Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

212. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Review Group¹

Washington, June 7, 1971, 3:51–4:42 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Cambodia

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • Under Secretary John N. Irwin
  • Mr. Marshall Green
  • Mr. Arthur Hartman
  • Mr. Ronald Spiers
• CIA
  • Mr. Richard Helms
  • Mr. George Carver
• Defense
  • Mr. Warren Nutter
  • Mr. Dennis Doolin
  • Col. Morris Brady
  • Mr. Francis J. West
• JCS
  • Gen. William C. Westmoreland
  • Major Gen. John H. Elder, Jr.
  • Lt. Col. John G. Hill
• OMB
  • Mr. James Schlesinger
• NSC Staff
  • Brig. Gen. Alexander Haig
  • Mr. Wayne Smith
  • Mr. John H. Holdridge
  • Mr. Robert Sansom
  • Mr. John Negroponte
  • Mr. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. Military Assistance Plan. Building on the JCS plans already requested by Secretary Laird, Defense will submit by July 1 a military assistance plan for Cambodia designed to achieve the objectives set forth in NSDM 89.² The plan should outline strategy alternatives for the FANK and should include a time-phased program for providing the FANK with the necessary training and logistic support. The plan should also propose recommendations for improving the management of the U.S. military assistance program in Cambodia.³

2. MAP Personnel Levels. The number of personnel permanently stationed in Cambodia to administer the military assistance program should be determined by the requirements for implementing the plan to be prepared by Defense. Defense (CINCPAC) and State (Embassy Phnom Penh) recommendations on personnel levels should be justified on this basis.⁴

Dr. Kissinger: We were going to get a briefing from the DOD team.⁵

Mr. Smith: Two members of the team are prepared to brief. They are Mr. West and Col. Brady.⁶

Dr. Kissinger: Okay. Can we go ahead then?

Mr. West: I will discuss the enemy threat. Then Col. Brady will brief on the friendly military situation.

In our report we divided the discussion of the enemy threat into two sections—one dealing with the main war against South Vietnam in which the North Vietnamese are using Cambodia as a conduit for men and supplies, and the other covering the subphase involving the North Vietnamese war against the Cambodians. Our assessment is that in the main war the South Vietnamese have gained the strategic offensive in MRs 3 and 4 [of South Vietnam] and in Cambodia.

Dr. Kissinger: Especially in the Snuol area.⁷

Mr. West: We hope that is a tactical aberration. The gains that have been made can be shown by noting that last year there were three NVA divisions totalling 63,000 men on the South Vietnamese border. Now there are only 27,000. This is what we call the force dislocation effect and comes from the enemy’s loss of sanctuary and the resultant necessity to protect his rear area. Also, with the closure of Sihanoukville, the North Vietnamese have to protect their line of communication overland from the north through Kratie. One effect of all of this has been to decouple the guerrillas in MRs 3 and 4. The net attrition [of guerrilla forces] in MR 3 has been 26%. In addition, the North Vietnamese now have to divert 33% of their forces in Cambodia against FANK targets. To sum up, as long as the ARVN keeps pressure against the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth [NVA] Divisions, which are in the Snuol–Chup Area, the enemy will have to stay on the defensive. However, if the situation there begins to unravel, all bets are off. General Manh of [the South Vietnamese] JGS told me that they are going to keep the pressure on during the wet season. This has allowed the RVN to free its general reserve for use up north. They anticipate using the airborne troops and marines [which make up the reserve] in the north next year while pinning down the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth NVA Divisions where they are [in northeast Cambodia].

We look for a stalemate in the main war between the South Vietnamese and North Vietnamese in MRs 3 and 4 and in Cambodia. The North Vietnamese will be concentrating on maintaining their supplies, and South Vietnamese control [in MRs 3 and 4] will go up. After 1973, if the enemy succeeds in rebuilding his logistical system and the ARVN provides no more troops, there could be difficulties. Thus, there is a long term problem.

