Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

126. Minutes of a Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, February 10, 1971, 11 a.m.

SUBJECT

• Military Operations in South Laos and North Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman—Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • Amb. U. Alexis Johnson
  • Amb. William Sullivan
• Defense
  • Mr. Dennis Doolin
• JCS
  • Adm. Thomas Moorer
• CIA
  • Mr. Richard Helms
  • Mr. George Carver
• NSC
  • Gen. Alexander M. Haig
  • Mr. John H. Holdridge

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS²

Dr. Kissinger: Is it raining or not? I’d appreciate a weather report so that we can all understand what’s going on.

Adm. Moorer: The latest report we have is as of 0230Z, that is, 10:30 last night our time, so that this refers to the situation around noon Vietnam time. We don’t have a report for the rest of the day. Fog was reported then, but helicopter insertions were made. We sometimes have a situation where fire support bases on a hilltop may be clear, but it’s foggy down on the ground. The fog usually burns off by mid-morning. The prognosis now is that the clouds will decrease. There is good weather to the west, and 239 sorties were carried out, but right along the border there is low visibility from time to time, although this is not critical. Running on our side of the border, it is more difficult to run along Route 9. This is being taken care of. There is some delay in establishing fire support bases, but we are not trying to rush in—this is an orderly process. Abe thinks the operation is going well, and that the South Vietnamese are showing excellent professionalism.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there anything in the CBS report to the effect that there is an embargo on US casualty reports?

Adm. Moorer: Casualty reports are being regularly released once a week.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we say that casualties are being reported in the normal way, and that there are no restrictions?

Adm. Moorer: Yes.

Amb. Sullivan: This week’s report will be released tonight, and there will be 24 killed.

Dr. Kissinger: Are the Laotian figures being folded into the Vietnam figures? Will they be folded in next week? What about helicopter losses?

Adm. Moorer: We always mention helicopter losses, and will have all casualties for all Indochina. These will not be identified as having been in Laos or any particular place.

Dr. Kissinger: Couldn’t we treat all our losses the same? I would prefer not to separate any of them out.

Amb. Johnson: The press will hound us for Laotian casualties.

Amb. Sullivan: We could report losses on a daily basis, including helicopter losses, and casualties in Laos and Cambodia. I’ll take this up at the Friday³ meeting of the Ad Hoc Group.

Dr. Kissinger: I would appreciate a recommendation on Friday, but I have no fixed views, except I want to be able to state that we can categorically deny that there is an embargo on casualties and that we are reporting exactly as we have been reporting prior to the Laotian operation. Where are we militarily?

Adm. Moorer: The North Vietnamese are moving reinforcements from the north across Highway 9. We have reports of 2400 and 1200 men. This raises the enemy total to 19,000 in the whole area, all of whom are combat troops.

Dr. Kissinger: This doesn’t worry us?

Adm. Moorer: No. Abe has said our forces are at the intersection of Routes 9 and 92, and that the road is open all the way from the Laotian border with ground forces supporting. Two more fire support bases have been inserted. The road from the intersection west is in very good shape, since this has been part of their main route. When we decide to go into Tchepone, we’ll watch the weather and wait until the best conditions develop. The operation is going on schedule, and is very satisfactory.

Mr. Helms: What is showing up north of Route 9 is the equivalent of a North Vietnamese division. That’s what we want—to give them a pasting. They want to put harassing fire on the gorges along Route 9 and make it difficult for us to move up. The enemy unit is the 320th Division.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we bombing?

Adm. Moorer: Yes. We are using B–52s there at every opportunity. There are now people on the ground and we are getting much better information.

Dr. Kissinger: Will they attempt to pick up a fire support base?

Adm. Moorer: They may try, as they did at Khesanh. Their tactic is to close in at night and rush the friendly positions.

Mr. Carver: Most casualties in Chup were suffered this way.

Adm. Moorer: At Khesanh, they rushed several times, but we bombed them with B–52s. It’s beginning to shape up into a pattern on their side—they’re reacting by giving wild instructions to the Binh Trams to move and pull back. They have been disrupted. Chup is going fine, with a number of encounters. A regiment in the vicinity of Snuol directed an attack against the ARVN, several clashes ensued, and they came off the worse. A lot of the Chup plantation area is burning. The operation is moving from the west to the northeast side. We’ll have a series of clashes—50 today or 70 tomorrow, and they’ll be decimated, particularly if they don’t get supplies. We have found some small caches.

Mr. Helms: We had had confirmation that ‘flu is taking hold among North Vietnamese troops in the Panhandle. An intercept spoke of a “rapidly deteriorating health situation” within one unit.

Amb. Sullivan: Have the ARVN troops been inoculated?

Adm. Moorer: I don’t know. We’ll check, but I imagine that they have been inoculated.

Dr. Kissinger: Have we stopped the enemy supply offensive?

Amb. Sullivan and Mr. Helms: No, they are relocating truck traffic to Route 23 and moving through Muong Phine.

