Office of the Historian

180. Backchannel Message From the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Bunker)1

Washington, April 13, 1971, 1539Z.

WHS 1038. We plan to approach other side soon to reopen special Paris forum. They indicated interest through Dobrynin here before latter returned to Moscow for Party Congress.2 However, we plan usual direct contact and do not envisage going through Soviet Union.

If they agree to resume talks our thinking is to table a concrete package, say that we want to know promptly if genuine negotiations are possible, and indicate that time for negotiated settlement is in fact running out. We envisage a package proposal along the lines that Haig discussed with you on March trip.3

I would appreciate your personal views in this channel on the following:

  • —What should be in the package, including possible new elements.
  • —How do we handle Thieu, including his likely reaction to the proposals.

You indicated to Haig that we should test other side’s reaction before informing Thieu. This has obvious advantages and avoids possible problems such as shaking Thieu’s morale when there are real doubts that the other side will negotiate seriously. On the other hand, failure to take Thieu into our confidence from the outset also has clearcut pitfalls for our bilateral relationship. If we do go to him in advance how much detail should we give him? Do we seek his concurrence or do we in effect tell him what we are going to do in any event? How do you envisage the scenario, including early summer meeting between the two Presidents and South Vietnam’s October election?

Warm regards.

  1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 869, For the President’s Files-Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Sensitive, Camp David, Cables, 10/69–12/31/71. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. In an April 12 memorandum to Kissinger, Lord wrote the following: “I know I am preaching to the converted when I say now is the time for an all-out effort for a negotiated settlement in Indochina.” He recommended contacting Bunker to get his opinion on how to deal with Thieu. (Ibid., Box 853, For the President’s Files-Lord, Vietnam Negotiations, Camp David, Vol. VII)↩
  2. See Document 165.↩
  3. See Document 151.↩