Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

211. Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 7, 1971.

Kissinger: Well, on the Delta, I talked to our commander there, who is one of our few good ones—General Cushman²—when he was here about six weeks ago. And he said there’s slightly more enemy activity, but, actually, that the situation is under good control. And him, I tend to believe. I wouldn’t believe a word Abrams says anymore.

Nixon: I know.

Kissinger: And—

Nixon: You’ve got to go directly to the local [unclear] commanders from now on.

Kissinger: Except that—except for Cushman, he’s put second-raters in as corps commanders—Abrams—

Nixon: Yeah, okay. Well, at least, there’s one. What about [unclear]?

Kissinger: Second, that Thieu had a conversation last week with Bruce—with Bunker, in which he outlined his plan for after the election, and he said he could move some of the troops that had been active in the Delta into the more threatened areas, because they had cleaned out the base areas.

Nixon: Um-hmm.

Kissinger: But I don’t think the Delta is our worst area—is our big problem—

Nixon: When these guys are out running around, they don’t know anything, of course. [unclear]

Kissinger: Our problems are I Corps, and with that incompetent they’ve put in to replace Tri—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —it may start acting up in III Corps again.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. What about the other points [unclear]?

Kissinger: And we talked about that yesterday. That’s absolutely—we’re going to do that.

Nixon: Okay [unclear].

Kissinger: We’ve got the plan. We’ve got more amm—

Nixon: At least we’ll hit them hard.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: I want the—I want them to be out there, loading hard and fast, because we’re really going to crack the bastards.

Kissinger: Absolutely. And I agree with you on the other point.

Nixon: It’s one of those things that—

Kissinger: That’s just—

Nixon: —but sometimes is not particularly friendly, then, in terms of the war situation, but, they’re accurately reflecting what the attitude of the people are. We’re just at that time when even that attitude isn’t going to budge us, but it will—it could very well budge Senators, Henry. That’s my point—

Kissinger: I talked to MacGregor³ this morning about—

Nixon: Good.

Kissinger: —McGovern–Hatfield—⁴

Nixon: What does he say?

Kissinger: He thinks we cannot—It would be a mistake to try to talk it to death, because it would kill the draft—

Nixon: We assume.

Kissinger: He thinks the vote, now, is 52 to 40 in our favor. And—

Nixon: McGovern–Hatfield?

Kissinger: On McGovern–Hatfield. And he thinks the McGovern–Hatfield one is easy if—

Nixon: And the draft?

Kissinger: No, the draft is all right. Our problem would be the same as the Mansfield one, that somebody comes in with a—

Nixon: Yeah?

Kissinger: —with a substitute resolution. But, if one of those substitute resolutions—we shouldn’t—we should hard-line it. But, it’s—to say they took the—what is that Cook–Stevens one, nine months after they released the last prisoners—we wouldn’t want that. But [unclear].

Nixon: [laughs] Hell, they aren’t going to really release them, or they’d release them today and that could do it.

Kissinger: So—

Nixon: You know—

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: —they can at least start talking. [unclear]

Kissinger: But he said he’s actually quite confident—MacGregor—and, you know, he’s usually soft on this. I told him even—we can’t have it now. He thinks it’s possible, if we absolutely must, if we line up Mansfield, to get it delayed for month, but then signals would go up all over the—

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: —the Senate.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation 511–1. No classification marking. The editors transcribed the portions of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume. This exchange is part of a larger conversation, 9:43–11:05 a.m.
2. Major General John H. Cushman, from May 1971, head of Delta Regional Assistance Command and thus senior U.S. military adviser in Military Region 4.
3. Clark MacGregor was Counsel to the President for Congressional Relations.
4. The McGovern––Hatfield Amendment would have required a United States military withdrawal from Vietnam by December 31. It was defeated on June 16 by a Senate vote of 55 to 42.