As for the Cambodia subphase, the enemy has the strategic initiative in every way. He has tied down 180,000 Cambodian troops (if there are 180,000 troops in the FANK). It’s hard to believe how they really are tied down until you see them just sitting around in towns and camps. The North Vietnamese have the countryside. The question is what they are going to do with it.

We had one team member who spoke fluent Vietnamese. He picked up some interesting information about the conduct of the North Vietnamese toward the Khmers in the countryside. The North Vietnamese have been using the propaganda line: “Judge your enemy by how he acts.” This invites contrast with the ARVN, whose conduct in Cambodia has been abysmal.

The North Vietnamese also claim they are supporters of Sihanouk and say the war is between the Sihanouk forces and the Lon Nol forces, who are American lackeys. To enhance their credibility, the North Vietnamese also give the Khmer Communists some nominal authority by allowing them to arrest North Vietnamese soldiers who don’t have authority to travel.

Dr. Kissinger: There aren’t any North Vietnamese except deserters travelling in Cambodia.

Mr. West: North Vietnamese soldiers are given authorized leave in Cambodia. A rallier explained to us what the procedures were.

Dr. Kissinger: They are not being very generous to the Cambodians by permitting these arrests.

Mr. West: It enables the North Vietnamese to claim that some of the Khmer Communists have control over the North Vietnamese troops.

We came away concerned that the Cambodians had granted the North Vietnamese a one-year suzerainty over the countryside. The Cambodians argued that racism will prevent the North Vietnamese from winning the support of the Khmers in the country.

Now Col. Brady can discuss the military situation.

Col. Brady: Our first observation was confirmed by what we subsequently saw—that is, that combat operations seemed very light. Even where the Cambodians said there had been battles, the physical evidence of combat was missing. This conclusion is supported by the data that less than three percent of the FANK infantry strength was killed in combat during the first year. In general, the enemy is using the economy-of-force technique. He employs small unit (as low as five or six men) attacks to harass. He also launches small fire attacks. The FANK reports these as major engagements. In Battambang Province the FANK was estimating there were 19 enemy battalions. We calculated about one regiment.

We found the FANK was on the defensive. 85% of the units said that their mission was to defend the ground they occupied. Commanders limit their actions to patrols within three kilometers of their camps. Most contacts with the enemy occur along the LOCs. Most of the areas that are regarded as under Cambodian control have in fact been forfeited.

The Cambodian commanders were concerned about shortages of ammunition and equipment. We found a hoarding phenomenon. They wouldn’t expend ammunition because of concern about resupply. They were afraid they wouldn’t be resupplied before some unplanned engagement might develop. The lack of initiative below the military region level inhibits FANK resupply operations.

Firepower is inadequate. The average battalion has about five mortars, and half of these have no sights. The troops are not trained in the use of the mortars. Instead, they are trained in nomenclature. They never fire more than one round [in training].

Dr. Kissinger: What do you mean by training in nomenclature?

Col. Brady: They have the mortars there and explain the various parts and tell how they work.

In some cases they are using Chinese 82 mm. mortars with U.S. 81 mm. mortar ammunition.

Dr. Kissinger: Does that work?

Col. Brady: The round comes out of the tube.

Dr. Kissinger: How do they aim the mortars that don’t have sights?

Col. Brady: Up at Kampol we asked about this. The reply was that the mortars had been used against enemy rockets being fired at Phnom Penh. Then they explained that the unit had an artilleryman who really knew his business. He aimed the mortars, and after about ten rockets the enemy rockets stopped. Thus, they concluded that the mortars must work.

They also told me how they had three platoons go out on patrol, and I asked how they coordinated their mortar fire with those three platoons. They again cited the expert artilleryman, who, they said, always knew where the platoons were located.

They lack even the most basic consideration for integration of firepower. That is probably why we have such a high use of air sorties there.

Finally, the FANK’s training is at low ebb. They need more people who know what they are doing. Only one-third of the officers and one-third of the whole army could be considered trained. They especially need training in infantry and technical skills, such as medical and communication services.

