Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

287. Minutes of a Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, January 17, 1973, 10:26–11:35 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Vietnam Planning

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • U. Alexis Johnson
  • William Porter
  • Marshall Green
• Defense
  • Kenneth Rush
  • R/Adm. Daniel P. Murphy
• JCS
  • Adm. Thomas H. Moorer
  • V/Adm. John P. Weinel
• CIA
  • Richard Helms
  • George Carver
  • William Newton
• NSC Staff
  • B/Gen. Brent Scowcroft
  • Richard T. Kennedy
  • John H. Holdridge
  • James T. Hackett

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

• —The JCS will submit its detailed minesweeping plan to Mr. Kissinger. Some action will be necessary to remove the mines and clear the channels; it will not be satisfactory to just let them deactivate. However, nothing should be done in this regard until specific instructions are issued. There should be no movement of minesweepers now. When we begin minesweeping we should not move too rapidly to complete the task.
• —State will submit its recommendations concerning the International Conference by January 19.
• —State will submit its proposals for the economic program. Nothing on this should be put before the Congress until the agreement is signed.
• —The ICCS teams should be in place within 24 hours of a ceasefire. They will have three or four days to get in place from the time of the announcement of an agreement. The Canadian and Indonesian teams should be put on a three-day alert when notified by Mr. Kissinger.
• —The number of U.S. civilian employees acting as advisors to the military branches of the South Vietnamese Government will be limited to those on duty on the date the agreement is signed. Eventually, all U.S. civilians in these categories will have to leave Vietnam.
• —U.S. troop withdrawals should be carefully measured to assure that all troops are not out before all U.S. POWs are released. Withdrawal schedule should contemplate a heavy package toward the end of the withdrawal period.
• —Military activity in Laos and Cambodia will not be stopped until we have agreements that cover those countries.
• —There will be no limitation on U.S. military activities in Thailand.
• —No steps should be taken to prepare for moving North Vietnamese POWs to the North until an agreement is signed.
• —We will provide airlift to the ICCS teams if necessary to get them to Vietnam in time for the ceasefire.
• —There will be no memoranda prepared, messages to the field issued or debriefings conducted concerning this meeting.

Mr. Kissinger: This is a meeting of principals only. Who are all the others?

Mr. Johnson: This is Ambassador Porter, the new Under Secretary of State.

Mr. Kissinger: He’s O.K., and so is Marshall Green, but why do we have so many others?

Mr. Rush: I just have Dan Murphy with me.

Mr. Kissinger: This meeting is just for our own purposes. I want no memos circulated and no messages to the field concerning anything we discuss here. I don’t want a situation like we had after the previous WSAGs, with messages going all over the place. The only purpose of this meeting is for the principals to know what they have to do and to take the necessary action. Can I be sure there won’t be any messages around the world following this meeting? There should be no actions taken except those which the principals themselves can take right here in Washington.

Mr. Johnson: Yes, you can. We understand the rules.

Mr. Kissinger: After four years you do. Now do I have to start all over again with Porter?

Mr. Porter: You don’t have to worry about me, or perhaps I shouldn’t say that until after I’ve attended some of the meetings.

Mr. Kissinger: Dick (Helms), do you want to give us the situation?

Mr. Helms read a prepared statement (copy attached).²

Mr. Kissinger: Tom (Moorer), what about the military situation?

Adm. Moorer: The South Vietnamese have initiated a number of key actions in recent days. In southern MR–1 they have made pretty good progress moving to the west. They have moved well against the NVN forces there and we have received an intercept ordering the North Vietnamese units in that area to hold at all costs. In MR–3 the highway from Saigon to Song Be is now open; it had been closed for a long time.

Mr. Helms: The highway to where?

Adm. Moorer: (pointing to map) Here, to Song Be. It’s an important roadway. We are continuing to press hard in the south with B–52s. In fact, we are conducting heavy air strikes against all suitable targets in South Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, trying to prevent them from resupplying or building up before a ceasefire.

Mr. Kissinger: Central to this effort is the objective of weakening them as much as possible in Laos and Cambodia.

Adm. Moorer: That’s right. We have been taking enemy positions on the Mekong River and there are only two left that have not yet been recaptured. We’ve been hitting hard at Thakhek (Laos), the town just across the river from NKP (Nakhon Phanom, Thailand), where we plan to establish our new headquarters. (Gen.) Johnny Vogt has really been pouring it on there; he has a special interest in that one. We have been intercepting new instructions that are going out to all enemy commands, which say that a ceasefire is about to be signed. The messages have mentioned two different dates; January 23rd and 27th.

