Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

105. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, January 19, 1971, noon.

SUBJECT

• Minutes of the WSAG Meeting

PARTICIPANTS

• U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary for Political Affairs, Department of State
• David Packard, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Department of Defense
• Admiral Moorer, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
• Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman, Jr., Deputy Director, Central Intelligence Agency
• Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
• Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting by informing the group that the meeting was being convened to discuss two future military operations by South Vietnamese forces. These would be conducted outside South Vietnam and had been approved by the President in a meeting with the Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Director of Central Intelligence on the preceding day.²

Dr. Kissinger stated that there were actually three operations involved. The first was the clearing operation along Route 4 which was currently under way. Dr. Kissinger did not feel that operation required much discussion at the meeting. The two subsequent operations would be conducted in the near future, and Dr. Kissinger asked Admiral Moorer to discuss plans for these operations.

Admiral Moorer stated that on approximately February 4, 1971, ARVN forces would initiate an operation targeted on the area of the Chup Plantation, north and east of Kompong Cham. The operation would involve between 20,000 and 22,000 South Vietnamese forces in an area where there were approximately 12,000 enemy forces. The operation was designed to extend through the entire dry season and would consist of three phases:

• —Phase 1 would involve a drive by South Vietnamese forces west along route 7 toward Kompong Cham. Concurrently, South Vietnamese forces would also attack northwest along Route 1.
• —Phase 2 would involve operations north of route 7 into the Chup Plantation area up to the elbow of the Mekong River. This phase of the operation would be launched as soon as route 7 had been opened as far west as Kompong Cham.
• —Phase 3 would involve a sweep south of route 7 by ARVN forces, including a link-up of the northern Task Forces, with the ARVN forces attacking northwest from route 1.

Mr. Johnson inquired about the coordination of the operation, how it would be done, and whether or not we were leaving it entirely to the South Vietnamese and the Cambodians to resolve. Mr. Kissinger replied that this was essentially the procedure which was being followed although General Abrams was obviously aware of the coordination involved. Admiral Moorer stated that he was quite sure that Lon Nol was thoroughly apprised of the forthcoming operation. He added that U.S. involvement in the operation would consist of air support, logistics lift, medical evacuation and gunship support and that these arrangements were also being worked out locally. Admiral Moorer stated that he would contact General Abrams following the meeting and insure that necessary coordination was under control. Dr. Kissinger added that the purpose of the meeting was to prepare a check list for these requirements.

Admiral Moorer then continued his presentation, stating that the Chup operation would start around February 4th but that the date was not yet precise.

Mr. Johnson then interjected a question concerning the route 4 operation which was under way, asking whether or not the Cambodians could be expected to hold the route open once it had been cleared by the South Vietnamese. Admiral Moorer replied that the South Vietnamese assistance would enable the Cambodians to occupy the high ground in the Pich Nil Pass which they have never held before and that this fact, together with ample U.S. air support, should enable the Cambodians to do quite well.

Admiral Moorer also pointed out that in the route clearing operation then under way, we had moved two helicopter platforms—the Cleveland which actually carried the helicopters and the Iwo Jima which was providing the logistic support off the southern coast of Cambodia. The Cleveland was operating within five miles of the coast and the Iwo Jima was farther out to sea in international waters. Mr. Johnson asked whether or not the helicopters were Marine or Army. Admiral Moorer confirmed that Army aviation was involved.

Admiral Moorer then turned to the Tchepone operation in Southern Laos. Admiral Moorer stated that this operation would be conducted in four phases and was designed to clean out the Tchepone area which is the critical LOC control point for the flow of enemy supplies into Laos, Cambodia, and South Vietnam. The operation would involve two ARVN division equivalents—the ARVN airborne division and the 1st ARVN Division from I Corps. The South Vietnamese strategic reserve, which normally consisted of the airborne division, would be reconstituted by a brigade of South Vietnamese marines now involved in the route 4 clearing operation, thus permitting the airborne division to be moved into I Corps for employment in Laos:

