56. Backchannel Message From the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) in Saigon1
Tohak 89/WHS 2289. Despite my call to Dobrynin early this morning to stand by for an important message, he did not make himself available until 8:00 tonight. Vorontsov is out of the country, and Dobrynin insisted that since it was after working hours in Moscow, there was little value in our meeting urgently.
He did arrive in the office at 8:00 p.m., and I covered all of the talking points you outlined2 and mentioned specifically the problems associated with the expedited pace Hanoi imposed on us, their breach of faith at a critical moment, and the difficulty brought about by the unimpaired presence of the entire North Vietnamese army in the South. I told him that despite this, the President was intent on bringing the conflict to a negotiated settlement and that we considered it essential that both the United States and the Soviet Union exercise the greatest degree of restraint on both of their partners to be sure this occurred. It was especially important that Hanoi not enter into a public polemic with us as a result of this temporary setback or we might well be forced to take measures which would be inimical to all the progress that had been made thus far. At the President’s insistence, I told Dobrynin that [Page 277] Brezhnev should be assured that the President is determined to continue to make every effort to solve the problem and that the efforts we are making now will not be affected by the election in any way.
I told Dobrynin you were returning to Washington urgently tomorrow to meet with the President and that you hoped another meeting could be promptly arranged with the other side with the view toward adjusting the work schedule in the light of recent difficulties. In the meantime, we were taking certain military actions which would demonstrate our good will and serious intent. At the conclusion of the meeting, I urged Dobrynin to inform Brezhnev as soon as possible of this development and to urge him to work with us constructively on this matter as they have done in recent days. Above all, it was essential that neither of us allow the situation in Southeast Asia to affect the improving relations between the two of us which were so important to easing tensions worldwide.
Dobrynin replied that he had to state frankly that he thought we were nearing a breaking point, that Hanoi had informed them that the United States Government repeatedly made additional demands, and that for this reason, the suspicion was that we were either stalling or unable to satisfy what we had already agreed to. He stated that Brezhnev would have only [one?] question as would Hanoi, and that was whether or not this delay would be followed by a new set of requirements. He especially latched onto the problem of North Vietnamese troops in the South and wanted to know whether you would have new demands with respect to them. He said it was essential that he know whether or not the delay in the additional meeting was occasioned by a need to modify the work schedule or a need to insist on further concessions from Hanoi. I told him that the President had accepted the agreement but stated that we had difficulties in Saigon related to the speed of the work schedule, the serious complication brought about by the Hanoi leak, and as you had pointed out to him on several occasions, the difficulty that the South Vietnamese were having with the lack of assurances of any kind with respect to North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam. I stated that the President was writing a letter to Mr. Brezhnev in which I would be sure that the question he asked was clarified. However, I noted that from my perspective, the U.S. side would have no additional demands but would wish to communicate further with Hanoi so that a revised workable schedule could be adopted and to be sure that they understood the complications we were faced with. I also made it clear that if Hanoi were to enter into a period of public polemic about what is understandably a disappointing setback, both sides might be forced to undertake military actions which would be counter-productive to the goals we both sought.I pointed out that the U.S. and the President in particular were deadly serious about arriving [Page 278] at a settlement as soon as possible. He then said that it now appears that it could not be until after the election, with a twinkle in his eye that suggested he suspected this was our strategy all along. I told him that the election had absolutely no bearing on the timing of the settlement, whether it occurred before, on the day of the election or after, and that we intended to pursue the matter with the same sense of urgency we have adopted from the outset of the serious talks.
Warm regards.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 25, HAK Trip Files, HAK Paris/Saigon Trip Tohak, October 16–23, 1972 (1 of 2). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent via Lord. Written on October 22.↩
- See Document 52.↩