Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

184. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker) to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Saigon, April 17, 1971, 1210Z.

270. Ref: WHS–1038.²

1. I assume special Paris forum refers to talks between you and Yul.

2. I think we should inform Thieu in advance that we have had an indication of interest of the other side in resuming private contact and that you propose to meet very secretly to determine whether there is any serious interest now in negotiations with or without a cease-fire. We would say that, as always, we will inform him promptly of results of meeting. This would conform to precedent already established and will avoid any elements of suspicion which post-disclosure might generate.

3. It seems to me that the aim of this first meeting should be exclusively to establish whether Hanoi is interested in negotiations or not. Depending on the outcome, we can then determine whether to table a package at the next meeting. To surface proposal now so soon after Lam Son 719, in which RVNAF took heavy losses, followed by acceleration of our withdrawal, could shake Thieu’s confidence in credibility of our support at time when it is most important that it remain solid. Moreover it would be subject to misunderstanding by the other side. As RVNAF demonstrates its strength, resilience, and recuperative powers, as it is already beginning to do, confidence will increase and Thieu (and the GVN) will prove receptive to proposal.

4. I would envisage scenario along the following lines:

A) At first meeting we should say that we intend to continue to reduce our forces during 1971 and 1972. All our forces will be out of ground combat during 1971. Air and logistic support will continue thereafter until the South Vietnamese air and logistic forces are fully ready to assume these responsibilities.

B) The South Vietnamese military forces, regular and territorial, number 1.1 million men. They are professionally led and combat hardened. They are supported by 1.5 million members of the Peoples’ Self-Defense Force who have been combat trained. These forces cannot be defeated in the field even after our forces leaves Viet-Nam. In accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, we intend to supply South Vietnamese military forces with all essential military equipment indefinitely.

C) The South Vietnamese economy is solidly based and economic improvement will continue to be made. We intend to maintain economic support of the economy as long as it is necessary. As our troops leave and dollar earnings fall, we will make up the loss with more economic aid so as to maintain a high and steady level of economic support. There will be no collapse of the economy.

D) In Cambodia and Laos, we intend to continue to supply economic and military aid indefinitely. The Cambodian forces have greatly expanded and improved during the past year and will further expand and improve in the coming years. The South Vietnamese will continue to give Cambodia support in the form of training and cross-border operations.

E) We are prepared to withdraw all our forces from Viet-Nam if there is a negotiated settlement for Indo-China and a return of our prisoners, and to provide a timetable. If there is no negotiated settlement, then we will reduce to a minimum force and maintain it indedefinitely.

F) In South Viet-Nam—indeed in Cambodia and Laos, as well—there is a real desire for peace and a negotiated settlement on the part of the people, the main organized groups and the government. In the absence of a negotiated settlement the great majority of people believe there is no alternative except to continue to fight. If there is no negotiated settlement the prospect that we see is an indefinite continuation of the war between North Viet-Nam and the rest of Indo-China which neither side can win.

G) The longer the war goes on, the more difficult it will be to arrange a negotiated settlement. After this year’s South Vietnamese elections, it will be even more difficult to negotiate, and after our forces are reduced to a minimum, it will be still more difficult. It seems to us it is in everyone’s interests to open negotiations now.

H) South Viet-Nam has a constitution and functioning government, and new elections for a National Assembly and the President will take place in August and October. The South Vietnamese will not give up their constitution or their elections in favor of Hanoi’s proposals for a provisional government that will install a coalition government by means of an election. That is a reality that Hanoi must face. Hanoi will not accept the present constitution and government in South Viet-Nam which is a reality that South Viet-Nam must face. But negotiations have a dynamics of their own. Once there is a cease-fire and negotiations all kinds of formulas and arrangements which represent something between the South Vietnamese Government and the Hanoi proposals can be examined and discussed. A serious attempt on both sides to find a middle way in which the interests of all sides are protected could in our opinion produce a negotiated settlement. We, therefore, propose immediate negotiations for a cease-fire to be followed by negotiations for an overall and durable settlement.

5. If the other side is determined to stick to its old formula, there is probably nothing to be gained in pursuing the matter. If there is interest in real negotiations, we could then table a package at the second meeting which might contain:

I) Terminal date for withdrawal of all U.S. forces, say in a 12 month period, effective perhaps 1 September 1972.

II) Terminal date would not be effective until prisoner exchange completed.

III) Cease-fire in all SEA to become effective 1 September 1971.

IV) Infiltration limited to amount needed to provide for rotation and supply of troops and to make up losses.

V) International supervision of cease-fire.

VI) On completion of withdrawal of U.S. forces and exchange of prisoners all foreign troops would begin withdrawal from countries of Indo-China—(NVN from Laos, Cambodia, SVN; Thais from Laos), such withdrawal to be completed within six months, i.e., by March 1, 1973.

Thieu would be informed of this package.³

6. Meeting between two Presidents, late June or early July. Thieu would:

A) Say GVN would not require ground combat role of U.S. troops after December 31, 1971.

B) Request U.S. to withdraw all troops by September 1, 1972.

C) Agree to exchange of all prisoners by September 1, 1972.

7. President Nixon would assure Thieu on following points:

A) The U.S. will provide long-term economic aid.

B) Acceleration of Vietnamization and further strengthening of RVNAF with additional equipment.

C) Continuation of air support until RVN Air Force attains adequate strength.

8. I discussed with Thieu April 16 the question of a political initiative. In all the previous discussions we have had, the last one taking place during Secretary Laird’s meeting with him,⁴ Thieu agreed in principle that some political initiative would be advisable, but he has always added that the timing is important, that the problem is difficult and that there are limitations on what he can say. He expressed similar views today, but said he was having his staff study problem carefully. Regarding timing, he thought it is too soon after Lam Son 719 to do it now lest it be misinterpreted by Hanoi and his own people. On the other hand it cannot be done too close to the Vietnamese elections lest it become an issue in the elections. The most favorable time for the initiative would be prior to his meeting with the President.

Warm regards.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 85, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations March 70 on. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.
2. Document 180.
3. In backchannel message WHS 1047 to Bunker, May 25, Kissinger informed him that a secret meeting was set for May 31 and that he would use a modified version of Bunker’s recommendations, excluding specific withdrawal deadlines. Kissinger further told him that the administration would never concede to North Vietnamese demands to replace South Vietnam’s leaders and that such political issues should be settled by the Vietnamese themselves. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 869, For the President’s Files—Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David Cables, 10/69–12/31/71)
4. See Document 105.