251. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker)1

WHS 0803. 1. I have discussed the situation with the President in great detail.2 Our thinking here is that there are two major considerations. On the one hand, we cannot let candidates who may be objectively weak overthrow their opponent merely by withdrawing from an election they could not win. On the other hand, we cannot have an election which does not offer the South Vietnamese people a choice, a factor which would seem important for Thieu’s legitimacy as well as our own domestic situation. We thus lean against his carrying through with an election with only a pro forma opponent on the ballot.

2. In light of these considerations, the President and I believe that our best bet is for Thieu to turn the October election into a genuine referendum. In doing so Thieu might take the following line:

  • —He had hoped above all to have an open and free election, vigorously contested by responsible opposition leaders. Unfortunately, [Page 887] opposition candidates have chosen to withdraw from the electoral test on the basis of trumped up and unsubstantiated charges.
  • —In view of this turn of events and since Thieu still believes that a clear expression of the popular will is essential for Vietnam’s future, he has decided to modify the character of the October election to a simple mandate by which the electorate can register a vote of confidence or no confidence in his regime.
  • —If the outcome is affirmative, he will then consider that the confidence vote constitutes a mandate to continue in office for a full four year term.
  • —If the outcome should prove to be a vote of no confidence, Thieu would then resign and call for a new election within 90 days.

3. In conjunction with this rationale, Thieu should concurrently offer both Minh and Ky the full opportunity to campaign on the “confidence and no confidence” issue. In doing so, he would assure both men the full opportunity to campaign actively in an opposition role. This might include the provision of free radio and television time, government helicopters and other auxiliary assets which would tend to insure fairness and equal opportunity to both sides. It is essential that the steps in paragraphs two and three be taken concurrently and the provisions of paragraph 3 be generous.

4. The President and I consider that the foregoing solution would again allow Thieu to seize the initiative. It would enable him to establish his legitimacy, challenge his opponents to a real contest, and be in the position of placing maximum emphasis on the popular will. This course of action would strip both Minh and Ky of the cause celebre that a straight noncontested election process seems to provide them with.

5. We note in your telegram 06573 that you consider a referendum effectively indistinguishable from a no contest election. It seems to us that the difference is that Thieu could not lose an uncontested election, and that a refusal by Ky and Minh to participate in a referendum would put them clearly on the defensive. At a minimum Thieu’s public position would be greatly strengthened.

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6. I recognize that there may be some technical difficulties in adjusting the nature of the election but these appear surmountable from here. There are also risks for Thieu, of course, but in our view these are less than an uncontested election. The odds would seem to favor his winning and his victory would then have substance.

7. Please discuss this alternative urgently with Thieu and assure him in the most solemn terms that the President is determined not to repeat the mistakes of the past by self-defeating U.S. involvement in South Vietnamese internal affairs. But also convey our strongest judgment that the common cause will be strengthened if he takes this course as quickly as possible. He may consider delaying the referendum by a week. This course of action appears to have such overriding advantages compared to other realistic alternatives that you should put it to Thieu in the strongest terms and as expeditiously as possible before he becomes wedded to a less satisfactory solution.4

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 872, For the President’s Files, Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Vietnam Election. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
  2. Bunker reported to Kissinger in backchannel message 619 from Saigon, August 21, that he met with Ky to convince him to remain in the race, arguing that he would be better able to form a constructive opposition, but Ky was noncommittal. (Ibid.)
  3. In backchannel message 657 from Saigon, August 23, Bunker outlined the following options: 1) have Thieu conduct a no contest or national referendum, which he believed could lead to chaos and a “tarnished victory” for Thieu; 2) declare a state of emergency and call for new elections within a certain period, which could also create chaos and a tarnished Thieu victory; 3) set a new election date by constitutional amendment, which could prove difficult to do by October 3; and 4) create a caretaker government headed by the GVN House Speaker and hold new elections in 3 months, which Bunker thought the best option if Thieu and Ky decided to act responsibly and offer their resignations. (Ibid.)
  4. Bunker held two meetings with Thieu on August 25 to discuss his plans for a referendum and reported on them in backchannel message 692 from Saigon, August 25, backchannel message 714 from Saigon, August 25, and telegram 13853 from Saigon, August 27. (All ibid.)