Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

231. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Saigon, July 4, 1971, 10:40 a.m.–12:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• President Thieu, Republic of South Vietnam
• Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Hon. Ellsworth Bunker, U.S. Ambassador to South Vietnam
• Mr. Winston Lord, NSC Staff

There were some opening pleasantries during which President Thieu asked about President Nixon. Dr. Kissinger said that the President sent his warm regards to President Thieu. He then presented President Thieu with a gift of a Steuben glass horsehead.

Meeting Between Two Presidents

After some more pleasantries, Dr. Kissinger conveyed the President’s enormous regret that he had decided it was best that he and President Thieu not meet this month. He noted that there were two problems: one in Vietnam and one in America. He then explained that there was an extremely complicated situation in the Senate where various amendments were being tacked on to the Draft Bill and military and economic appropriations, both of which were up this month. Senators were adding amendments designed to cut off funds. So far all the amendments had been defeated, except the Mansfield Amendment which would not have the force of law, but rather was the sense of the Senate. The President was worried therefore, that putting Vietnam in the front of the debate, coupled with the theft of the Pentagon documents, would create an impossible situation. Dr. Kissinger added parenthetically that the President’s papers would not leave the White House; they would stay there only for him and not for the cabinet or the bureaucracy.

Dr. Kissinger continued that President Nixon had great admiration for President Thieu. He would do anything he could to support South Vietnam, and the U.S. remained committed to achieving common objectives. He thought that cancellation of this meeting was on behalf of common objectives. He was here to do whatever he could do on behalf of the President. He hoped that the meeting was deferred and not canceled.

President Thieu responded that he understood that the meeting at the present time would have created disturbances for President Nixon. Dr. Kissinger added that coming right after the Viet Cong peace proposal,² the meeting would have meant an impossible situation in America. President Thieu said that he wished to have the meeting not for any purpose except for continuing personal contact with President Nixon and to request what South Vietnam needed. He had asked Ambassador Bunker to present to the President three points, knowing that the U.S. needed to withdraw troops very substantially from next year.

Enemy Plans and South Vietnam’s Needs

President Thieu then said that South Vietnam needed the following:

1. Continued air support and logistics support for many more years.

2. Strengthening and modernizing the Vietnamese Army and armed forces which the South Vietnamese felt should be done more rapidly.

3. Long range economic and social assistance.

If he supported strengthening and modernization it was because after analyzing the situation the South Vietnamese see very clearly that if it were not for the Laos operation last February they would have difficulty next year, not over the entire country but at certain points, because the Communists had the capability to concentrate their efforts to seek very limited military victories. This would probably be in the northern provinces below the DMZ. They had more capability and opportunity there than in other parts of the country because they had a big concentration of troops in Laos and that section was linked with North Vietnam so the logistics were easier. Even now the last few weeks they had tried to move down the Khesanh corridor and would like to wipe out the fire base. They would continue to do this until the elections, trying to inflict casualties and achieve foreign policy and propaganda impact rather than real success. He said he thought Lam Son 719 and the Cambodian operations had foiled what they planned to do through 1971.

Right after the elections, after the rainy season in Laos, and with concentration of logistics, they would try again to have another effort somewhere at the beginning of 1972. He believed this would take place in MR 1. Dr. Kissinger asked whether they would try also in MR 2, and President Thieu said that that region was their secondary effort and MR 1 was their main effort.

President Thieu continued that if they failed again, that would not cease their action forever, because they would like to do something for propaganda pressure in Vietnam and the U.S., to demonstrate that Vietnamization and the Nixon Doctrine had failed. They hoped with some military victories to have some influence on the 1972 U.S. elections. By the end of 1972 and the beginning of 1973 (at the usual seasonal cycle), after U.S. elections, there would be no political situation to play upon. Then there would be the real situation in Vietnam, with most American troops withdrawn and the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese face-to-face. This would be the last confrontation between the two armies, the last big battle deciding the issue of the war. This was the reason why South Vietnam still needed continued logistics and air support, fire power and mobility, bombing and helicopters. At the time that all responsibility of the war would belong to the Vietnamese they needed modernization for their force because the Communist regular army would attack and they would have to oppose them like Laos.

