Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

252. Memorandum for the President’s File¹

San Clemente, August 24, 1971, 10:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

• The President’s Meeting with Amb. William J. Porter, New U.S. Chief Delegate to Paris Peace Talks

OTHER PARTICIPANTS

• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

The President met with Ambassador Porter for a discussion of the issues in the Paris negotiations, where the Ambassador was about to take up his post as head of the U.S. delegation.

After welcoming the Ambassador to San Clemente, the President warned the Ambassador to watch the French food when he got to Paris. “My wife watches it for me,” Ambassador Porter replied.

The President then began by saying that the course of the negotiations rested on the private contacts that Dr. Kissinger had told the Ambassador about.² These gave us some hope for the future. Under no circumstances, however, should Ambassador Porter discuss these private contacts with anybody in the Department. The Department was just rambling along about the Vietnamese elections.

What could we say about the Vietnamese elections, the President then asked. The Ambassador called recent developments in Saigon unfortunate, and said that we were watching things. The President agreed. These developments were unfortunate not so much because of the facts of what was really happening, but because of their public impact. The Ambassador recommended we take the position that the South Vietnamese were running things themselves and that this was a South Vietnamese internal matter. The strategy of the North Vietnamese, Dr. Kissinger noted, was to try to get us to do what they could not accomplish themselves, namely, overthrow the South Vietnamese Government.

The President stressed that we could not throw up our hands now. He asked Ambassador Porter what the impact would be in Asia if the U.S. suddenly did that. The whole structure of stability in Asia would be irreparably damaged, Ambassador Porter replied. We would lose the respect of Asia, including that of the very people we were trying to reach, like the Chinese and North Vietnamese. The Koreans were an interesting people, he added. Here we had two irreconcilable peoples (the North and South Koreans), and they were now talking to each other. The same thing could happen in Vietnam.

The President asked how Thieu’s uncontested election would affect the situation. Wouldn’t the other side strengthen its demand to overthrow Thieu? Ambassador Porter noted that both Cabot Lodge and he had been able to stop coups. When Thieu first came in he was thought to be able to last only six weeks. The Ambassador sensed a big change in the comportment of the South Vietnamese now, and a real prospect that they would work out a solution.

As the conversation ended, the President wished Ambassador Porter the best success in the forthcoming negotiations. “I hope you will give the press something to write about,” he said.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, MemCon between President and Amb. William J. Porter Re: Paris Peace Talks, Aug. 24, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the President’s office in the Western White House. According to Nixon’s Daily Diary, it ended at 11:28 a.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)
2. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, he had a breakfast meeting with Porter, August 24, from 8:35 to 9:25 a.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No further record of the meeting has been found.