213. Memorandum From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon1
SUBJECT
- Memorandum From Secretary Laird on POW’s
Secretary Laird has sent you a memorandum (Tab A)2 expressing his concern that we may get trapped by the North Vietnamese on the POW issue. The Secretary makes the following points:
- —We have given great emphasis to the POW’s.
- —There is a growing possibility that the families may turn against us on this issue and call for a withdrawal date, thus (he fears) turning public opinion at large against us.
- —The North Vietnamese may try some maneuver which would
embarrass us and which could, if they are clever, make us give
up more than they are already asking:
- —For example, they could indicate that they would “release” our POW’s at a specified time if we would set a date.
- —Or, even worse, they might offer a release date in exchange for a U.S. commitment to end all military aid to South Vietnam and to grant economic aid to all the countries of Southeast Asia, including North Vietnam.
- —In order to preempt such a Hanoi move, the Secretary believes it is urgent “that we review again the question of linking release of prisoners to troop withdrawal and the setting of a date certain for U.S. withdrawal.” He believes this is “our only hope for avoiding damaging concessions.”3
All of us have from time to time wondered why Hanoi does not propose the kind of bargain Secretary Laird fears. We do not know the reason, but we suspect it is because the North Vietnamese want more for the POW’s than just a U.S. withdrawal. They also want us to turnover the South Vietnamese Government, which they may fear they can no longer do themselves. They may also want to build more [Page 689] steam under the issue before they actually do offer release of POW’s, although they are obviously also under some time pressure if they want to have a devastating effect on the upcoming South Vietnamese elections.
As you know, the Laird memorandum has been overtaken by our recent initiative. In addition, he is also writing for the record.
- Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 121, Vietnam Subject Files, Viet (POW), Vol. II. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. A stamped notation on the memorandum reads, “The President has seen.” Smyser sent this memorandum to Kissinger under a June 4 covering memorandum, recommending that he sign it.↩
- Attached but not printed is a memorandum from Laird to Nixon, May 17.↩
- Nixon highlighted this paragraph and wrote the following: “K—note! He is right on the political problem however.”↩