Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

233. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, July 14, 1971.

SUBJECT

• My Meeting with the North Vietnamese, July 12, 1971

I met again with the North Vietnamese on July 12.²

The tone of the meeting was very positive and the other side tried hard to be serious and constructive. I think we have now reached essential agreement on all issues except the political one, and their remarks in the meeting indicated that they would look at this question seriously between now and the next meeting.

Key Points

The following remarks and actions by the North Vietnamese indicated their desire to engage in serious negotiations:

• —They said after my presentation that we had made more progress than ever before although I did not really give them anything.
• —They pointed out—even before I had done so—that there were a number of areas of agreement between their points and ours, including even the cease-fire. This is unprecedented.
• —Although they said our seven points were not yet “concrete” they accepted them as a basis of negotiation in conjunction with their own nine points and they said that the two were congruent in major respects.³
• —They repeatedly stressed—in an almost plaintive tone—that they wanted to settle the war.
• —They expressed a great desire to reach agreement quickly, and voiced what appeared to be genuine concern about the delay which might result from debate about a withdrawal date.
• —They, in effect, dismissed Mme. Binh’s seven points, saying that they were different from their own nine points⁴ and that we should negotiate on the latter.
• —They again asked one of my staff to read them the exact text of my remarks on their points so they could take them down verbatim.
• —They agreed to a cease-fire, though only after a political settlement.
• —They also asked a number of questions about our aid offer, indicating they are prepared to drop their demand for reparations.

The Political Issue

It is now more clear than ever that Hanoi is debating how to resolve the political issue. We have agreed in principle on eight of the nine points, and the political issue is the only remaining problem.

Both Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy repeatedly said that we had to get rid of President Thieu, but Tho said that our refusal to do that would make a settlement “difficult” to reach, rather than “impossible” (as Thuy had said earlier).

When I asked them how they would propose for us to do this, they came up with such vague formulas as our not supporting Thieu in the election, or persuading him not to run.

They now need to make up their minds about what kinds of risks they are ready to run, and whether they will give up their demand that we do their political work for them. This is a difficult and fundamental decision for them, and I think they know they will have to make it soon.

• —They obviously fear that Thieu’s re-election will freeze the political outcome against them.
• —They also appear very reluctant to face yet another cycle of military action.
• —Their statements on the issue at the meeting conveyed the sense of being made for the record, as evidence that they had done all they could to get us to accept their view.

Given their desire for a settlement, and some of the other things which are going to be developing, I think there is a better than ever chance that they will shift their position on the political issue and will do it by the next meeting.

What Happened:

I opened the meeting with a very sharp attack on them for having published Mme. Binh’s seven points. I told them that this represented a breach of confidence since they had told me that they would not publish their nine⁵ points, which are similar.

I also warned them that the recent series of press interviews which they had given in order to put us under pressure represented nothing except propaganda, and that they had to choose between propaganda and negotiations.

Thuy, who had probably come prepared for some complaint from us, replied first with a series of grab-bag charges that we were exerting military pressure against them, but he was careful not to overstate his case and to stress their desire to settle.

Tho followed up with a brief presentation in which he did what he had probably planned to do later in the meeting; as evidence of their sincere desire to settle he listed the areas of agreements between their points and ours.

Tho said that we agreed in principle on a number of points, even though details remained to be settled, and specifically said we agreed on international supervision and on international guarantees. He also said we agreed on a cease-fire, although we differed on when it should come into effect. He said we did not agree on other issues, but we were making an effort.

He stressed that their points went much further than Madame Binh’s and covered all of Indochina, not just South Vietnam.

I replied to Thuy’s charges regarding our military actions by citing their recent build-up in the DMZ area, and recalled the 1968 “understanding.” I then read my prepared statement, also listing areas of agreement. I said we agreed in principle on a number of points, although details had to be worked out. I said we were prepared to have a large aid program after the war but would not pay reparations. I also stated that we would not accept their demand that we replace Thieu but would agree to define our relationship with any government existing in Saigon. I did not give them a date, but said this would be the first item of business once we had agreed on a framework for a settlement.

After a very lengthy break, they made their concluding statements, in which they asked a few questions about our position and stressed at some length their desire to have us get rid of Thieu.

We then agreed to review our respective positions and to meet again on 7/26.⁶

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 853, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Vol. IX. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.”
2. A memorandum of conversation, July 12, is ibid.
3. Haig sent a version of the memorandum that did not include this paragraph to Rogers under a July 14 covering memorandum. Haig attached a note to Kissinger indicating that Rogers read and returned it to him without comment. (Ibid.)
4. In the version given to Rogers, the words “nine points” were not included.
5. The word “nine” was not included in the version given to Rogers.
6. Kissinger sent a brief summary of the memorandum to Bunker in backchannel message WHS 1068, July 17, and promised to give him a full transcript. He instructed Bunker to inform Thieu. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 853, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Vol. IX)