55. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)1

Hakto 46/226. 1. After reading Tohak 84 and 852 I can only conclude that the breakdown in communications between us is so massive that I question how any discussion between us can be possible. Nothing I have proposed was to be implemented immediately. Indeed, I would not have gone nearly so far as you in telling the Soviets and Chinese of our failure to bring Thieu along. That indeed would produce the consequences you describe, though a little more slowly and as a result of their going public.

2. What I have proposed to the total incomprehension of those of my associates who have not seen me bring matters to this point was first devise a way to get us off a collision course and secondly, to throw out vague references which would give the other side an incentive to resume negotiations without precisely specifying their content.

3. I would propose to arrive at the point you describe only after a massive effort has been made to bring Thieu along and well after November 7. At no time would we make a public revelation of what has been negotiated though we must be prepared for an enemy revelation and it is precisely to forestall this that I have wished to take some action.

4. If Dobrynin has not already been approached we have lost close to 18 hours. He must be approached immediately along the lines of my previous cables, including putting blame on Hanoi for Thieu’s intransigence along the lines of Hakto 44,3 paragraph 2 but also expressing determination to proceed. Under no circumstances should we propose now the content of an alternative negotiating package. The most important thing to get accomplished is the resumption of talks between Le Duc Tho and myself.

5. With regard to bombing, what you propose in Tohak 85 is exactly what I have been proposing.

I shall leave here at 1500 Saigon time as the President requested. Bunker and I both agreed that the Presidential letter received this [Page 276] morning for Thieu is too defensive and would be a total cave-in and we are therefore not using it.4 I regret to have to spend so much of my time clearing up the misconceptions of my closest associates.

Warm regards.

  1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 59, Geopolitical File, Vietnam, Trips, Kissinger, Henry, 1972, October, Chronological File. Top Secret; Flash; Exclusively Eyes Only.
  2. Documents 50 and 53.
  3. Document 52.
  4. Backchannel message Tohak 86/WHS 2285, October 22, 2104Z, transmitted the letter from Nixon to Thieu. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 25, HAK Trip Files, HAK Paris/Saigon Trip Tohak, October 16–23, 1972 (1 of 2))