Mr. Helms: There has been no drop-off at all.

Amb. Sullivan: When they get to where Route 16 intercepts the Se Kong, they are literally under the guns of PS–22, which maintains 24-hour coverage. For this reason, PS–22 is a prime NVA target.

Dr. Kissinger: The enemy can get supplies over?

Amb. Sullivan: And troops. However, we blew the bridge at the Se Dong River.

Mr. Helms: The enemy can’t be enjoying it.

Dr. Kissinger: What about the total tonnage in the system?

Mr. Carver: The bulk of the serious supplies for the enemy’s southern forces are still north of Tchepone.

Adm. Moorer: Last night there were truck kills both north and south of Tchepone.

Amb. Sullivan: North Vietnamese broadcasts began last night to show concern over attacks against their own territory north of the DMZ. Ky has said publicly that this is the best place to attack.

Adm. Moorer: They’re worried about an amphibious operation.

Dr. Kissinger: Have there been any political reactions?

Amb. Sullivan: There was a message from Souvannavong to Souvanna, which didn’t blame him but rather the US and South Vietnamese, and saying that the PL would resist with all its forces. Souvanna was asked to intercede. This message was significant because it showed that they are not abandoning the Geneva Agreement of 1962. Minin (the Soviet Ambassador in Vientiane) went to Luang Prabang to see the King, and Tass put out another statement about the British having prostituted their co-chairman role by supporting the US. The Canadian Minister here passed to me the instructions which the Canadians have sent to their missions, which were to get the ICC into Tchepone to investigate. I was also given a copy of the Indian declaration, which contained a lot of prize words, but wasn’t very helpful. The Indians should put their money where their mouth is. I heard from Habib, who says there is no sign of any postponement in the talks. Some demonstrations have taken place in various capitals.

On actions with regard to Laos, we have sent a cable to Vientiane about evacuating the King.⁴ We have also drafted a joint State/Defense message regarding the personnel ceilings in Laos. Are we still in agreement on having flexibility between 1040 and 1100 people?

Dr. Kissinger: We’ll clear the message. I mentioned this to the President, who had no trouble.

Amb. Sullivan: What about giving authority to the people in the field on Arc Light?

Adm. Moorer: We will straighten this out with Packard.

Mr. Helms: We had a message from Godley which contained a lot of advice on what should be done to deal with the North Laos situation. We told our Station in Vientiane to stand back and get shut of the tactical situation, and to look at Long Tieng objectively to see what can be done.

Dr. Kissinger: Are there any other problems?

Mr. Doolin: Secretary Laird has already lifted the ceilings, and Mr. Packard wants to assure the group that Defense will do everything that is needed.

Dr. Kissinger: What does this mean?

Adm. Moorer: We are writing a message now, and will take care of the personnel limits.

Amb. Sullivan: One of the things that Godley was pointing out in his message is that he would like an increase in sorties allocated to the Raven FACs. The problem is that only a small percentage of TACAIR missions are flown without a designated target even if a more lucrative target can be developed by a sortie. A certain number of sorties are assigned to a Raven, who orders a strike against what he considers a lucrative target. However, the 7th Air Force doesn’t want to designate sorties to the Raven but prefers to frag in Saigon against designated targets. It would be better to give control to the Raven FACs, since the other targets may be as much as 72-hours old.

Dr. Kissinger: What about that? It seems like good sense to me.

Adm. Moorer: We will work this out, positively.

Amb. Sullivan: One other thing from Godley—the situation is improving in Long Tieng. They have pulled T–28s out of the line from Luang Prabang, and L–19s too, from sunset to dawn in order to get more sorties. One other matter. What about the pay for the Thai RCTs if they go into Laos?

Mr. Doolin: If the RCTs move into Laos as regular forces, we can’t pay them. We have no authority, and can only pay for local forces. But we could pay if the RCTs were converted into SGUs. Also, we can support Vietnamese moving from the direction of Vietnam, but not the other way. Sierra Romeo can be paid as on-going, but the 13th RCT is now carried on the books as a SGU.

Mr. Helms: This is a little fiction which we are carrying on.

Amb. Sullivan: If the Thai RCTs were shifted to SGUs, I assume that Dick Helms would pay them through switchback from Defense funds.

Mr. Doolin: The greatest danger now with Proxmire⁵ taking over is of being accused of violating Congressional actions. The 13th RCT is o.k. because it was put in before the legislation. The cost for the new RCT would be $3 million per month each.

Dr. Kissinger: For operations along Route 9?

Mr. Doolin: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: What do we have in Long Tieng in the way of Thai troops?

Mr. Helms: Three infantry battalions and two artillery battalions, with two SGUs about to go.

Dr. Kissinger: One other question—should we move the Thai RCTs to the border as a warning?

Amb. Sullivan: There would be a logistics problem. They are now in Ubon and Korat where they can function. On the border where there are no base or housing facilities it would be more difficult.