Thus, he thought the danger was over for 1971. In 1972 and 1973 they would still have many very hard battles to defeat the Viet Cong. If they didn’t take over somewhere they would back off. Meanwhile, South Vietnam still needed some effort and the support of U.S. airpower along with the strengthening and modernizing of the armed forces. That was most important in order to resist and to defend itself.

He hoped with that assistance that by 1973 the Communists would fade away and negotiate seriously while staying in Laos and Cambodia. In Vietnam they could say that they were defending themselves. They would need economic assistance. He said that if he had met President Nixon he would have asked for this support.

Dr. Kissinger said that Ambassador Bunker had had a long talk with President Nixon.³ He said that President Thieu could be sure that everything he said would go to President Nixon word-for-word. He worked very closely with the President. Direct talks were of course better, but the next best thing was his immediate and personal attention. He would transmit President Thieu’s words exactly to the President.

Paris Negotiations

Dr. Kissinger told President Thieu about the last Paris meeting with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy. He said that as Ambassador Bunker had explained, the first meeting (May 31)⁴ had no real content and was simply an exploration of their willingness to negotiate. In the second meeting (June 26)⁵ the North Vietnamese gave us a nine point program which was roughly the same as the seven point program of Madame Binh in Paris on Thursday. Four days after promising not to make the proposal public, Madame Binh’s proposal, which was almost exactly the same, was published. One could see how trustworthy they were.

Madame Binh’s proposal mentioned reunification which was not covered in the North Vietnamese nine points, while the latter had language on the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia which Madame Binh’s plan did not. In every other way they were almost exactly the same. On prisoners they promised to release them in exchange for U.S. withdrawals, agreeing to discuss the modalities. One point said that we should stop supporting Thieu/Ky/Khiem. Dr. Kissinger remarked that he didn’t have the impression that Ky was of great support for Thieu, but they didn’t say coalition government or replace Thieu/Ky/Khiem as they always had before. Dr. Kissinger explained that he kept asking the North Vietnamese what this point meant, and they replied that we would know what it meant. He told President Thieu that the U.S. had said that under no circumstances would it do anything to interfere with the government in Saigon. He assured President Thieu that under no circumstances would the U.S. agree with any such proposals.

Another interesting aspect of the North Vietnamese proposal was that for the first time they said it was negotiable, and they were willing to bargain. Always before they said, “you must” while this time they said “you should.” When Dr. Kissinger would object, they would say, let’s bargain, whereas formerly they would say their proposals were the basis of negotiations. This time they said that we should talk about both our proposals and their proposals and bargain.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that he didn’t know exactly what the North Vietnamese proposal meant, and that he would see them on July 12 on the way back to the U.S. He would say that some proposals were acceptable, such as the neutrality of Laos and Cambodia and the release of prisoners, while under no circumstances would the U.S. interfere with the South Vietnamese government. Then we would see that would happen. Probably President Thieu was right, that they wouldn’t wish to negotiate.

President Thieu said that the first thing to notice was the timing of the North Vietnamese proposal, i.e., July 1, recalling that they had demanded a final date of U.S. withdrawals of June 30 which had now been reached without agreement. Thus, psychologically, they were now renewing their proposal.

Secondly, President Thieu said, having studied the proposal he thought that the only new thing was on prisoners, which was aimed at the U.S. public rather than the Vietnamese. Concerning Vietnam and political questions, points 2–5 represented no change. There was nothing new. Instead of coalition they said “national concord,” but the meaning was the same. On prisoners they had said before that they would discuss this after withdrawals; now they said they would agree. It was a matter of vocabulary rather than real meaning. He had asked his Foreign Minister to study the proposal and to give guidance to Ambassador Lam. The South Vietnamese were ready to work together with the U.S. and, with the approval of President Nixon, to get together a common position for next Thursday’s plenary session. Ambassador Lam and Ambassador Bruce should use the same tone.

Dr. Kissinger responded that he agreed absolutely and that this approach would have our support.

President Thieu continued that he had told Ambassador Lam to wait until Tuesday, because on Monday the South Vietnamese would work with Ambassador Bunker who would get guidance from Washington. He had told Lam that by Tuesday he would send supplementary guidelines. Bruce and he should use the same language which would be agreed upon by Ambassador Bunker and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs so that final word could go to Paris on Tuesday.