On the plus side, we were able to witness Khmer nationalism, esprit, and fervor. However, we can’t say whether they can marshal this effectively against the enemy. They have accomplished a good deal in fourteen months, but it is also apparent that more could have been done.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Gen. Westmoreland) What do you think about all of this?

Gen. Westmoreland: Last year I gave the Cambodians about a 50/50 chance of survival. Now I would say the odds are about 60/40 over the next eighteen months. We can increase the odds by additional assistance. The question is: how much assistance will the political traffic bear?

Dr. Kissinger: They haven’t used all they are getting.

Gen. Westmoreland: Because they have been in the throes of organizing a government. They have had growing pains as they have moved away from the monarchy. They are feeling their way. They are developing a strategy, but they haven’t applied it well. We are under constraints as to what we are able to give them. Of course, we can’t overwhelm them by providing more assistance than they can use. The fact is that they have no logistical system. We should work with them to develop it.

Also, they have no counter-insurgency effort worthy of the name. They haven’t made any campaign to wrest control away from the enemy. This is a long-term process. No results will be seen until one year after they start.

Dr. Kissinger: From what I have read in this report, we think there is going to be a stalemate. However, anytime the North Vietnamese want to move, they can run the Cambodians out.

Mr. West: Our assessment was in terms of gains for costs. The Cambodians have no place to go. The North Vietnamese would have to expend an awful lot of bodies in order to defeat them.

Dr. Kissinger: Why would they have to expend a lot of bodies?

Mr. West: Their defensive positions are set up with 18 battalions over three kilometers. The barbed wire has portholes like on a Spanish galleon. They could take the areas the Cambodians now occupy, but they would have to walk over their bodies to do it. What gain would this be to them if they were subject to our air attacks as well as to ARVN counterattacks on the ground?

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Irwin) You were just there. What do you think?

Mr. Irwin: I think it is a good report. The differences we would have would be on how you shade the findings one way or the other. The Embassy is more optimistic [than the DOD team about the Cambodian prospects].⁸

It all depends on what our objective is—on what we really want to do. The implications in this report are that we can solve the problems by increasing the MEDT and by doing more in-country training.

Dr. Kissinger: What do you think about that?

Mr. Irwin: That’s true if you could do so, but it might not be possible to get the necessary support from Congress. Even if you could solve the Congressional problem, the Embassy raises questions about the feasibility of undertaking these activities in Cambodia. We come out in favor of continuing a low profile without suggesting any specific figure [for number of U.S. personnel in Cambodia]. We prefer to put in temporary people such as teams from MACV. I gather that three survey teams are there now.

There may be differences in what the report, DOD, and we consider the U.S. objective to be.

Dr. Kissinger: There is a strategy, which we agreed to on October 26, 1970. It is set forth in NSDM 89, which says we will try to preserve half of Cambodia from enemy control and to build up the light infantry capability of the FANK. The ARVN will be used in certain areas, but its involvement will decline as FANK capabilities grow. This is the policy on which the President decided. Unless somebody wants to change it, then it is the one under which we are operating.

No one is going to give us an award for having a low profile if there is a catastrophe next year. No one is going to criticize us for a high profile if we are successful.

Why is it that only 35% of the FANK are trained? I thought that training was being carried out in Vietnam and Thailand.

Col. Brady: It’s largely a matter of numbers. Some 28,000 were trained in Vietnam last year. There are additional FANK troops there now.

Dr. Kissinger: I know it’s a matter of numbers.

Col. Brady: Then I withdraw my response.

Gen. Westmoreland: We estimate that 75% of the FANK will be trained by the first of October. NSDM 89 was not issued until October 26, so this will have been done in less than a year.

Mr. Nutter: It is a large force to train. It is disturbing that they haven’t done as much as could have been done in-country. Another thing that disturbs me is that it took this three-man team to get down there and find out what the situation was. We have people there, but they stay in Phnom Penh and are busy with paperwork. They don’t get out. We have trouble locating the equipment we have supplied. Thus, we feel we need more people in-country to keep an eye on things. We don’t say that this will solve all the problems.

