Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume IX, Vietnam, October 1972–January 1973

285. Backchannel Message From the Vice Chief of Staff of the Army (Haig) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Saigon, January 17, 1973, 1435Z.

Haigto 13/336. Deliver immediately upon receipt.

I have just finished one hour meeting with Thieu.² He was emotional and extremely despondent. He explained that he felt this was the most serious period he had faced in his six years as President and handed me a sealed reply to the President’s letter of January 14.³ He noted that I would probably open it but when I asked him if I could do so he suggested that I wait until later. He then went through his lengthy exposition to the effect that the agreement would be viewed by the people of South Vietnam as a defeat but constantly repeated the theme that nevertheless he understood he had to maintain U.S. support. Upon reading the letter after the meeting, it is quite evident that Thieu was trying to soften in conversation what was brittle and uncompromising in writing. I am convinced, based on our intelligence readouts of his meetings earlier today,⁴ that Thieu believes that he can afford one more stalling round in an effort to either get further improvements in the agreement or as a minimum to buy more time. We know from his discussion with the NSC today that this was his strategy. We also know that he told the NSC that if the U.S. remains firm he will collapse. In order to underline the seriousness with which I personally viewed the letter, I called Nha after the meeting and told him that I was extremely concerned with the contents of President Thieu’s letter and wanted to express this concern before dispatching it electrically to Washington. I pointed out that the letter would have grave consequences for our future relationships and Nha cryptically replied that President Thieu wished the letter sent on to President Nixon.

I now recommend the following. A prompt, unemotional but nevertheless steely, matter of fact response which cites the President’s letter of January 14 that clearly points out that we can accept no more changes. The letter should state that the President outlines in the letter of January 14 the consequences of Thieu’s failure to join him and the sequence he intends to follow. Finally, the letter should inform Thieu that because of the gravity of the situation and its consequences for the future security of both of our countries the President has instructed General Haig to return to Saigon Saturday morning following his visits to Cambodia, Laos and Thailand, at which time President Nixon hopes that President Thieu will have had an opportunity to reconsider the situation and agree to join with us in signing the current draft.

Recommend response to the attached letter be forwarded as soon as possible to Ambassador Bunker for immediate delivery to President Thieu. Both Bunker and I are confident that Thieu will come along since just prior to meeting with me this evening he, in fact, told his corps commanders that he intended to do so. This last effort is consistent with the strategy he outlined for his NSC today in which he indicated that he would try to get further improvements or at least a delay of three or four more days but that rather than provoke the United States he would ultimately agree to adhere to the schedule and the agreement if this was the only alternative to a termination of U.S. support.

Warm regards.

Attachment

January 17, 1973

Dear Mr. President,

General Haig transmitted to me yesterday your letter dated January 14, and gave to me in further details the U.S. position with regard to the problem of peace settlement in Viet-Nam.

I have weighed with utmost care the various considerations raised in your letter and in General Haig’s explanations. I must say however that, in its present form, the draft agreement has not resolved the basic vital issues for the RVN, which I presented to you in my letters of December 20 and January 7, namely the continued presence of the NVA in SVN after the ceasefire, and the pretentions of the Communists to establish a government parallel to the GVN in SVN.

On the other hand, the Communists try to introduce in the protocols many crucial points of substance, especially with the notion of Communist “areas of control”, and their pretentions to have a police force in SVN, which of course is an attribute of a government. Furthermore, they attempt to paralyze the police force of the GVN which has to remain unhindered in its responsibility to maintain law and order after the cease-fire.

Since this is a matter of life and death for the RVN, I must point out to you that the draft agreement, in its present form, does not materialize any substantial progress. On the contrary, it contains many serious setbacks in comparison with previous texts.

With regard to the issues of the sovereignty of the RVN and the illegitimacy of the NVA presence, the agreement now:

• —Stipulates that the DMZ is not a political or territorial boundary between NVN and SVN. Thus, it will be used by Hanoi to corroborate its thesis that it has the right to be in SVN.
• —The reference to the final declaration of the 1954 Geneva Agreement is not an advantage to our side, because it contains many provisions which South Viet Nam did not approve at the Geneva Conference. Besides, the declaration has no legal force, as it did not bear the signatures of the participants to the conference.

On the other hand, the present draft agreement has left out the reference to the obligations by the parties to “respect each other’s territory in accordance with Article 24 of the Geneva Agreement”. This is very detrimental to us, because it is crucial for the preservation of the RVN pending the reunification of Viet Nam by peaceful means.

• —Concerning the demobilization, the text now leaves out the words “one to one basis” and “return to their native places”. This formula at least would have helped to solve indirectly the problem of the NVA in SVN within a certain time frame.
• —With regard to the political provisions of the agreement the text leaves out the very important member of phrase “equally appointed by the two South Vietnamese parties” which follows the words “three equal segments” describing the composition of the CNCR.

Besides, the Vietnamese text still contains many words which imply that the CNCR is a supergovernment after the cease-fire, for instance the word “don-doc”, which means “supervise”, in relation to its relation with the two South Vietnamese parties. In contrast, in the article on the CNCR, the English text uses only the word “promote”, which differs greatly from the Vietnamese text. There are also many discrepancies between the English and the Vietnamese texts which need to be ironed out.