Dr. Kissinger agreed. He knew what was on the President’s mind and could work with Ambassador Bunker, with only technical reference to Washington since he had had a long talk with the President before he left and knew what he wanted. For President Thieu’s information, he had told Ambassador Bruce to take a very strong line on Thursday.⁶ President Thieu said that up to now they had said nothing except that they would study the proposal carefully and give an official answer on Thursday. They would have something to say by next Thursday.

Dr. Kissinger replied that he was not absolutely sure about this approach. His own sense of tactics suggested that they should ask some questions to highlight the ambiguities of the position of the other side. President Thieu said that they could ask for clarifications, noting that opponents would not like a strong statement. Dr. Kissinger believed that on Thursday the US and GVN should primarily ask questions, bringing out points like “agree” versus “discuss” and the fact that “national concord” was no real change in position. Dr. Kissinger, Ambassador Bunker, and President Thieu agreed that the allied side should concentrate on asking questions this week and avoid a flat answer within a week, there being many points to clarify. Maybe they were changing their position and if not, we could always reject it the following week. We could renew our own proposals, such as the President’s October 7, 1970, speech.⁷ It was agreed that this was better tactics, for the other side would like us to reject their proposal outright so they could label us as warmongers. Thus, the South Vietnamese would work with Ambassador Bunker and instructions would be sent to Bruce and Lam.

Dr. Kissinger said that if President Thieu agreed, he could use a separate channel to Bruce and tell him that what we wanted was a series of questions to bring out the inconsistencies of the other side’s proposal, to clarify and to enable us to go back to the October 7 and South Vietnamese proposals. For example, when the other side mentioned ceasefire, we could say that we had already offered this. President Thieu agreed that we should do this.

Dr. Kissinger said that the U.S. was not eager to move fast. The other side should not dictate the pace of events. He would see them Monday and would, of course, immediately send a message to Bunker on what went on. He would never see them without informing President Thieu. The other side had wanted him to meet Madame Binh, and he had rejected this completely. Madame Binh had publicly said that she would like to meet him on Monday, and we rejected this publicly. President Thieu could be sure that he would never meet her or the NLF unless President Thieu wanted him to.

Korean Troops

President Thieu said that Prime Minister Khiem and President Park had met on the question of withdrawal of Korean troops from Vietnam. President Park proposed that from December 1971 to June 1972 they would withdraw only 10,000 Korean troops from Vietnam. The remaining force, about 37,860, would be discussed later on. President Park had no date to prescribe. He said that, as he had promised his people during the election, he must withdraw the 10,000 man marine brigade between December 1971 and June 1972. He would leave the other two divisions. That was the final proposal of President Park.

Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Bunker commented that this was very good news. Dr. Kissinger said that the U.S. had studied this question and had concluded that the marine brigade should go, being dependent on American support, while the other two divisions should stay.

President Thieu said that he had told Ambassador Bunker and the Koreans that they still needed the Korean troops in MR 2. Next year was crucial. The South Vietnamese would use all their general reserves in MR 1 to cope with the situation there. They might phase out more divisions from territorial responsibility to reinforce MR 1 and MR 2 and they might be asked by the Cambodian government to help somewhere. The effort next year would be in MR 1, where there would be a new North Vietnamese offensive. They would be ready with some other reserve divisions for Cambodia. These were his main efforts.

In MR 2 there were only two Vietnamese divisions so they needed two Korean divisions on the seacoast in order to maintain the results of pacification while the South Vietnamese fought the war on the borders.

Dr. Kissinger said South Vietnam had the strong support of President Nixon. If anyone said anything different, he should tell Ambassador Bunker. The U.S. thought that South Vietnam needed to cover MR 2 and they would have full support. President Nixon had approved a study and the United States would do what it could. He was delighted that they agreed on the military objectives.

President Thieu said that President Park had said that only those troops he promised in the campaign would leave, and that he thought Thieu would he happy with this. Dr. Kissinger said the U.S. would use its influence with President Park in June if there were any difficulties. President Thieu thought this Korean decision was correct. Dr. Kissinger said that he was delighted, that the decision was just right since the marines were not so good. Ambassador Bunker added that they took special equipment and didn’t get along with the South Vietnamese people.