Mr. Helms: I remember all the talk last year about getting the Khmer Krom to Cambodia. Here we are a year later, and they are still doing all the fighting.

Mr. Green: Last year there was profound gloom about Cambodia. 50/50 odds for its survival seemed optimistic. The situation is better than we projected a year ago. At that time we didn’t have any aid program. Now the level is $285 million. The training program has also grown, although I don’t know how many have been trained. We would not have thought the situation would be any better than it is now. It doesn’t surprise me that we still have problems.

Dr. Kissinger: They don’t give an award for doing as well as possible. They are not going to pay us off on that basis next year.

Mr. Green: Last year in Phnom Penh Cambodian officials were very bland about the war. Now Phnom Penh is under siege, and the attitude has changed. Sirik Matak, who has always been more capable than Lon Nol, is a changed man. I feel they are growing up to the situation. We are better off.

Dr. Kissinger: The question is whether we are getting them the aid which they need. We are pulling out. Next year the moment of truth will come.

For two months I have been trying to get a strategy developed. My nightmare used to be that no thinking was being done in the government about what our strategy should be. Now that we have started doing some thinking, my nightmare is that we will have the best studies ever done but they will be signed on the day the enemy offensive starts. I am going to get a strategy by the end of this month if we have to do it unilaterally over here. We are playing with national treason next year if we don’t do so.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Helms) Do you have any views on this?

Mr. Helms: I wonder if we have really advanced much with the FANK since last year. They never seem to fight.⁹ I wonder if we are doing the right thing. I am no military man, but I am concerned that even in small groups the FANK doesn’t perform well. One would think you could take 100 men and train them to perform adequately without getting them absorbed in all this glop.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not very consoling to think that racism is going to stop Communist organization.

Mr. Nutter: When you look back at the gloomy picture that Marshall Green was painting about the situation last year, you have to agree that we have bought them a year, thanks to the Cambodian and Laotian incursions and our other actions. What disturbs me is that they haven’t used the year as well as they could have.

Dr. Kissinger: Why can’t we even match up sights with mortars?

Mr. Irwin: I think the question is why we have not done better. The question is how best to go about doing what we want to achieve.

Dr. Kissinger: The CIA and other studies say that the enemy has the capability to attack Cambodia from the middle of next year. The DOD team feels they won’t do it. If the FANK could be urged to get moving during this time . . .

Mr. Green: (to Gen. Westmoreland) Have our people been urging the Cambodians on? Has Gen. Weyand been working on them?

Gen. Westmoreland: We have a tripartite [South Vietnamese, Cambodian, and U.S. military) committee. It met twice during May and has another meeting scheduled for June 12. We received a cable yesterday reporting on the last meeting. They got into quite a lot of detail. The tripartite committee has been revitalized.

Mr. Irwin: How has the training been conducted—by individuals or by units?

Gen. Westmoreland: Both ways. 33 battalions have been trained so far. There will be 43 by October 1. In FY 72 eighteen battalions will be trained.

Dr. Kissinger: Do they fight? Do we have any indication about that?

Gen. Westmoreland: I have no details or statistics on that.

Dr. Kissinger: Given the force ratios the team brought back, why can’t the FANK go out in the countryside?

Mr. West: One thing that struck us is that all orders start at the highest level. All commanding officers talk about awaiting word from the highest level.

Mr. Doolin: Part of it is the lack of organic firepower. You can’t ask a unit to operate without an artillery screen.

Col. Brady: We saw an aggressive brigade operating at Pichnil Pass. It was clearly an untrained outfit. They had five radios to each battalion and only a few medium mortars. Even though the operation was put together as non-professionals would do it, they did fight. I think with equipment and firepower (it wouldn’t have to be air support), they would fight. The nationalist fervor is there, but nobody has thought very hard about how to get the job done now.

Dr. Kissinger: In contrast to us.

