Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

228. National Security Decision Memorandum 118¹

Washington, July 3, 1971.

MEMORANDUM FOR

• The Secretary of State
• The Secretary of Defense

SUBJECT

• Improvements in South Vietnamese Forces

I have carefully reviewed the assessment of the military situation in Vietnam in 1972 undertaken by the Senior Review Group and the Department of Defense paper, forwarded by Deputy Secretary Packard’s June 18, 1971 memorandum, summarizing the alternatives that emerged from this assessment.²

I have decided that the U.S. will provide support for RVNAF forces in FY 1972 in accordance with alternative 2 as described in the Department of Defense paper and as recommended by the Secretary of Defense.

Specifically the Department of Defense and the U.S. Mission to South Vietnam should take actions immediately to accomplish the following:

• —Take special measures, including training and promotion programs and urging the removal of incompetent commanders, to improve South Vietnamese military leadership and morale. A program to provide incentive (dislocation or combat) pay to RVNAF units in combat in isolated areas should be implemented.
• —Increase manning levels in RVNAF combat and other key units to 90 percent.
• —Strengthen RVNAF forces in Military Regions 1 and 2 by such measures as the addition of another division in MR 1 and a division headquarters with appropriate support in MR 2.

Alternative 2 should be negotiated and implemented, particularly in regard to the strengthening of RVNAF forces in MRs 1 and 2, in a manner that does not provide the GVN with perverse incentives with regard to the security of MRs 3 and 4. Should the GVN request U.S. support for additions to RVNAF beyond 1.1 million men in FY 72 and in the judgment of the U.S. Mission the alternative of adding to RVNAF forces by removing or demobilizing units in MRs 3 and 4 involves excessive risks to the security of these areas, the U.S. is willing to consider an increase beyond 1.1 million men. U.S. support for any such increase would be contingent on demonstration by the GVN that such increases would not jeopardize the attainment of manning levels of 90 percent in combat and other key units.

The Secretary of Defense will be in charge of implementing these actions in coordination with the Secretary of State and the U.S. Mission to South Vietnam. He should report to me by September 1, 1971, the actions that have been taken to implement these decisions.³

Richard Nixon

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–225, Policy Papers (1969–1974), National Security Decision Memorandums, NSDM 118. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis. Copies were sent to the Director of Central Intelligence and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Kissinger sent the draft NSDM 118 to Nixon under an undated covering memorandum, in which he explained that it was an outgrowth of extensive interagency review of the military situation in South Vietnam and based on an SRG paper that was also attached. (Ibid.)
2. Not printed. (Ibid.)
3. Laird sent the follow-up report in a September 4 memorandum to Nixon. Kissinger forwarded it to Nixon under a September 20 covering memorandum, noting that all the actions directed by NSDM 118 were underway, but that the combat pay proposal was still under discussion; that Laird had set a goal of manning ARVN units up to 90 percent by January 1, 1972; and that MACV was still pushing the ARVN to rid itself of poor leaders. Nixon approved the report and Kissinger sent a September 20 memorandum to Laird thanking him for his efforts and requesting another report on December 1. (Ibid., Box H–218, Policy Papers (1969–1974), National Security Decision Memoranda, NSDM 118)