South Vietnamese Deployments and U.S. Funding

Ambassador Bunker asked President Thieu how he would reinforce MR 1. President Thieu replied that he would do this with airborne and marines, and he would phase out the 9th Division in the Delta in the next 5 months to be ready as a general reserve for MR 3 and Cambodia. Dr. Kissinger commented that the U.S. had always been told that Vietnamese troops couldn’t move out of their region without a loss in morale and an increase in desertions. President Thieu said that the 9th Division would be on temporary missions in MR 3 and Cambodia as a general reserve and wouldn’t move to MR 1. Dr. Kissinger commented that U.S. studies showed that even with reserves there would be trouble in MR 1. President Thieu said that he must rotate troops, and these would be marines and not the 9th Division. In response to Dr. Kissinger’s question, he thought that this would be enough for MR 1 and he could compensate with air power.

Dr. Kissinger told President Thieu for his information—there had not been official notification to General Abrams,—that President Nixon had just approved a program to strengthen ARVN so that manning levels would be up to 90%; he thought they were 78% now.⁸ This would cost the U.S. $200 million and should help the South Vietnamese. The U.S. would be willing, if the South Vietnamese thought it necessary, to support the creation of new units in MR 1 and MR 2. It was up to the South Vietnamese to make recommendations.

Thus, there were two alternatives. They could stay within the 1.1 million man ceiling by reducing forces in MR 3 and 4. If not, the U.S. would support an increase of up to 50,000 men in MR 1 and 2 if this was what the South Vietnamese wanted. This was not official; the South Vietnamese must request it after which the U.S. would approve it. Dr. Kissinger confirmed that this 50,000 was in addition to the 1.1 million ceiling. The other option was an increase in manning levels. Bureaucratically, it was somewhat easier for the U.S. to stay within the 1.1 million ceiling, but the U.S. wanted the South Vietnamese to succeed. There would be no awards for keeping down the force levels, and the important thing was to succeed. He repeated that the U.S. would support the South Vietnamese in any way, and that the 50,000 increase was in the President’s mind but that it must be requested through Ambassador Bunker. President Thieu should forward his request not just to Abrams but also to Bunker.⁹

Ambassador Bunker asked President Thieu about recruitment in MR 1. President Thieu replied that he could move some personnel from the PSDF. Sometimes pacification and security had disadvantages: now that there was a security back in the villages, the men said that they wanted to be local soldiers and stay with their families. Thus the South Vietnamese needed new formulas to refill their units. He thought that in MR 1 the 50,000 manpower figure would not be difficult.

Dr. Kissinger repeated that the decisions would be left to the South Vietnamese. They could reduce forces in MR 3 and 4 and recruit an additional 50,000 in MR 1 and 2, and thus stay within the present ceiling. This was already approved and no decision was necessary. If, on the other hand, they wanted to keep force levels in MR 3 and 4 and add 50,000 more, that would be approved in the White House. He should make his request to Ambassador Bunker, and he could assure President Thieu that it would be approved.

U.S. Withdrawals

President Thieu asked if there were any new plans for troop withdrawals. Dr. Kissinger replied that there were no plans yet for reducing forces next year. Regardless of what the press said, he was not in Saigon to discuss new withdrawals. The U.S. would wait until September–October and then discuss the situation. There was no need to make an announcement until November 15. And before then the U.S. would not accelerate the plan that it now had. Thus, President Thieu should disregard the press; there were politicians who were racing each other for publicity on this question. 5000 troops, more or less, were good for a one day headline but would mean nothing to the next Presidential election. Before December 1 there would be no further troops withdrawn beyond what was planned. After that, because of our own elections, the U.S. would have to make some pretty drastic moves, but President Thieu had always known this. There was no fixed number and the analysis had not been done yet.

He asked President Thieu for his recommendation for next summer, adding that he was not here to discuss this question, and if President Thieu had not raised it he would not have raised it. President Thieu noted that there would still be 184,000 American troops on December 1. Because of the election campaign and U.S. opinion the Vietnamese guessed that next year the U.S. would withdraw forces so that at least by October 1972, just before elections, at least 100,000–120,000 would leave. Thus, President Nixon could announce that when he was elected there were 560,000 Americans in Vietnam and now at the end of his term there were only 50,000 or 70,000. Everyone in South Vietnam thought this was the most logical and political way for President Nixon. Dr. Kissinger asked him what he believed.

