sequence for the proposed actions. However we had always agreed that a blow-up with Thieu had to be avoided at all costs, that if I failed to bring him around I would back off till after the elections. This is made crystal clear in my Hakto 434 where I spell out the advantages of settling after the election both for public policy and for the President.

4. Anyone familiar with the President could have predicted the impact of a simultaneous proposal to go to Hanoi and to end the bombing. Given what we now have to manage I cannot believe that shaking his confidence at this juncture which is so delicate from many points of view, can be in the national interest. I admit that some of my initial judgments were hasty especially with respect to the bombing. But when have I failed to come out in a balanced way without hectoring to which I have been subjected the last few days. I suggest you ask Abrams after his return about the role I played in Saigon.

5. I cannot agree with the course outlined in Tohak 85.5 The reactions of the Southeast Asian leaders now so favorable would be catastrophic if we made a separate ceasefire.

6. All this simply to ask you to seek an opportunity to see the President before he leaves for New York to present my views in a balanced [Page 286] way. My concern is not the present situation but how to retain the moral capital without which we cannot survive the next few months.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 25, HAK Trip Files, HAK Paris/Saigon Trip Hakto, October 16–23, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Kissinger sent the message while in transit from Saigon to Washington.↩
  2. Document 57.↩
  3. Document 43.↩
  4. Document 48.↩
  5. Document 53.↩