Mr. Carver: Actually, they have mentioned several different dates in their communications, ranging from January 20th to the 27th. Of course, they did the same thing last October.

Mr. Kissinger: How much did they lose in October?

Mr. Carver: It was pretty bad for them. A lot of them thought the ceasefire was about to be signed and then had to fall back and regroup when they learned that it wasn’t. They were in disarray for some time.

Adm. Moorer: One South Vietnamese unit caught 200 of them just walking down the road, thinking a ceasefire was in effect. They killed or captured most of them.

Mr. Kissinger: That happened in October?

Adm. Moorer: That’s right.

Mr. Kissinger: Did the South Vietnamese do a good job then?

Adm. Moorer: Yes, they killed or captured a lot of them.

Mr. Helms: They’re doing much better now, though.

Adm. Moorer: The North Vietnamese are trying to move 200 tanks and a lot of equipment down from Vinh.

Mr. Kissinger: Is this their version of Enhance Plus or do they plan a new assault?

Adm. Moorer: Probably both. Last fall they started sending five regiments down and then reduced that effort. Now they are trying to move two regiments south.

Mr. Kissinger: For what purpose?

Adm. Moorer: Probably to replace losses and get in a good position before a ceasefire.

Mr. Porter: They may want to have forces in place to defend their administrative areas after a ceasefire. That possibility can’t be ignored.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s true.

Mr. Carver: I think the tanks, or at least part of them, are intended to be used to initiate a new drive if there is no ceasefire. That undoubtedly sounds good in the North, while there’s probably not much enthusiasm for the idea among the NVN forces in the South.

Mr. Johnson: Are they going to try to establish a VC provisional capital?

Mr. Carver: They probably will.

Mr. Kissinger: Where, at Dong Ha?

Mr. Carver: I don’t know, that’s a pretty lousy place for a capital. They’d like Tay Ninh, but they can’t get it. They want at least a provincial capital.

Adm. Moorer: The original group of tanks we spotted coming south was about 120 and now they have added eighty more, but they are still all in North Vietnam. None of them have yet crossed the DMZ. There is no question, though, that they are pressing hard to push everything they can into South Vietnam.

Mr. Kissinger: What is the diplomatic situation?

Mr. Johnson: In Laos, they are having meetings once a week. Actually, they are all postured for a ceasefire; the negotiating machinery between the Pathet Lao and the Lao Government is all in place and ready to go into effect as soon as there is an agreement. Of course, there is nothing like that in Cambodia, although there have been some sporadic contacts between the Cambodian Government and the Khmer Rouge. Marshall (Green), do you have anything to add?

Mr. Green: I would only add the observation that the Cambodians have a great propensity to compromise.

Mr. Kissinger: We have a pretty good idea what will develop in Laos, but not in Cambodia.

Mr. Johnson: Cambodia is a pretty messy situation. Some of these Khmer Rouge are not associated with the North Vietnamese and we don’t know what they’ll do.

Adm. Moorer: The Khmer Rouge have been active near Odong. They have been attacking the road there, but without any apparent contact with the North Vietnamese.

Mr. Johnson: One question I would like to raise is when and how should we try to arrange for the Indians to begin re-participating in the ICC?

Mr. Kissinger: We can pursue that when the situation on the agreement is more definite after the resumption of talks in Paris. What about the Canadians?

Mr. Johnson: The Canadians were in yesterday and gave (William) Sullivan a list of things they want in order to participate.

Mr. Kissinger: What do they want, the text of the negotiating sessions?

Mr. Johnson: Sure.

Mr. Kissinger: We can give them the protocols when they are announced publicly, but not a day before.

Mr. Johnson: Of course, they are already involved with the ICC in Laos and I don’t think there is any question they will continue there, but the Canadians have not yet made a decision on their participation in the ICCS in Vietnam. Before they make that decision they want certain things. So we should decide whether we want them on board and if so, what we can give them to get them there. We had thought about the Dutch as a substitute, but now I understand there is some sentiment against them over here. A better possibility now seems to be the Norwegians.

Mr. Kissinger: Not the Norwegians! Sullivan told me they are not believable friends. I take the State Department at its word on these matters.

Mr. Johnson: No, you’re thinking of the Swedes.

Mr. Kissinger: Speaking of the Swedes, do you know that Palme asked for an appointment with me when I was in Paris?

Mr. Johnson: The Norwegians have been friendly and offered to help. In a New Year’s statement, the Norwegian Prime Minister offered to participate in the commission.

Mr. Kissinger: Well, why not drop the Canadians if they can’t make up their minds?

