230. Editorial Note
On July 3, 1971, in a telephone conversation with Alexander Haig, the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs, President Nixon complained about the North Vietnamese insistence that the United States end its support of South Vietnamese President Nguyen Van Thieu, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky, and Prime Minister Tran Thien Khiem. Their discussion went as follows:
“President: I was wondering—one thought you might send on to Henry for his Paris meeting. If he has to haggle about our support of the South Vietnamese, why doesn’t he just throw in a hooker—’let’s consider the outside support for North Vietnam.’ I mean they are supported by the Chinese and Russians. The question is do they want to talk about a trade-off.
“Haig: Good.
“President: He can say we are not interested in this being a place of conflict, but if it is neutral it has to be neutral on both sides.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 998, Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons 1971)
On July 9, after a brief discussion of Kissinger’s secret trip to China, July 9–12, the President raised with Haig the issue of Kissinger’s upcoming secret meeting with the North Vietnamese in Paris on July 12. According to a transcript of their conversation, they had the following exchange:
“President: As far as anything he does in Paris, we can still get instructions to him, can’t we?
“Haig: Yes Sir. I have a direct contact.
“President: We should think about that. We have got to set it up so that we can hit them if necessary. I am thinking if negotiations break off. What you do is say, alright, it has broken down, we will withdraw but we have to protect our withdrawal but we also have to get our prisoners back but since the negotiations have broken down we shall bomb certain targets until the prisoners are returned. I think if you have a breakdown in negotiations and—I think we will be right up the creek.
[Page 782]“Haig: They might say you are killing your own people and they might then turn around and execute them.
“President: Yes, that is the danger, but I don’t know what we can do. A strong warning might do it.” (Ibid.)
Finally, in an undated message to Lieutenant General Vernon Walters, Senior Military Attaché in the Embassy in Paris, Haig instructed that the following message be passed to Kissinger:
“Leader has again directed that I convey to you his wishes that in your discussions you emphasize, in no uncertain terms, the decisiveness of this round. Leader states it is essential that he know as a result of this round whether or not the other side is truly interested in negotiated settlement. He is clearly thinking of discontinuing future efforts. I made it clear to him, based on your last communication, that at least one other session would be required. He has accepted this but is adamant that the sessions not go beyond that unless there is substantial movement. You should be aware that he is seriously considering that alternate plan which he has mentioned previously, of moving out precipitously and concurrently undertaking major air effort against North. Obviously this message is characterized by overkill and instructions must be interpreted in the light of your discussions at previous stop. I did feel you should have the benefit of atmosphere here.” (Ibid., Box 853, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David, Vol. IX)