Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

234. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 14, 1971.

SUBJECT

• My Talks with Chou En-lai

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Vietnam.]

Indochina²

Chou En-lai was as forthcoming as we could have hoped. His attitude throughout reflected the ambivalence of Peking’s position. For ideological reasons, he clearly had to support Hanoi. On the other hand, it was apparent that he did not wish to jeopardize the chances for an improvement in our relations, especially after I explained the positions we had taken in Paris and warned of the danger of escalation if negotiations failed. He came back to this latter point again and again, without threat or bluster, simply using it as an argument for the desirability of peace.

Thus Chou went back and forth between a formal theoretical defense of Hanoi’s position (though in much lower key than Le Duc Tho at Paris) and concrete questions that sought to discover areas of agreement. He stressed Peking’s support of Hanoi while insisting that there had not been advisers in Indochina nor would there be. He criticized American aggression but stressed Chinese interest in an “honorable exit” for the US.

From the outset, I linked the Indochina conflict and our relations with Peking:

• —I pointed out that two-thirds of our forces in Taiwan were linked to the war and their removal would depend on an end of the conflict.
• —I also pointed out that an end to the war would accelerate the improvement in our relationship.

In addition, I reviewed the current situation in Paris and pointed out that the talks were blocked because of Hanoi’s insistence on the overthrow of Thieu and its refusal to agree to a ceasefire. I warned that a breakdown in the negotiations would mean continuation of the war, with incalculable consequences.

Chou addressed Indochina several times during the first two days of our talks.

On the first day he asked a number of questions about our position, generally in an intelligent and sympathetic manner. These were:

• —Were we really ready to pull out?
• —Would we close all our bases?
• —Why would we wish to leave a “tail,” such as some advisers and/or the Thieu Government?
• —Would we be prepared to accept having the Indochinese people determine their own future?
• —Why did we wish a cease-fire?
• —Would we wish to continue giving aid to the present government?

It was clear that he understood the linkage between Taiwan and Vietnam and did not object to it. He also was extremely concerned about the possibility of escalation. In addition, he made the following points:

• —He revealed that he had not been informed about the secret meetings we had had with the North Vietnamese in Paris recently.
• —He said that China only had two objectives with regard to a Vietnam settlement:
  • • There must be a withdrawal of US and Allied forces.
  • • The peoples of the three Indochinese countries must be left to decide their own future.
• —He insisted that China would keep hands off after a settlement.

On the second day Chou took a harder line. As part of a generally tough presentation, he attacked the Thieu and Lon Nol Governments and he charged us with having committed “aggression” in Indochina since World War II. He warned that we should pull out completely and not leave a “tail” behind in the form of advisers since these would be the entering wedge for a new involvement.

He warned about the dangers of escalation but also made clear that China would not intervene. He explained several times that Chinese assistance to Hanoi had never included combat forces—there had only been some bridgebuilding and road repair crews during the bombing.³

He stressed that there were no Chinese advisors in Indochina nor would there be.

The morning of our departure, without prompting, Chou returned to Indochina in an astonishingly sympathetic and open manner. He made the following points:

• —He hoped our negotiations in Paris would be successful and he wished me luck.
• —He would talk to Hanoi after the announcement of the President’s visit to Peking had been made.
• —Peking supports Mme. Binh’s seven point proposal but they were negotiable.
• —He hopes our withdrawal will be complete, thorough and honorable.
• —He thought that we would find Hanoi more generous than we believed.

This means he will talk to the North Vietnamese and may be able to exert some influence. The mere fact of his talking to them is likely to compound the shock of your announced visit to Peking. In any case, he knows that the very fact that we and Peking are moving closer will have an impact in Hanoi.

[Omitted here is material unrelated to Vietnam.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1032, Files for the President, China Materials, Polo I, Record. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Printed from an unsigned copy. Other portions of the memorandum are printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 144. Kissinger met with Chou En-lai on July 9 and 10. The memoranda of conversation of these meetings are printed in full ibid., Documents 139–141 and 143.
2. In a July 1 meeting with Haig and Kissinger before the trip to Beijing, Nixon instructed Kissinger to emphasize three fears in his discussions with the Chinese, the first of which was their “fears of what the President might do in the event of continued stalemate in the South Vietnam war.” He also listed progress in the war as one of his four preconditions for agreeing to a summit and wanted Kissinger to remind them that if the war were settled the United States could remove 6,000 troops from Taiwan. (Memorandum for the President’s File, July 1; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Geopolitical Files—China, China Trips, July 1971 Briefing Notebook)
3. In an October 18 memorandum to Laird, Carver provided him with CIA data on Communist military aid to the DRV, noting that while both the Soviet Union and PRC had reduced their support since it peaked in 1967, in 1970 the PRC provided $53 million and the Soviets provided $49 million. It was the first time the PRC surpassed the Soviets, but this was because the DRV was requesting more of the types of aid that the PRC provided. The aid did not include combat personnel. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, Box 88, Viet (North) 091.3)