President Thieu responded that he had said many times that there were two aspects to the problem. First, there was the capability of Vietnam to replace U.S. forces. Even if next year there were 70,000 or 80,000 or 100,000, the combat mission would be practically ended. Dr. Kissinger interjected that he was right from the combat point of view. President Thieu continued that the South Vietnamese problem was to be ready before that day to cope with the situation, before the U.S. elections, and after the elections in the summer of 1973. That was why he had asked frankly about modernization. Whatever the level, 100 or 50 or 20 thousand was not very big.

The second question was how the U.S. saw its place in this region. Would it withdraw all its troops and rely on air power and the 7th Fleet only, or would it retain some troops, not in South Vietnam, but in this part of the world? That depended on the American conception and its decision on how many men should be in South Vietnam even if South Vietnam had a full capability to defend against the threat. South Vietnam needed a so-called residual force of advisers, technicians, and logistics people. This must be conceived in the sense of the American presence in South Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger said that he would give President Thieu some answers. He noted that President Thieu thought more precisely then the U.S. bureaucracy and had touched on some questions that had not been formally studied. Thus, he could only give impressions and an attitude. He agreed with the point that it would not make much difference what the numbers were below a certain level, because the combat capability was not very great. Below that level, we must think what the troops were supposed to do.

He then sketched what seemed possible in order of domestic difficulty. Advisers, technicians, logistics people, not organized in big military units, were the easiest, would stay the longest, and would present very little difficulty. Secondly, air power was the next easiest, especially on carriers and based in Thailand, and even air power to some extent in Vietnam. Thirdly, logistical troops in organized units were harder, but helicopter companies for example, should be possible the better part of 1972. Fourthly, on infantry units, he must be honest. There were no decisions yet but this would be hard. We must always decide whether in fighting a battle for a particular unit, we might lose the battle for all other units. He would not delude President Thieu. The Administration had opponents who were not just for making peace but wanted to defeat South Vietnam. The government’s problem was to give them a minimum point of attack. Infantry units after a certain point would be the hardest problem. There might be some security forces, but he would prefer not to make them a point of issue right now.

U.S. Support

Dr. Kissinger commented that the U.S. was in a transitory period. In a couple of years the tide would turn, many people now speaking loudly would be on the defensive. Over the long term the U.S. must and would play a role in Southeast Asia. He thought that South Vietnam could count on the kind of units he had described for some period of time.

Concerning air support, the U.S. was in the process of establishing sortie rates for this year and next year. Based on his conversations with Abrams, although this was not yet approved, he foresaw that 10,000 tactical sorties and 1000 B–52 sorties through the calendar year would almost certainly be approved. He and Ambassador Bunker confirmed that this was about the same level as now. Dr. Kissinger added that he was saying what he “thought”, for he had to be correct. The President must sign his approval, but he almost always approved his recommendations. If President Thieu had any problems, he should tell Ambassador Bunker immediately. The President had told him to talk with President Thieu and Abrams and then decide. The only question was whether there should be 10,000 sorties for the whole period or 9,000, with a surge capability to 12,000. He asked President Thieu’s view. President Thieu replied that he thought that General Abrams’ proposal was correct. He confirmed that he thought the 10,000 level was probably preferable to 9,000 with a surge capability.

President Thieu said that he would like to discuss artillery and helicopters for 1972–1973. There would be a shift from the present level to less than 50 percent in terms of helicopter ability and artillery for the next year or 1973. He wanted to understand what might make up for this, perhaps by compensating VNAF with new units and helicopters. As for air power, the figures they had discussed were quite correct.

Dr. Kissinger replied that the U.S. view, for example on helicopters, was to do what it could. The U.S. had always been told that the South Vietnamese could not handle more. If they could, that would be approved. If the South Vietnamese convinced Ambassador Bunker and General Abrams that they could use more helicopters, the U.S. would provide them. The U.S. would do what it could to keep the maximum number of helicopter companies in Vietnam. We would fix redeployments so that helicopters came out last.

President Thieu said that South Vietnamese capability relied on two things, fire power and mobility. Thus continued air support and enough helicopters to move and lift fast would compensate and give the South Vietnamese the ability to cope with the situation.