Mr. Green: (to Gen. Westmoreland) Do you see something coming out of the tripartite committee that will lead to an action-oriented approach?

Gen. Westmoreland: I do feel that we need more equipment delivery teams. We need to develop a long range program for training individuals in units. There are many advantages to training their people as units.

Mr. Green: Could they be used in operations in Vietnam to gain experience?

Gen. Westmoreland: They could be used in training exercises. In South Vietnam they have the facilities, the knowhow, and the wherewithal.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we have three different problems: (1) logistical support and training for the FANK, (2) what strategy the FANK should pursue, e.g., whether FANK should permit 85% of its forces to be tied down in defensive positions, and (3) how the U.S. Government should organize itself to reach its objectives.

With regard to the first problem, what keeps us from getting a program that would provide some criteria for judging what units and equipment we ought to have—measured against some sort of time scale? If we had that, at least we would get a sense of how well we were doing in reaching our objectives. I couldn’t get from this paper any sense of what kind of force we think we are supporting. This task can be done unilaterally.

Gen. Westmoreland: JCS can do it.

Mr. Nutter: The Secretary [Laird] just sent a memorandum to the JCS asking them to draw up a program.

Mr. Doolin: We will need until July 15 to prepare a really good paper.

Dr. Kissinger: We are running up against a time limit.

Gen. Westmoreland: We can get it for you by July 1.

Dr. Kissinger: How do we handle the strategy question?

Mr. Nutter: This is part of what we are looking at. We have asked the Joint Staff to develop a plan for training and logistics to implement our strategy.

Mr. Irwin: The point is whether we should consider having a larger number of people in Phnom Penh or should concentrate on training in other countries. This is the sort of guidance I would think that Westy [Gen. Westmoreland] would want in drawing up his plans.

Dr. Kissinger: The President’s view is that we should do what is necessary to get the job done. He doesn’t think he will get any awards next year for keeping our profile low if the North Vietnamese sweep all over Cambodia. Of course, a high profile is not our objective. However, the President is not inclined to have artificial restraints on manpower.

Gen. Westmoreland: We studied this in detail. We feel our request is a modest one. It would involve 93 people in Cambodia and 20 in Saigon.

Dr. Kissinger: How many do you have now in Phnom Penh?

Gen. Westmoreland: 23 permanent plus 10–12 temporary.

Dr. Kissinger: Then we are talking about 70 people. Would you drop the TDY personnel if you got these seventy?

Gen. Westmoreland: The situation would not be the same as it is now. As a general statement, I can say that we would not have as many temporary people.

Mr. Nutter: Secretary Laird is thinking in terms of 50 people.

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, I must say that compared with what we will be up against next year, this seems like a subsidiary issue. At least, let’s get a figure we believe in and get it down on paper. We have to get this implemented in July. We don’t have much time.

Mr. Irwin: There is a different view in the Embassy of what we need.

Dr. Kissinger: Let the Embassy make its case in terms of what is needed to carry out our objectives. Let the military make their argument. This dispute has been going on since the Cambodian operation last year.

I think we have gone about as far as we can go today.

(to Gen. Westmoreland) Westy, the more of your paper that you can break out ahead of schedule the better.

Mr. Doolin: The MAP reassessment will be ready June 29.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you take a week off of that, since we are already taking two weeks off the deadline for the strategy paper?

Gen. Westmoreland: I should point out that during Congressional hearings, DOD representatives said that we would have 100–150 men in Phnom Penh. What we are asking for is a lower number.

Mr. Green: We can cite other and lower figures that our people have used in hearings.

Dr. Kissinger: The worst thing that could happen would be for us to put $300 million into Cambodia and for some newsmen or Congressional investigators to come out with a report like this one [the DOD team report].

Mr. Green: That is true if you can relate the size of our mission to attaining our objectives. The question is whether doubling or tripling personnel will do it. I asked our Ambassador about this.

Dr. Kissinger: He doesn’t want any more people.