Mr. Johnson: Because they’re good. The Canadian military, who will have to carry out the mission, are very enthusiastic about it. The only problem is the political one. Besides, the Norwegians know what the Canadians have asked for and if we were to switch to them, they would ask for the same things. What is the timing for getting the ICCS members in place?

Mr. Kissinger: We want something in place within twenty-four hours of a ceasefire. The Canadians were on a three day alert but are now on a seven day alert. At the proper point I want to get them back on a three-day alert. There will be at least three days between the announcement and the signing. Once they are on a three-day alert, we will be able to give them at least three days to get in place.

Mr. Johnson: The Canadians already have people there, on the ICC, but the Indonesians don’t.

Mr. Kissinger: We can give them four days to get there. Is that acceptable?

Mr. Johnson: We can live with that. When we get an agreement, we can put the Canadians in a position in which they will be obstructing peace if they don’t get out there in three or four days.

Mr. Kissinger: We’ll have to get them into Laos and Cambodia, too. I’ll work on some of those restrictions. So you think it’s manageable?

Mr. Johnson: With regard to the Canadians? Oh, yes, I do.

Mr. Green: They will come in at the beginning without much problem, but if things start to go wrong, they may want out.

Mr. Kissinger: Why are the Canadians better than the Norwegians?

Mr. Johnson: For a lot of reasons. They are already there, they have experience in the area, they have been doing this sort of thing for a long time, in the Middle East and elsewhere, and they are very good at it. It has been the main function of the Canadian armed forces in recent years and they are raring to go.

Mr. Helms: There’s no doubt about it, they’ll be good once they get started.

Adm. Moorer: The Canadian commander, General Dexter,³ is real good. He lost a son in Vietnam, serving there with the U.S. Marines. He’s anxious to get going.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Adm. Murphy) What about the POWs? Are you ready to bring them out?

Adm. Murphy: Yes, sir, we’re all set to go.

Mr. Johnson: Will it be necessary for us to airlift the North Vietnamese POWs from South to North Vietnam?

Mr. Kissinger: We can worry about that after the agreement is reached. We should take no action now, until everything is settled.

Mr. Johnson: I was asked about this by Defense. They are concerned about taking out all of our resources and then having a requirement they can’t meet. It will be up to them to provide transport.

Adm. Moorer: South Vietnam has pretty good airlift capability.

Mr. Kissinger: There will probably be a quota of U.S. prisoner releases every two weeks.

Adm. Murphy: What was that?

Mr. Kissinger: They will set a quota of POWs to come out every two weeks.

Adm. Moorer: I don’t want to remove the mines too fast. I assume they will be tied to the release of POWs.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s right. You should show plenty of activity, but be sure not to get all the mines out before the POWs. They want a terminal date for the removal of all the mines but we have not given any.

Adm. Moorer: We can’t set a date.

Mr. Kissinger: We’ll have to give them a date eventually, but it doesn’t have to be within two months. Your expert told me the best way to deactivate the mines is to do nothing, just let them deactivate themselves. Is that true?

Adm. Moorer: Yes, it is.

Mr. Kissinger: But we can’t do it that way. If we tell them we are going to remove the mines, we have to do something. We can’t just sit and show no activity. I’m sure the North Vietnamese don’t know a thing about mines. We will have to show some kind of effort.

Adm. Moorer: Oh, we can do that. We will have to clear the main channel at Haiphong, in any case. Actually, we’ll have to clear all the channels. We can show plenty of activity and take our time at it. We have three minesweepers standing by at Pearl Harbor. Can we start moving them to Vietnam?

Mr. Kissinger: No, don’t do a thing with them yet.

Adm. Murphy: Actually, we have five minesweepers out there now and can show some motion right away, as soon as you give the word. The three in Hawaii will take some time to get there.

Adm. Moorer: Even after all the mines are out, they will have to dredge Haiphong Channel before they can use it. That’s the main problem in this exercise, clearing the channel and then dredging it, and we sank their dredge.

Mr. Kissinger: Isn’t it possible some of these mines may go off when they start dredging?

Adm. Moorer: Sure, if the dredge bites into them, they’ll go off.

Mr. Johnson: Then what will they do?

Adm. Moorer: Well, they’ll have to get another dredge. I worked on the minesweeping of the Sea of Japan after World War II. It took us a year to sweep the Sea of Japan and twenty six ships were sunk by mines after the ceasefire.

Mr. Johnson: Now he tells us!

Mr. Kissinger: I notice that the Chairman, who is usually very sedate, lights up when we start talking about mines. Do you have a plan for specific actions in this minesweeping?

Adm. Moorer: Oh, yes, we have a detailed plan.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we see it over here?

Adm. Moorer: Sure, I’ll send it over.

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t want to just tell them the mines are deactivated.