• —Phase 1 would consist of preparatory operations during which the U.S. 5th Mechanized Brigade would attack west along Highway 9 in South Vietnam to secure the line of communications for the operation and to establish logistics and fire support bases along South Vietnam’s border with Laos. An airhead would be established at Khe Sanh and U.S. heavy artillery would be placed along the border. Concurrently, South Vietnamese and U.S. forces would establish blocking positions south of the demilitarized zone.
• —Phase 2 would consist of an assault into Tchepone and an overland attack by the 1st ARVN Division, west along route 9. The 1st Division would establish fire support bases north and south of route 9 and the river paralleling this route.
• —Phase 3. Once route 9 was secure and the Tchepone airfield seized and secure, ARVN forces would commence probes out of Tchepone along key logistics routes in Laos.
• —Phase 4. This phase involves optional courses of action which may or may not be undertaken, dependent on developments. The option for phase 4 would include an attack southwest from Tchepone through Base Area 611 and a link-up with separate ARVN forces attacking northwest from a position just east of Base Area 611 in South Vietnam.

Admiral Moorer stated that U.S. support for this operation would consist of logistics lift, tactical fighter, bomber and B–52 bomber support, helicopter evacuation, and gunship support. Phase 1 of the operation was to commence about January 30 with Phase 2 on or about the 7th or 8th of February.

Dr. Kissinger asked if it would be likely that the enemy would know that the ARVN were coming. Admiral Moorer answered that we had habitually attacked along route 9 in South Vietnam and it was likely that the Phase 1 operation would not stir too much concern. He stated that code names were being used which conformed to earlier Ashau Valley operations to insure that enemy forces would not pick up the fact of the pending operation.

Mr. Johnson noted that an attack on Tchepone was precisely what he had recommended in 1965 but that his recommendations had been overruled by estimates that six U.S. divisions were required for such an operation. He was now astounded that people believed it could be done with two ARVN divisions, even recognizing that the enemy had become much weaker in the interim. Mr. Packard stated that we estimated it could be done with good air support and because the enemy lacks our mobility and would have difficulty in reacting. Mr. Packard added that the operation should last several months. Mr. Johnson stated that there were many enemy close to the demilitarized zone who could reinforce.

Dr. Kissinger then asked whether or not it would be possible to compress the time between Phase 1 and Phase 2. Secretary Packard replied that this time was needed to open route 9 in South Vietnam and to be sure that it was in good trafficable condition. Admiral Moorer reiterated that since we had opened this route many times in the past it would merely look like a repeat operation and added that the enemy would have difficulty reacting very quickly.

Both Mr. Johnson and Mr. Packard stated that in this area it was probable that the enemy would have to stand and fight. Dr. Kissinger agreed and asked Admiral Moorer whether or not he thought adequate friendly forces were being employed. Admiral Moorer stated that he had discussed this issue in detail with General Abrams, General Lon and General Sutherland and that all were confident.

Dr. Kissinger asked whether three ARVN battalions would be able to hold Tchepone airfield. Admiral Moorer answered that the overall weight of preponderance in favor of the South Vietnamese would be three to one. Dr. Kissinger asked how long it would take for the overland elements to link up with the air assault elements at Tchepone, and Admiral Moorer replied that the link-up would be very quick since they were only moving some 35 kilometers.

Mr. Johnson then asked if the concept was to hold Tchepone during the entire period. Admiral Moorer stated that Tchepone would serve as an airhead to support the overall operation in Laos but that operations would commence along the routes leading into and leaving Tchepone.

Mr. Johnson stated that he was somewhat surprised that Tchepone had been selected and wondered why an operation further south in Laos, farther from North Vietnamese reserves in North Vietnam, had not been selected. Admiral Moorer answered that a careful analysis had been made of all possibilities.

Dr. Kissinger then stated that the day’s objective was to prepare a detailed check list of what preliminary actions had to be accomplished with respect to the operation. He stated that yesterday the President had approved the operation, as well as the provision of medical evacuation, helicopter logistics and gunship support, the utilization of heavy U.S. artillery in South Vietnam, as well as B–52 raids in Laos. The President had also approved a public line for the Chup operation. With respect to Tchepone operation the principals had suggested that a line be taken to the effect that ARVN forces were conducting a raid in force against enemy logistics installations in Laos.

