278. Letter From President Nixon to South Vietnamese President Thieu1
As Ambassador Bunker has already told you, Dr. Kissinger and Special Advisor Le Duc Tho have completed the text of the Agreement in Paris. They have also settled all the principles of the protocols which will help to implement the Agreement. By the time this letter reaches you no doubt these texts will be completed also. I have personally approved at every stage and in final form each provision of the Agreement and the protocols. I am sending you this letter with General Haig, our new Vice Chief of Staff of the Army, in order to present our position and make possible the continuation of our close cooperation.
Let me now sum up my final views very frankly.
I have respected you for defending the interests of your country with skill and determination. Certainly the question of national survival is your most solemn obligation. However the most essential element for the security of South Vietnam, in addition to the courageous efforts of your own people, is the maintenance of unity between the United States and the Republic of Vietnam and with it our continued economic and military assistance. All the actions I have undertaken in recent months have been guided by this consideration of preserving for your country the support which is essential for our mutual objectives. Your Ambassador to Washington, as well as Messrs. Tran Van Do and Bui Diem, must have told you that the only alternative to the pursuit of the course I have followed is the cutting off by the U.S. Congress of all future support to the Republic of Vietnam.
[Page 1005]I am proceeding now with all the more assurance because I believe that the three months’ period produced in part by your policy, together with our strenuous negotiating efforts, have resulted in major improvements in the Agreement as well as the drafting of satisfactory protocols to implement it. Specifically, the following are some of the major improvements that I think we have gained in the Agreement since October, without granting significant concessions in return.
With respect to the issues of the sovereignty of your country and the illegitimacy of North Vietnamese troop presence, the Agreement now:
- —stipulates that North Vietnam shall respect the demilitarized zone.
- —refers to the final Declaration of the 1954 Geneva Conference in describing the military demarcation line.
- —obligates the parties not to use Laos and Cambodia to encroach on the sovereignty and security of one another.
- —contains no reference to “three” Indochinese countries.
- —specifies that demobilization of the armed forces in South Vietnam shall occur “as soon as possible.”
With respect to the political implications of the Agreement:
- —The phrase “administrative structure”, formerly used to describe the National Council, has been deleted.
- —The role of the National Council has been further diluted by eliminating its functions of helping to maintain the ceasefire and preserve the peace. The limited nature of the Council’s role is further underscored by the ICCS protocol where the Council is mentioned only with respect to elections.
- —The title of the PRG has been deleted entirely from the document, while your Government is specifically cited in the Agreement.
- —The new signing procedure and ceremony will serve to maintain your constant stand with respect to the status of the PRG.
With respect to security provisions:
- —The parties are now explicitly obligated to respect the Geneva Agreements on Laos and Cambodia.
- —The interval between the Vietnam ceasefire and the Laos ceasefire has been shortened to not more than 15 days.
- —The definition of permitted equipment under the military replacement provision has been significantly expanded to include equipment which has been “destroyed” and “used up”.
- —We have virtually completed the protocols which will bring into effect meaningful control machinery, including provisions for disagreed [Page 1006] reports and international inspection posts along the DMZ, to help police the ceasefire.
This listing is by no means exhaustive, as there are many other changes since the October draft which have improved both the substance and tone of the Agreement. In addition to the improvement of the Agreement, these past months have served to strengthen your position in preparation for a ceasefire. The Communist military plans have been disrupted. We have provided you with over $1 billion in military equipment, accelerating the completion of Vietnamization and increasing the base for replacement aid. And your Government has further solidified its popular support and made preparations for the coming political competition.
Having achieved all of this, however, it is clear that any further delay would be totally counterproductive and have disastrous consequences for us all. We have vigorously presented your positions in Paris and achieved the best obtainable settlement. More crucial now than any particular provisions is the requirement for our two countries to implement this Agreement in unity and with self-confidence.
I have therefore irrevocably decided to proceed to initial the Agreement on January 23, 1973 and to sign it on January 27, 1973 in Paris. I will do so, if necessary, alone. In that case I shall have to explain publicly that your Government obstructs peace. The result will be an inevitable and immediate termination of U.S. economic and military assistance which cannot be forestalled by a change of personnel in your government. I hope, however, that after all our two countries have shared and suffered together in conflict, we will stay together to preserve peace and reap its benefits.
To this end I want to repeat to you the assurances that I have already conveyed. At the time of signing the Agreement I will make emphatically clear that the United States recognizes your Government as the only legal government of South Vietnam; that we do not recognize the right of any foreign troops to be present on South Vietnamese territory; and that we will react strongly in the event the Agreement is violated. Finally, I want to emphasize my continued commitment to the freedom and progress of the Republic of Vietnam. It is my firm intention to continue full economic and military aid.
It is in this spirit that I ask that we join together in peace as we have in war. Let us now consecrate our sacrifices by uniting for a peace with honor.
I would like to invite Foreign Minister Lam to meet with me in Washington on January 24, 1973, the day after the Agreement is initialed, on his way to Paris for the signing ceremony. I look forward, as [Page 1007] well, to the continued friendship and unity of our two peoples and countries.
Sincerely,
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV. No classification marking. Haig was to personally hand the letter to Thieu when the two met in Saigon on January 16.↩
- Printed from a copy that indicates that Nixon signed the original.↩