Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

286. Backchannel Message From the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Saigon, January 17, 1973, 1510Z.

Haigto 14/337. Deliver immediately.

Attached are two additional reports which you should read in the context of the reply to Thieu’s letter of January 17 which I just forwarded to you by separate message.² The first report summarizes the results of a meeting held just before the meeting with me. It confirms that while Thieu is making one more valiant effort with a Duc-like letter, he has already instructed his corps commanders to prepare for the ceasefire. The second enclosure contains a very detailed report of the President’s earlier meeting today with the National Security Council. You should read the entire report since Thieu adhered rather closely to it in his meeting with me tonight. In the light of both of these reports, I believe the President should hold absolutely firm in his response to Thieu while avoiding any vitriolic and emotional or threatening language. He should merely state matter of factly that he intends to proceed as outlined in the letter I carried to Thieu.

You will note in the second report that Thieu is very conscious of the President’s upcoming inauguration. I am convinced that he believes he has at least until that time for further stalling tactics recognizing that the President would not want a public blowup before that time. One complication which we must consider, however, is the fact that Thieu has committed himself to both an Assembly vote and a public referendum on the agreement. If we are to be postured for the President’s address by Tuesday night,³ we will have to force him to bite the bullet not later than Saturday.

Warm regards.

2 Attachments.

January 17, 1973.

1. During the late afternoon of 17 January President Thieu held a meeting with all the top military personnel, including General Vien, Chairman of the JGS, Lt. General Khang, Special Assistant for Operations, Lt. General Quang, Assistant to the President for Military and Security Affairs, the four military region commanders, and one or two others. The President read to the group the letter which General Haig had carried to him from President Nixon⁴ and explained to the group the significance of the various paragraphs.

2. He said that this letter must be viewed against the background of President Nixon’s political objectives and economic problems and his relations with Congress. The GVN must not do anything which would make President Nixon’s task more difficult.

3. Accordingly President Thieu announced to the commanders he has decided to go along with the cease-fire agreement despite its shortcomings and many disadvantages to the GVN. He felt this was the only responsible course which he could take and said in effect that he had no other choice in view of the pressures brought on him and in view of the continuing necessity to have a basis for continuing U.S. aid.

17 January 1973.

Subject: President Thieu’s meeting with the National Security Council, 17 January.

1. A meeting of the GVN National Security Council began shortly after 1000 hours 17 January. As first item, President Thieu announced that he had called the military region commanders to Saigon to let them know personally of his decision with respect to the cease-fire agreement and to give them various directives for implementation.

2. Vice President Huong stated his doubts about provisions for a leopard-skin cease-fire. President Thieu replied (that instead of leopard-skin) that the agreement foresaw controlled zones and areas and he had hoped that there would be provisions to define the limits of each and every unit but the protocols are not yet clear on the point.

3. Developing his argument, President Thieu stated that sooner or later the North Vietnamese troops will have to return to North Vietnam. The in-place cease-fire will permit the NLF to control a few places like Loc Ninh, Dak To, and Tan Canh, and they will be in areas of the U Minh forest, in Quang Ngai, etc. This risk must be accepted and the GVN will certainly lose those places. But by letting the NLF have those spots, the GVN can demand that the principle of the North Vietnamese troops regrouping be established and that the cease-fire in place will be with the NLF and internal solutions will be reached with the NLF. President Thieu said that it wasn’t logical to demand that the NLF regroup as well because then they could turn around and demand that the ARVN regroup. Thieu said that one had to be realistic about the situation; by letting the NLF have some spots in a leopard-skin cease-fire, a logical argument can be made that the NVA should regroup.

4. President Thieu then asked Vice President Huong for comments on President Nixon’s letter which was read to the group yesterday.⁵ Huong replied that provisions on continuing U.S. aid should be strengthened and he thought that there will be reactions among the people. Many people actually fear a cease-fire.

5. President Thieu said that there certainly will be a reaction among the people, they will be very moved and there will be a bit of trouble in their reaction. This has to be faced. The President stated he will step forward and explain the situation to the people. He said the relations about to be established with the NLF will cause especially strong reactions, but a week later things will calm down.

6. President Thieu said that he is signing the cease-fire accord strictly to ensure the continuation of American aid. The GVN must continue an attitude of watchfulness. He will not refer to this as a peace agreement because there is no peace. Peace can come only when there is no more threat from the invaders. There will only be peace when the North Vietnamese troops are out of the country and the GVN and the NLF have reconciled a political solution. Up until that time he will say that this is a temporary cease-fire which the GVN is signing as a sign of good will for peace.

7. President Thieu said that he intends to seek a vote of confidence on two levels: (a) one in the National Assembly and (b) as a popular referendum. If the people have confidence in him and if they wish to retain him as President, they will endorse his signing of the cease-fire agreement. He said that if the people understand that any other President would have had to do the same then they certainly will retain him as President. If they feel that he has betrayed the duty of the President, he will step down. But, Thieu said, he will go before the people and explain that the cease-fire agreement is not an ideal solution, but he has done his best. He will show that he had no choice and that President Nixon himself has said this. He will not hide anything from the people but he will not provoke the U.S. The important things are now to assure the continuity of U.S. aid and to preserve the GVN’s military strength.

8. President Thieu then emphasized the necessity to maintain determination and a solid morale and spirit among the people. The situation isn’t perfect but much better militarily than in October. After three months, perhaps they will be able to take back a few more hamlets.