Adm. Moorer: No, we have to clear all the channels.

Mr. Kissinger: Now, regarding civilian employees, can we keep quiet about them?

Adm. Murphy: Yes, sir.

Mr. Kissinger: As the result of all our leaking, now we can’t increase the number of civilian employees.

Mr. Carver: What is the limit, duty strength as of the date of the signing the agreement?

Mr. Kissinger: That’s right. We can’t increase the number of civilian employees working for the military branches of the government. There is one escape clause we can explore; the possibility of moving some activities from military to civilian branches.

Adm. Murphy: Like communications.

Mr. Kissinger: That’s right.

Mr. Johnson: If we are going to have civilians working for non-military agencies, we will need an increase in AID employees.

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, but I don’t want anyone to start working on it now. If you start working on this, the word will leak out and then we’ll have new problems. I don’t want you to work on anything until after we get an agreement.

Mr. Johnson: You’re right, we can’t keep this sort of thing secure.

Mr. Kissinger: I should make clear that I am talking about Vietnam military and civilian branches, not U.S.

Mr. Carver: We have about 250 people in communications intelligence functions that we have to take care of. I am getting together with NSA and DIA this afternoon to see what we can work out.

Mr. Kissinger: There is no problem concerning AID or USIA, only civilians working for military branches.

Mr. Johnson: We do have a problem with the AID public safety people.

Mr. Kissinger: You’re right, they will have to go. We have no limit on intelligence personnel, per se.

Mr. Carver: I don’t understand exactly what you mean.

Adm. Murphy: Neither do I.

Mr. Kissinger: What is there to understand? There can be no U.S. civilians working for military branches of the South Vietnamese Government.

Mr. Carver: In other words, there is no problem for American civilians so long as they are not in a direct advisory role to the Vietnamese Government?

Mr. Kissinger: That’s right. Does that give you a problem?

Mr. Carver: We have 250 U.S./DOD civilians now out there. Can they legally be in place after the smoke clears?

Mr. Kissinger: Yes, they don’t have to go in sixty days, but they will have to go eventually.

Adm. Murphy: We have 900 others in the same situation.

Mr. Carver: Not really, some of the 250 are included in the 900.

Mr. Kissinger: The limitation is in the form of a ceiling effective as of the date the ceasefire is signed. We don’t have to cut below the ceiling, but after the signing we can’t increase above it.

Adm. Murphy: Shall we determine the number of slots we want before the ceasefire?

Mr. Kissinger: You won’t be able to fill a vacant slot after the ceasefire, but you certainly should establish the number you want in advance. On the troop withdrawal plans, we don’t want to set a world record on withdrawals. There may be a limit of one quarter every two weeks, but on every withdrawal date we have set in the past DOD has been proud of beating the deadline. Let’s not get them all out so fast. I’d prefer to hold most of them until the end, if we can. I’d like to see a heavy package toward the end of the withdrawal period.

Mr. Carver: Will the release of POWs be tied to the rate of withdrawals?

Mr. Kissinger: Not to the rate of withdrawals, just to the totals. Alex (Johnson), regarding the economic package, we want to consider it in the postwar situation and not get too far ahead on it before these other matters are settled. They have made clear that they prefer bilateral to multilateral aid, and they don’t want the World Bank involved.

Mr. Johnson: Do you think they’d be interested in the Asian Development Bank?

Mr. Kissinger: I have never had a detailed discussion with them on this, but they did make clear their preference for bilateral assistance and their strong opposition to the World Bank. I want to talk with Marshall Green about this.

Mr. Johnson: We will have to bring in OMB and Treasury at some suitable time.

Mr. Kissinger: I’ve talked briefly with Treasury just to let them know about it.

Mr. Green: We will have to go to Congress for the funds.

Mr. Kissinger: I prefer to put nothing before Congress until the agreement is signed.

Mr. Kennedy: We have thought of sending up a completely separate bill on this.

Mr. Green: That may be a good idea, but we have to decide here how to handle it.

Mr. Kissinger: Have you done anything on it yet?

Mr. Green: Oh, yes, we have prepared a draft paper.

Mr. Kissinger: Can we see that?

Mr. Green: Surely, I’ll get it to you tomorrow.

Mr. Kissinger: I would like to see you (Mr. Green), Bill (Porter) and Alex (Johnson) about this. What do you think the International Conference should do?

Mr. Johnson: I have a paper on that right here.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Porter) You see how Alex treats us? He sits here for an hour listening to us talk and then pulls out a paper with all the answers. I hope you treat us better.

Mr. Johnson: Don’t worry, I’ve already briefed him thoroughly.