Ambassador Bunker asked President Thieu for his views on artillery. President Thieu replied the first question was how to provide more artillery to South Vietnamese troops. If they could do that, they would use the artillery units to support regular forces. Dr. Kissinger replied that he didn’t know about artillery; there hadn’t been any studies on it or Presidential decisions. He knew that the President favored President Thieu’s ideas on helicopters and he would look into the question of artillery. President Thieu commented that concerning artillery he would like some more explanation concerning what General Abrams had submitted. Ambassador Bunker said that he and General Abrams would get together. President Thieu said that after that he would ask for what he still needed.

South Vietnamese Military Plans

Ambassador Bunker asked President Thieu about crossborder operations, and Dr. Kissinger remarked that he had planned to raise this issue also. President Thieu replied that he thought the South Vietnamese would launch new operations. After Lam Son 719 the North Vietnamese understood that they were no longer safe from attack. Two years ago they never believed the South Vietnamese could launch offensives in Cambodia because of the political situation. Now after the changed regime in Cambodia they realized that the South Vietnamese had the military capability to do so. Therefore Lam Son 719 was not a surprise. Returnees and prisoners said that the North Vietnamese had been prepared for a South Vietnamese offensive in Laos for eight months, since the time they had seen the success in Cambodia. Thus they judged that the South Vietnamese could do this and that the next step would be in Laos. They had been prepared psychologically, politically and technically for at least six months. They had suffered heavy casualties in Lam Son 719 at which time the South Vietnamese still had the logistic support of the U.S. in MR 1.

Now this year they must look ahead to what they would do next. He didn’t rule out South Vietnamese capabilities in Laos next year even though there would be less U.S. support. They could still do this on some scale. The North Vietnamese were shifting westward, were opening new roads in the Bolovens Plateau area, getting ready for a long war. In that area they would be out of the range of the South Vietnamese. Thus they were shifting everything westward and avoiding the South Vietnamese reach. Even in Cambodia they made no efforts between Phnom Penh and the Parrots Beak area. Everything was shifted so that they would be out of the reach of the South Vietnamese forces, tactical air and helicopters and even infantry. They wanted to control the Bolovens Plateau, use it as a stronghold and wage either conventional or guerrilla warfare from there. They intended to occupy the Battabung and Siem Reap regions, believing that they were safer with Thai troops than with South Vietnamese. If they could, they would build up the Khmer Rouge, bring Sihanouk back and liberate Cambodia.

If they did not succeed in Vietnam and even if there were peace there, then with their positions in the Bolovens Plateau and Cambodia they could continue a long-term war. Even with temporary peace in Vietnam, they could wage a long-range war from these strongholds.

President Thieu continued that he didn’t know whether they would attack Laos. There were three North Vietnamese divisions in Cambodia therefore the next South Vietnamese attack would be in Cambodia rather than Laos. In response to Dr. Kissinger’s query, President Thieu said this would be after the rainy season if he were elected.

Dr. Kissinger commented that President’s Thieu’s friends were less worried about his being elected than about his having opponents. President Thieu said that he was not overoptimistic. Dr. Kissinger said the U.S. wanted him to have opponents.

President Thieu said that he hoped to take care of the situation in MR 3 and 4 and Cambodia so that they would have a free hand for MR 1 and 2. Dr. Kissinger asked him if he thought they could do this, and President Thieu replied that he thought so, that if they solved the problems in the South then they could handle them in the North. Dr. Kissinger remarked that they had not succeeded this year with three divisions. President Thieu noted that there had been a change in command and the problems of the rainy season. He would move many of the divisions, not just three, and there would be a bigger campaign. He would pull other divisions from MR 3 and 4. He would give the troops in MR 3 and 4 six months to consolidate pacification and then he would pull one division from them and the Rangers. Dr. Kissinger asked whether the South Vietnamese would attack in the Kratie region. President Thieu replied that maybe the Viet Cong would change their positions. Dr. Kissinger remarked that no general would tell his real intentions.

President Thieu said that the North Vietnamese would like to break south through the South Vietnamese line, because they were being held North of Route 7. They would like to break through and threaten Phnom Penh and regain the old base areas that they had had in Cambodia. For now, the South Vietnamese were just conducting defensive operations, not letting them through, but after the rainy season they would push them westward. He hoped the Cambodian Government would make some military and pacification efforts, noting that they were slow on pacification. Dr. Kissinger commented that they had no experience in this. President Thieu said that the South Vietnamese would help them and would like to cooperate. Cambodians had to do something about pacification and were in a better position to do this now. The Cambodian countryside was not controlled by either the government or the Khmer Rouge. It would be up to those who arrived first. President Thieu confirmed for Dr. Kissinger that the South Vietnamese worked closely with the Cambodians but not yet on pacification. They were ready to start on the latter. He didn’t think the Communists were very strong judging from what they were doing. Cambodia had two rainy seasons and these two respites helped Cambodia.

