Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

54. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Saigon, October 22, 1972, 2050Z.

Hakto 45/225. Reference: Tohak 84.²

1. With reference to Tohak 84, I hope you are not briefing the President along those lines and that you let him read my cables.

2. Can you find one cable where I recommend an open public break with Thieu? On the contrary, all my advice has been in precisely the opposite direction; and some of your own recommendations would have put the focus on Thieu.

3. As for your characterization of the content of the agreement I would like to recall your view that it was a good agreement when we concluded it. It has since been greatly improved with respect to Cambodia, Laos, the international conference, American prisoners, South Vietnamese prisoners and the replacement provision. As for asking Thieu to give up sovereignty over his territory just what has a ceasefire always added up to? We proposed this way back in October 1970 and again in January 1972 and May 1972. What else were these plans going to lead to except precisely the situation we now have? I make these points in order to ensure that my views are being presented in the proper light to the President. They are certainly not contained in Tohak 84.

4. As for the security situation I just do not recognize your characterization that Hanoi would get an improved de facto security situation backed up by divisions from the North. As I have told you, I have met with all regional advisors, the Director of Military Intelligence etc. and the picture they present is totally different. General Minh estimates that there are 8,000 North Vietnamese in MR3. No battalion has a strength over 150. A survey this week showed exactly 2 hamlets under Vietcong control in MR3. I would have thought that to freeze the situation with a prohibition against reinforcement was as close to a military as well as a political defeat for the DRV. If another infiltration push starts we may be worse off next year. Many wars have been lost by untoward timidity. But enormous tragedies have also been produced by the inability of military people to recognize when the time for a settlement had arrived.

5. With respect to bombing restrictions, all your arguments are in the misleading context of a unilateral American move along the lines of 1968. Please put the following arguments before the President as well as the rationale I have already presented.

The argument for a bombing restriction is not soft-headedness but to salvage what can be salvaged and give us the time we need. We are dealing with an enemy who has made every concession we have demanded of him within the last two weeks, accepting our verbatim text on five major items within 24 hours. We have just sent him two Presidential messages to the effect that our essential terms had been met and we had a complete agreement.³ To maintain the position that to restrict our bombing while we renegotiate an agreement is the sort of mock toughness that if they go back to protracted warfare would destroy the whole basis of our public support.

We must institute a restriction at least at the 20th parallel—though I doubt that is enough—until I can return to talk to the President. We can of course lift the restriction if the other side digs in again but if your theory is followed we will blow whatever chance there is of North Vietnamese restraint.

6. So I count on the institution of a 20th parallel restriction which has been affirmed in a Presidential message. And I count on its being maintained at least until I return to Washington. It is not totally preposterous to suggest a process by which Hanoi does not get hit excessively for giving us the time we need at this point. Nothing in the record so far would tend to strengthen the moderates in Hanoi. Everything would tend to strengthen those who argue that every DRV concession leads to more U.S. demands and, under your theory, more escalation.

Please keep in mind what has gotten us as far as we have, and that we cannot break the framework in Moscow and Peking.

7. Again I ask that you make sure that the President reads my cables.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 59, Geopolitical File, Vietnam, Trips, Kissinger, Henry, 1972, October, Chronological File. Top Secret; Flash; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2. Document 50.
3. See Documents 30 and 51.