253. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1

SUBJECT

  • Thieu’s Speech

Background

In a nationwide radio and TV address delivered September 2,2 President Nguyen Van Thieu affirmed his intention to go forward unopposed with the scheduled October 3 presidential elections.

Thieu said he would consider the October 3 balloting as an expression of confidence or non-confidence in his leadership and policies and that if the results did not “clearly show” that his compatriots had confidence in him, he would “voluntarily not accept” to continue a new 4-year term and would definitely not accept election for another term.

Thieu also said that if entrusted with another 4-year term, he would devote all his “intellect, heart and efforts to restoring peace to the country” and, during the coming 4-year term, after restoring peace, he asked nothing more than to return to civilian life and let his countrymen elect a new leader.

Some Ambiguities

Thieu’s speech leaves ambiguous some important details, particularly with respect to voting mechanics. It is not clear precisely how voters will be able to voice a vote of non-confidence. At the moment only Thieu’s slate will appear on the ballot. Will voters be offered a choice of casting a “no” ballot or will they register their negative vote by simply not going to the polls? It is also not clear from the speech [Page 891] how large the mandate will have to be before Thieu considers it an expression of “clear confidence” by the people.

There seems little doubt that Thieu will be compelled to clarify these points in the coming days in response to pressures and queries from his own body politic.

Withdrawal of Ky and Minh a Matter of Will

Among other important points, Thieu:

  • —Gave a detailed chronology of election developments from August 7 to date, characterizing the withdrawal of Minh and Ky as a matter of individual freedom “completely subject to their will and their own situation, as well as their political calculations.”
  • —Forcefully (and for the first time personally) denounced allegations that he had intended to manipulate the elections, calling attention to the honesty of the 1970 Senate elections and the fact that in Sunday’s Lower House elections a number of victorious candidates had earlier said those elections would be fraudulent.
  • —Rejected Vice President Ky’s proposal that he resign so that new elections could be organized, stating this would be an irresponsible and unconstitutional act which could only create a political void beneficial to the Communists. Thieu said such a step would be the first move towards establishing a coalition government, writing another constitution and setting up a pro-Communist government which would gradually proceed to “engulfing all the South without resorting to bloodshed.”

Reaction from Saigon

It is too early to assess the impact of Thieu’s speech in South Vietnam. Vice-President Ky is already reported to have met with an assortment of oppositionist politicians at his home yesterday and is also known to be casting about for support from within the military. For the moment, however, Thieu appears to be in control of the situation and we cannot tell how strongly opposition might crystalize against his decision to go through with an uncontested election.3

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 153, Vietnam Country Files, Viet Sept 71. Secret. Sent for information. Printed from an unsigned copy and there is no indication that Nixon saw the memorandum. Negroponte forwarded it to Kissinger under a September 2 covering memorandum, which Haig initialed.
  2. Bunker sent an advance copy of the text in telegram 14150 from Saigon, September 2, and wrote that he had pressed Thieu to guarantee the facilities to the opposition to run their campaign. Instead, Thieu promised that he would plant questions at news conferences in the next few days to spell out the details of how the campaign would be run. Bunker commented that the speech was the best he could get from Thieu. Kennedy forwarded the telegram to Kissinger under a September 2 covering memorandum. (Ibid., Box 119, Vietnam Subject Files, Vietnam, Cherokee, September 71)
  3. Bunker reported to Kissinger in backchannel message 77 from Saigon, September 11, that he met with Thieu to press him to announce the details of the referendum. Thieu provided the following information: a blank or defaced ballot would count as a no confidence vote; if he did not receive 50 percent of the vote he would leave office so that new elections could be organized and he would not run; he would call for large groups of observers; and he would allow the opposition to use the press and hold meetings and, reluctantly, agreed with Bunker to allow them the use of radio and TV. (Ibid., Box 872, For the President’s Files, Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Vietnam Elections)