• —The name of the GVN is not yet specifically mentioned in the document, while the word “equality” is still maintained in Article 13, regarding the two South Vietnamese parties.
• —In another respect, the question has not yet been resolved as to the capacity and the name under which the NLF would participate in the international conference which is to follow the cease-fire. The GVN, of course, cannot participate in an international conference in which the NLF claims to participate as also a “government” in SVN, because this will imply our acceptance of the coexistence of two parallel governments in SVN.

On the question of the control machinery, I consider that the ICCS should be also stationed in NVN, not only for the return of the POW’s, but also to control the implementation of Article 15 (d), which prohibits the presence of foreign bases, foreign troops and military personnel not only in SVN but also in NVN.

In SVN, as long as NVN refuses to acknowledge the presence of the NVA and the principle of the NVA withdrawal, I do not see how Hanoi’s participation could be justified in the “four-party joint commission”, the responsibility of which regards only the implementation of the agreement in SVN.

In short, Mr. President, there are many important problems which are not yet solved satisfactorily.

Even though the Communist aggressors stubbornly refuse to accept openly our basic principles, I believe that the modalities of application of the agreement should reflect these basic principles. In all frankness, I must say that they do not yet reflect these principles at this time.

For this reason, I am sending today to Paris General Vinh Loc who is the head of our task force on the cease-fire, to work closely with the U.S. experts in dealing with the problems raised by the protocols.

As for the text of the agreement, I think that it is indispensable that further efforts be made in the negotiations with Hanoi, if possible with the direct participation of the GVN in this final stage of the negotiations.

Among the many points disadvantageous to us which I mentioned briefly above, I think that at least the following points must be consecrated in the agreement, as the barest minimum:

1. In the text of the agreement, with regard to demobilization, the wordings “one to one base”, and “return to their native places” must be restored.

Otherwise, an additional clause is necessary whereby the NVA should be regrouped for repatriation to NVN in a schedule parallel with the implementation of the political provisions.

2. Concerning the DMZ, the words “respect of each other’s territory in accordance with Article 24 of the 1954 Geneva Agreement” must be restored. The word “permanent” has to be added to the words “political and territorial boundary”.

3. In the protocols, the notion of a zone under the “control” of the Communist authorities, as well as the idea of a police force of the other side in SVN, are to be emphatically discarded, because they embody the Communist scheme to have a parallel government in SVN.
On the other hand, we absolutely cannot accept that the police force of the GVN would be hampered, after the cease-fire, in its responsibility to maintain law and order.

4. Concerning the procedure for the signing of the agreement and the protocols, we cannot accept the idea of a text in which the NLF is mentioned as “PRG”, to be signed between the USG and the DRVG “with the concurrence of” or “in concert with” the GVN and the “PRG”.

In our view, there should be only a unique document to be signed by two sides, with the mention of “the parties participating in the Paris conference” in the preamble.

I am deeply grateful for your assurance of support after the cease-fire. However, since both our governments will be bound by the agreement, I am still strongly convinced that the agreement should be based on sound principles which would permit the survival of the RVN in freedom.

The declarations you intend to make at the time of the signing of the cease-fire to reaffirm your support of the GVN viewpoints are valued very highly. Hopefully these declarations will be made in greater details and in strong terms. At a summit meeting between you and me following the cease-fire, which you had suggested to me, these declarations are to be reconfirmed more emphatically to cope with the grave concerns in SVN at the various clauses in the cease-fire agreement.

I look forward to your sympathetic response to these statements of our position, for a united stand of our two governments towards peace in freedom.

Sincerely,

Thieu

His Excellency Richard M. Nixon

President of the United States of America

1. Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box TS 45, Geopolitical File, Vietnam, Chronological File, 1969–75. Top Secret; Flash; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2. In backchannel message Haigto 12/335 from Saigon, January 17, 1140Z, written shortly before the meeting with Thieu, Haig informed Kissinger that while he expected Thieu to push for further delay in signing the agreement pending additional modifications and assurances from Nixon, “I do not intend to tolerate any equivocation or procrastination on time or additional changes. On additional assurances, I will use the Vice President’s visit as I had originally planned as a pot sweetener, during which I will tell Thieu the Vice President will make reassuring noises about U.S. recognition of the GVN and its sovereignty. I will also, if pushed, agree to a Presidential meeting after the 1st of March in the United States.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 860, For the President’s Files (Winston Lord)—China Trip/Vietnam, Sensitive Camp David, Vol. XXIV)
3. The sealed reply from Thieu to Nixon is attached below. The January 14 letter is Document 278. In backchannel message Tohaig 34/WHS 3038, January 16, 2242Z, Kissinger warned Haig that Thieu might offer to accept and abide by the agreement but not sign it, and that this would be unacceptable. Kissinger wrote: “The other side will never buy this, and it could wreck everything.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1020, Alexander M. Haig Special File, Gen. Haig’s Vietnam Trip, Tohaig 1–105, January 14–21, 1973 [2 of 2])
4. See Document 286.