Mr. Irwin: The Embassy also feels the group they have now is too high in rank and that this makes it seem that our intention all along was to build up the mission. They also point out that there is only one guy who speaks French.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s get Swank’s argument and the other argument. If the mission is top-heavy, let’s get the right people out there.

Mr. Nutter: I don’t believe the Embassy is right about the question of rank. The highest man out there is a colonel. There are lieutenant colonels and majors, but you have to have someone who knows what they are doing to get the job done right.

Col. Brady: I think the question of rank isn’t that significant. They are interested first in getting the job done. They are all out there when planes are to be unloaded.

Mr. Irwin: Then again you get a different impression out there. I understood that the unloading was mostly being taken care of by sergeants.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s how it was when I was in the army.

Mr. Nutter: One problem is tracing the equipment we provide.

Mr. Irwin: The Embassy says there is no reason you can’t have frequent spotchecks by visiting teams.

Dr. Kissinger: I think the main thing is to get a program and a strategy. Then we can discuss how to do it.

Mr. Green: I wouldn’t overlook having this [tripartite] committee pass the word to the Cambodians at the top. A little plain talk with Lon Nol might help. I don’t think we have to worry about the Cambodians’ morale at this point.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting was held in the Situation Room of the White House. All brackets are in the original.
2. Document 61.
3. On June 11, Kissinger sent a memorandum to Irwin, Packard, Helms, and Moorer, in which he requested the plan by July 1. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US–CAMB)
4. In his June 11 memorandum, Kissinger stated that neither a high nor low profile was a principal objective of policy. Key considerations were personnel required to provide assistance, but not training or advice; the ability to implement some of the program outside Cambodia; and whether those on temporary duty could accomplish the mission. On August 13, Laird responded that the JCS had completed the plan on July 1 but that he requested revisions because JCS based it on cost and force levels above that requested for FY 72. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, Box 61, Camb 300–399)
5. The DOD team report, entitled “A Department of Defense Assessment of the Military Situation in Cambodia, 18 April 1971–15 May 1971,” was prepared in response to Nixon’s request on April 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–1973, POL 27 CAMB.) Laird forwarded the report to Kissinger under a May 22 covering memorandum. K. Wayne Smith analyzed the report in a May 27 covering memorandum to Kissinger, and noted that U.S. funds and efforts to build up the FANK over the past year had accomplished little. Smith further explained that the FANK were inadequately trained and the GKR had no plan to train them and that 85 percent of FANK were tied down in defensive positions with no offensive strategy and deficient equipment. Smith concluded that FANK had abandoned the countryside to the enemy and allowed a self-sufficient Khmer Communist movement to further organize. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–56, SRG Meeting, Cambodia 6–7–71)
6. The third member was Colonel T. Owens, U.S. Marine Corps.
7. In a June 3 memorandum to Nixon, Kissinger summarized a report by Abrams on a significant battle near Snuol in which the enemy attacked ARVN forces as they were preparing to withdraw. According to Abrams, Minh reacted quickly, called in reinforcements, inflicted heavy damage on the enemy, and successfully pulled back his forces to South Vietnam to wait out the rainy season. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 155, Vietnam Country Files, Viet June 71)
8. In a July 4 meeting with Kissinger in Saigon, Swank noted that most of his staff concurred with the report but added: “It’s only that we were surprised that the West team was surprised. In such a short time you cannot expect miracles.” (Memorandum of conversation, July 4 (mistakenly dated June 4); ibid., Box 512, Country Files, Far East, Cambodia, Vol. XIII)
9. In addition to the problems with the FANK, Helms informed Kissinger in a June 4 memorandum that he was terminating the program to form four Cambodian SGUs for use in southern Laos because the recruits were of poor quality with no will to fight. Helms noted that two battalions that had been recruited by Lon Non, Lon Nol’s brother, had fought badly on the Bolovens Plateau and been AWOL since April. Helms believed that Lon Non had intended to use them as cover for his narcotics smuggling operations. (Ibid.)