President Thieu then confirmed that the South Vietnamese planned major efforts right after the rainy season in October. From November the Viet Cong would increase their infiltration until March before launching offensives, per the usual yearly cycle. Dr. Kissinger asked whether they might launch offensives before then, and President Thieu said that February might be a good time. Dr. Kissinger noted that they would be strong in MR 1 by then. President Thieu replied that they must take care of the southern situation first. The South Vietnamese must make their offensive first in Cambodia; then after that they could cope with the situation in MR 1. It would be more difficult than last time. In response to Dr. Kissinger’s question, President Thieu thought the South Vietnamese would be ready for the Communist offensive in MR 1 by February.

Dr. Kissinger told President Thieu that one of the comments the U.S. often heard was that the performance of the South Vietnamese forces improved tremendously when there were good commanders in charge. Some Americans thought that this was the biggest problem.

President Thieu noted the lack of good commanders. They tried to do their best but this was a general weakness of a fast-growing army. Dr. Kissinger commented that General Tri’s death was a big loss, and President Thieu agreed, saying that they needed more generals like him.

South Vietnamese Elections

Dr. Kissinger asked President Thieu how the elections looked to him. President Thieu said that this time they were very well organized and the people were familiar with elections. They were much better organized with the new system than before. He wanted to emphasize two points, better organization and fairness. With the experience of the elections in the Lower House, by August they would improve their system if necessary. He said that the candidates for the Lower House were starting well, with ten candidates for each seat, although this was not good in the sense of political organization. A good many people were interested. Ambassador Bunker noted the great political interest. President Thieu said that this time the quality of candidates for the Lower House was better and that many more prominent figures were taking part. Dr. Kissinger commented that if the South Vietnamese had good candidates, they should lend the U.S. a few.

Ambassador Bunker asked whether endorsements would be any problem for Minh and Ky. President Thieu said that he thought Minh would get enough, and Ky, too. When he promulgated the law he did not think it would hurt Minh or Ky. Those two seem well enough known in terms of political reputation and prestige to get enough signatures. He told Dr. Kissinger frankly that he promulgated the law for other purposes, i.e., not to allow fantasist candidates like 1967. Dr. Kissinger commented that the South Vietnamese didn’t want ten candidates, and President Thieu replied this time there would be very many more. President Thieu thought that any President, whether Minh, Ky or himself, should have sufficient prestige and not a 35% vote like before. This was important also for political stability.

Dr. Kissinger said that he understood. Since he thought that Americans knew nothing about South Vietnamese domestic politics, he had no personal view. The US understood the problem of stability. The US position was that elections should be conducted fairly and that this would strengthen the position of South Vietnam and its friends.

He asked President Thieu what he thought of having observers for the elections. President Thieu responded that they would welcome organized groups or private individuals to come to South Vietnam. They planned to have inter-ministerial committees charged with providing any information that these observers would like, to give means of travel to the observers, to explain and answer their questions and to guide them around. They would demonstrate that the elections were fair and well-organized, and observers could go anywhere they wished, ask any questions and raise any problems. These committees would deal with all such questions. Also, they would send information to the South Vietnamese embassies in foreign countries to explain to those who couldn’t come to observe for themselves.

The objective was to have real political parties, to support the government and to provide a real opposition. Dr. Kissinger noted that this was related to having few candidates. President Thieu said that he wanted them to take sides. Ambassador Bunker asked if President Thieu were elected whether he would form a party and the opposition would form one so that there would be two for the next elections. President Thieu responded that there would be two big parties and maybe ten-twenty smaller ones. Dr. Kissinger commented that the South Vietnamese political situation was like France before DeGaulle. President Thieu said that this party system might be established for 1975. In 1967 many political leaders asked that the military run the Presidency and hoped that in 1971 they would be united and continue the struggle. He had hoped in 1971 that there would be many civilian candidates and at least two big parties. However, after two years they had done nothing. He had tried to help but they were divided much more than before. This time he said that there were no alliances. He could frankly say that he would have his party and they would have theirs. He was looking for good competition and political life. Under his Administration they were free to have democratic expression and to organize parties. But they were divided, with everyone wanting to be a leader.