Dr. Kissinger stated that it would be necessary now to prepare a detailed diplomatic scenario for both operations. With respect to Chup, this would be a minimal requirement which should involve being sure that Lon Nol was fully apprised of events. It was probable that an announcement from Saigon would be adequate. Admiral Moorer commented that Lon Nol would be in Saigon the following day and would undoubtedly be well briefed on the operation. Secretary Packard instructed Admiral Moorer to send General Abrams a message designed to insure that Lon Nol was aboard.

Mr. Johnson said that our public position on Chup should merely be a straightforward statement of the fact. He then asked when the Tchepone operation would occur and Admiral Moorer reiterated that Phase 2 would commence on approximately February 7 or 8. Secretary Packard noted that both the Chup and Tchepone operations were almost simultaneous, thus posing the enemy with maximum difficulty.

Mr. Johnson then asked who was aware of the Tchepone operation, emphasizing that the most careful public relations handling would have to be assured. He stated that it was probable that Souvanna would not be overly concerned if operations were conducted in areas outside of his control. Probably the best public line would be to say very little but in either event it was essential that the South Vietnamese, the Lao’s and ourselves carefully coordinate on a public position.

Mr. Johnson asked if we should say something to Souvanna before the operation. Dr. Kissinger commented that he may actually prefer not to be put in a position of having to approve the operation, as was the case with Lon Nol on the Cambodian incursions. Mr. Johnson stated that this was merely a question that had to be answered. In any event, he believed that the public relations posture was a crucial one and should involve:

• —The public relations posture of the GVN.
• —The development of an integrated public relations plan which had been carefully coordinated and agreed to by Souvanna.

Mr. Johnson continued that it is obvious that we would take much domestic flak because of the violation of Laotian neutrality. Secretary Packard proposed that a Task Force be formed to develop a public relations plan on a close hold basis.

Dr. Kissinger cautioned that the danger of leaks within our government was a serious one. Mr. Johnson stated that he would like to cut in Assistant Secretary Green and Ambassador Sullivan. Dr. Kissinger agreed that this was acceptable but emphasized that a specific list of those who are informed of the operation must be maintained by all departments and agencies. Mr. Johnson agreed and stated that the list should not be enlarged without the specific approval of the principals. Dr. Kissinger concurred and stated that he would provide participants with the NSC list which would be limited to General Haig and one other. Mr. Packard suggested that dissemination be withheld for another week. Dr. Kissinger agreed in general with the exception of Assistant Secretary Green and Ambassador Sullivan.

Dr. Kissinger then stated that the task at hand was to prepare a diplomatic scenario, a public relations game plan, and a plan for congressional liaison. The plan should include a precise listing of who does and says what.

Mr. Johnson stated that he believed that South Vietnam was the major problem. Dr. Kissinger stated that Ambassador Bunker would be in Washington on February 1 and asked if it might not be prudent to ask Ambassador Bruce to return also. Mr. Johnson suggested that Ambassador Bruce could be brought aboard at the time of the operation.

Dr. Kissinger asked General Cushman to prepare a CIA estimate of enemy, Chicom, Soviet and other pertinent worldwide reactions on the closest hold basis. He asked Mr. Johnson to have State prepare a contingency plan in the event of Chicom intervention and added that Mr. Johnson might want to include representation from Defense and NSC. Mr. Packard stated that he believed there was a possibility of stepped up North Vietnamese operations in Northern Laos.

Dr. Kissinger then asked Mr. Johnson to insure that a US/UN posture on the issue of the Geneva Accords was included in the diplomatic scenario and that the question of contacts with other governments such as the British and the organization of the United Nations also was included. He emphasized that U.S. actions should be held to a minimum so as to give the operation a regional flavor.

Mr. Kissinger suggested that the group meet again on Thursday,³ that they bring their access lists, and that action be withheld in assigning tasks within the bureaucracy until that time. Mr. Johnson agreed but stated that he would, of course, discuss the operation with Assistant Secretary Green and Ambassador Sullivan.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 83, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations File, Vol I. Top Secret; Sensitive. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. The meeting ended at 12:50 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule) In a memorandum to Kissinger, January 19, Haig noted that the primary purpose of the meeting was to initiate Washington level planning and coordination for the dry season offensive and that it was being restricted to WSAG principals only. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–79, WSAG Meetings, (Principals Only) Vietnam 1–19–71)
2. See Document 104.
3. January 21.