9. In a general discussion which followed, various questions and worries were surfaced including the problems of Cambodia and Laos, where it was assumed that control will be even less effective than in South Vietnam; on the third segment of the National Reconciliation Council; the necessity of making sure that GVN police are not ham-strung by the military demobilization provisions of the cease-fire agreement and on the modalities of the signatures. President Thieu handled these questions well, seemingly doing a selling job on the whole package and mostly using General Haig’s arguments. At one point he noted with apparent approval that each of the four belligerents is getting a part but not all of what he wants. (The President has also spoken warmly of CIA support and said he had assurances that such would continue.)

10. The final phase of the meeting dealt with the tactics on how President Thieu is going to approach General Haig today. Thieu explained that while he, as the leader, had to take the decision, it was important that the members of the Council understand fully the provisions of President Nixon’s Letter. Page four, paragraph ten is where Nixon raises the stick. The second paragraph is the carrot, Thieu said, but that it wasn’t enough—it should be strengthened. It was up to President Nixon to find some way to make it stronger. He must put more in to it. We should have it speak of an absolute maximum engagement or “the most formal assurances.” The more solemn or formal the promise, the more his prestige will be engaged in the eyes of the world.”⁶ Thieu also hoped that some assurances could be included about a specific meeting between the two Presidents, somewhere in the future.

11. Thieu anticipated that the Americans will try to beg off but he felt that the points he was now raising were not difficult to grant, they are just window dressing for the Vietnamese public, but he noted that it is the decorations which make for the appearance of a table. These are points, he said, on which the Vietnamese side can be firm. Compared to the big issues, these are minor matters. What he will try to do, he said, is try to hit these points so as to “caramboler”⁷ into a couple of other points. For example, he said we won’t like these modalities of signature. The entire cease-fire accord is technically less than adequate. The protocols should be improved still further. The four nations of the International Control Commission are not really satisfactory. Even Canada, “although they haven’t opposed us, what good have they ever done, and what about these Polacks? They are here actually opposing us. What is the good of that? In sum, this International Control Commission has been useless.”

12. Presidential Press and Private Secretary Hoang Duc Nha attempted to cut off the discussion and said that there were really three main points to be discussed with General Haig. First, the signature stuff. Second, could President Nixon’s guarantees be strengthened? Third, how to set up the cease fire so as to keep it effective. President Thieu agreed with this summary and felt that there should be a explicit statement on U.S. retaliation if the cease-fire is violated. General Vien, Chairman of the Joint General Staff, emphasized this by saying that if there is a violation and the Americans do not react “then we are dead.” Nha then suggested that the President would want to be flexible in the discussion with General Haig.

13. President Thieu then outlined the course he intended to pursue with General Haig later in the day. He would start by saying that he was not a professional politician, just a soldier hoping to save his country. He would draw on the need for internal stability in South Vietnam after the cease-fire, the importance of popular morale to this stability and the importance of President Nixon’s assurances to popular morale. Then, Thieu continued, he would raise the question of can South Vietnam get something better, or not, or is this the end. “If we feel this is the end of it, then we will just talk very lightly about these matters.”

14. However, Thieu continued, he wants to see if he could get three or four more days by saying that he agrees in principle but that he needs several changes and he needs a reply to his suggestion before making a final decision. He said he would propose this but he will not force the situation. He will ask for the U.S. opinion on his demands but to force a U.S. reply would be “provocation”. He said he respects the feelings of the other participants, particularly Vice President Huong, that they needed to get more done, but if Haig’s reaction was too strongly negative, he would have to go along. He emphasized that he could not provoke the U.S. at this stage and asked the other participants to see the difficult spot he was in.

15. The discussion then turned to President Nixon’s relations with Congress. President Thieu said that Nixon could impose his will on Congress just as he, Thieu, had imposed his will on the National Assembly. However, Nixon is a minority President in the sense that the Congress is Democratic and if Nixon puts his head down and charges on Vietnam, he is finished politically. Right now Nixon is aiming his negotiations with Russia and China in preparation for electing a Republican President in 1976. This will be difficult if he were to feud with Congress for the next four years. Kennedy is sure to run in 1976 and his prospects at that time will be affected by whether Vietnam is strong politically or not at that time. So the GVN is buying time for Nixon, Nixon will have more difficulties in the next four years and will have to be more flexible than he was before. But, Thieu asked the other participants rhetorically what would be the South Vietnamese position now if McGovern had won?

16. Station comment: It appears to us that this entire session of the National Security Council was used as a vehicle by President Thieu to persuade the other members of the inevitability of his decision to go along with the cease-fire agreement. Although at times Thieu had indicated sympathy with the several arguments that the GVN was making too many concessions, he was obviously in control of the situation. We expect that President Thieu’s pressing his demands will depend on General Haig’s response. Thieu is determined not to provoke the U.S. He will pursue the demands as a ploy to see how much he can get but the real motivation is to assuage the desires of the other members of the National Security Council.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV. Top Secret; Flash; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2. Document 285.
3. January 23.
4. Document 278.
5. For a report on the January 16 NSC meeting, see Document 279.
6. The opening quotation mark is missing in the original.
7. A reference to the action in the billiard game carambole, where a player aims the cue ball at a second ball intending that it bounce into a third one.