Dr. Kissinger recalled that in 1966 Ambassador Lodge had tried to lecture the South Vietnamese on a constitution. President Thieu had said that he was worried about some colonel marching on Saigon, and after that he could worry about a constitution, because his authority and not a constitution would stop that colonel. Dr. Kissinger said that President Thieu had accomplished this first step by establishing his authority, but if he could accomplish the second step by 1975 that would be a tremendous achievement.

Economic Assistance

Dr. Kissinger said that he knew that President Thieu wanted to discuss economic development. He and President Thieu agreed that they were not economists. President Thieu said that his Economic Minister had had a good trip and met many influential people. The problems were first, that the US Government accept in principle that they wished to help South Vietnam over the long range, and secondly, to work very closely together. They had a good team now.

Dr. Kissinger said that he had met with the team the day before and there had been a meeting in Washington. He assured President Thieu on behalf of President Nixon that the US was prepared to provide a long-range economic assistance program for South Vietnam. The size and nature of the program was a matter for the technicians. The South Vietnamese should discuss reforms which would free the economy somewhat. The US would give assistance to make the programs succeed. The US intended to go to Congress for long-range military assistance at the same time as for the economic program. He felt that there would be less resistance to the economic assistance and that this would be no problem.

Ambassador Bunker confirmed that this was his impression also.

Dr. Kissinger continued that there were two problems, first, stabilization, which was going pretty well and, second, long-term development which must get started soon. This was receiving our energetic attention. He said that the US had ideas about administration reforms. The Administration had given instructions to American personnel to be very cooperative, and the US had encouraged other countries to do the same thing. Ambassador Bunker commented that the South Vietnamese had a good team.

Drugs

Dr. Kissinger said he wanted to mention another problem on which the South Vietnamese were already working. The narcotics problem was of tremendous concern to the US and anything that President Thieu could do personally was the key. This was a big problem. If it spread, no matter what else the US did, it might force withdrawals.

Dr. Kissinger closed by saying that it was always a privilege to see President Thieu and that he wished him and the country well. Both countries had suffered a great deal. They had not come all this way in order to lose.

The US wanted President Thieu to succeed, wanted South Vietnam to succeed, and they had a great friend in President Nixon.

President Thieu said that he appreciated President Nixon’s sending Dr. Kissinger to Saigon and he appreciated Dr. Kissinger’s frankness.

Dr. Kissinger said that he would tell the press that they had had a very fruitful talk, but he would not discuss the subjects they had covered. He asked President Thieu whether this was agreeable, and the latter confirmed that it was.

After a few more pleasantries, the meeting was concluded.¹⁰

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 103, Country Files, Far East, Vietnam, Saigon Background Docs. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the President’s Palace. Lord forwarded it under an August 4 covering memorandum to Kissinger, who approved it, along with a decision to keep it in the White House files only, for no wider distribution.
2. See Document 226.
3. See Document 220.
4. See Document 207.
5. See Document 223.
6. The plenary session of the Paris Peace Talks was scheduled to resume July 8.
7. See Document 46.
8. See Document 228.
9. Lord noted in his August 4 covering memorandum that one of the key points from this meeting was strengthening the ARVN. Kissinger wrote next to it: “Make sure Laird knows this.” On July 21, Kissinger sent Laird a memorandum noting that Nixon had directed him to take all feasible actions to increase in-country military assistance. Laird reported to the President on the actions he had taken in an August 20 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 157, Vietnam Country Files, Viet Sept 71)
10. In backchannel message 684 from Saigon, July 4, Kissinger characterized the meeting as productive and added that the assurances from Nixon to Thieu came at a very opportune time. (Ibid., Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, MemCon–President Thieu, HAK, and Amb. Bunker July 4, 1971) Bunker reported on the meeting in telegram 10853 from Saigon, July 5, but left out references to Kissinger’s meetings with the North Vietnamese and his explicit commitments on troop withdrawals, military assistance, and air sortie rates. (Ibid., Box 155, Vietnam Country Files, Viet July 71)