Mr. Kissinger: Laos should be visibly settled by the time the conference is convened, but Cambodia may be in a messy state. The situation in Cambodia could be anywhere from the worst to the best. Can we use this conference to bring about peace in Laos and Cambodia? The agreement leaves room for this; it reads in part that the conference is “to bring about peace in Indochina.”

Mr. Johnson: Yes, I think so.

Mr. Kissinger: We need some answers to basic questions concerning the conference. What should the agenda be? How long should it last? What do we want out of it? Can you get me something on that by Friday (January 19)?

Mr. Johnson: Yes.

Adm. Moorer: I have several questions I would like to ask.

Mr. Kissinger: Go ahead.

Adm. Moorer: Can U.S. contractors deal directly with South Vietnamese officials?

Mr. Kissinger: I think so. DOD will have to get their people out of there over a period of time.

Adm. Murphy: We will have to teach the South Vietnamese to monitor the programs. It will take some time.

Mr. Kissinger: You have no problem for at least a year.

Adm. Moorer: Will we have to stop military activity in Laos and Cambodia?

Mr. Kissinger: No, not until we have an agreement in Laos. The situation in Cambodia is much fuzzier. We’ll have to see how that develops.

Adm. Moorer: Will there be any limits on our military activity in Thailand?

Mr. Kissinger: No.

Adm. Moorer: What about overflights?

Mr. Kissinger: We discussed that at an earlier WSAG.⁴

Adm. Moorer: I just want to know if there is any change.

Mr. Kissinger: No, the policy we stated then still stands.

Adm. Moorer: Will we be able to inspect crash sites in North Vietnam?

Mr. Kissinger: Theoretically yes, in North Vietnam. That is in the agreement and has not been changed.

Adm. Moorer: The joint military commission will be a sixty day exercise?

Mr. Kissinger: That’s right.

Adm. Moorer: How many men will be needed for it?

Mr. Kissinger: Under the present plan, about 800.

Adm. Moorer: Where will the International Conference be held?

Mr. Kissinger: I don’t know, except that it won’t be held in Paris under any circumstances. What do you think about that, Bill (Porter)?

Mr. Porter: I agree. Pompidou brought it on himself.

Adm. Moorer: What will be the lowest level of jurisdiction in which the ICCS teams will operate?

Mr. Kissinger: We have had a lot of discussion about that. They want teams in every provincial capital, but we want them where the troops are. What’s the point of having them sit around the capitals? Your general wants them where the communications are best, but I don’t care about communications. Let’s equip them with their own radios. We need them where the troop concentrations are located. They gave us a list of places they wanted the teams that we didn’t like, so Sullivan and (George) Aldrich came up with something so crooked it surprised even me. They simply invented some new places that don’t even exist and said that’s where we want the teams. Concerning the frontiers, we told them we wanted teams at ten border posts and four crossing points. The next day they told us that was O.K. with them and we could even designate the border posts. All they wanted to do was designate the border crossing points. That was pretty clever, because what’s the point in watching crossing points where no one is crossing, while all their troops and equipment come across somewhere else. But that’s all settled now.

Adm. Moorer: Have you agreed on the size of the ICCS?

Mr. Kissinger: That’s essentially settled.

Adm. Moorer: About 2,000?

Mr. Kissinger: No, it will be about 1,200, but I don’t want to read that in the paper.

Mr. Johnson: The ICCS teams will need some organic support.

Mr. Kissinger: We can get into that when the protocols are finished.

Mr. Johnson: Can we provide support for that many on short notice?

Adm. Murphy: We can accommodate 400 right away. Any more than that will be tough initially.

Mr. Kennedy: Would we offer airlift to get the ICCS teams there?

Mr. Johnson: You mean to bring them from their own countries?

Mr. Kennedy: Yes, if we want to get them there in three or four days.

Mr. Johnson: Sure, if it is necessary we can do it. The Indonesians have C–130s, though.

Mr. Green: The Canadians would like to fly over on our planes going in to bring out our troops, assuming that they are going over empty.

Mr. Kissinger: Can I be sure that there will be no memos, no debriefing and no leaking about this meeting? We paid an enormous price for the leaks the last time.

Mr. Johnson: You can be sure we’ll send nothing to Saigon. That’s where I get my news, from Saigon and CBS.

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 80, National Security Council, Washington Special Actions Group, June 1972–Mar. 1973. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule this meeting took place on January 17. The original is mistakenly dated January 16. (Ibid., Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976)
2. Helms’s briefing, “The Situation in Indochina,” January 17, is attached but not printed.
3. General Jacques A. Dextraze, Chief of Defence Staff, Canadian Armed Forces.
4. See Document 109.