Mr. Helms: The regular Thai army has almost zero mobility. Whenever a move is needed, the US has to do the moving.

Amb. Johnson: Moreover, when the Thai regulars leave their garrisons, they must be paid per diem.

Amb. Sullivan: If a surge comes across Route 9, they can be moved then.

Dr. Kissinger: What could the enemy accomplish by moving westward?

Mr. Helms: It would be more likely for the enemy to curve back up north.

Amb. Sullivan: I think the enemy will give more emphasis to Route 23. This raises the question of getting Cambodian SGUs in to help out the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: Aren’t we planning to cut Route 23? When will this be done?

Adm. Moorer: That’s Phase II of the irregular operation. We will fly the SGUs in, going from Route 911 to Route 23.

Dr. Kissinger: Are they using Route 23 now?

Adm. Moorer: Yes. In January we ambushed a hell of a lot of them going through Route 23. They have added a second lane to the road from Muong Phine to Route 23.

Dr. Kissinger: What about Cambodian battalions?

Mr. Helms: Last fall, in September or October, Lon Nol rounded up a bunch of recruits, whom we sent to PS–18 to get them trained up gradually. A second battalion, which had been rounded up on the streets of Phnom Penh, mutinied and was sent back. Since then, work has been done to recruit another battalion. Three hundred and thirty men of this group are beginning training at PS–18. The first battalion is now on the Bolovens, but performing poorly. We can’t get any more recruits. That’s the situation about Cambodian troops up to now. However, Sisouk went to Phnom Penh and said afterwards that Lon Nol had promised one Khmer Krom battalion and one Long Hai battalion. He reported this to Godley, but there has been no other source.

Amb. Sullivan: No. Lon Nol told Swank about this at the time that Lam Son 719 began.

Mr. Helms: But Lon Nol hasn’t designated the units, and now he is flat on his back.⁶

Dr. Kissinger: However, he hasn’t lost his mental capacity.

Amb. Sullivan: Somebody should go back to Phnom Penh and ask what Lon Nol had in mind. Who should do this. Swank or the CIA.

Amb. Johnson: We can do this through State channels.⁷

Amb. Sullivan: We’ll ask Ladd.

Dr. Kissinger: Do we all agree that if two battalions can be identified, they should be moved in?

Mr. Helms: Yes, this was all in the plan.

Dr. Kissinger: Will Sullivan take care of identifying the units?

Amb. Sullivan: Yes, we’ll ask Swank.

Dr. Kissinger: What are the facts about US forces on the ground in Laos?

Amb. Johnson: Freidheim said yesterday that US forces could go into Laos to rescue downed chopper pilots.

Adm. Moorer: We did go into Laos to recover a helicopter.

Dr. Kissinger: Please get the facts for me, Tom. What about Lon Nol’s request to go to Hawaii?

Amb. Johnson: Let me read Phnom Penh’s 599.⁸

Dr. Kissinger: Didn’t he get the word about keeping Lon Nol in the country?

Amb. Johnson: We were going to go out discouraging his leaving the country, but this was overtaken by events.

Dr. Kissinger: Once he is in a US military hospital, it will be tougher for him to get back.

Amb. Johnson: It would have been better for him to go to Bangkok, where there are excellent facilities.

Dr. Kissinger: My worry is his being labeled as an American stooge.

Mr. Doolin: One of the best neurologists in the world is at Bangkok, in the Rockefeller Hospital.

Dr. Kissinger: It’s my strong instinctive sense, first, that he should not leave the country; secondly, that we shouldn’t have him in a US military hospital; and, thirdly, he should not be in the continental US. Taking him to Hawaii seems wrong to me.

Adm. Moorer: Once you take him past Saigon, he might as well go all the way.

Amb. Johnson: We’ll go back to Phnom Penh and Saigon on this, and then go out to Bangkok about his acceptability.

Dr. Kissinger: Could we give the flavor in these messages of deliberately keeping him in the country?

Amb. Sullivan: Yes, we’ll get together and get out a message.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe Bangkok is the best place.

Adm. Moorer: If necessary, we can augment the medical facilities there with our own.

Dr. Kissinger: If another meeting is needed, you can get together with Al Haig in my absence toward the end of next week.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-115, WSAG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting ended at 12:11 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968-76)
2. The original contains no text for the summary of conclusions.
3. February 12.
4. See footnote 8, Document 125.
5. Senator William Proxmire (D–WI), member of the Senate Armed Services Committee.
6. In telegram 564 from Phnom Penh, February 8, the Embassy reported that Lon Nol had suffered a serious stroke that paralyzed his left side and that the GKR did not intend to make a public statement about the situation. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 511, Country Files, Far East, Cambodia, Vol. XII) Kissinger sent a memorandum to Nixon on February 9 indicating that the Embassy would not know for several weeks if Lon Nol would be able to resume his duties. (Ibid.)
7. In telegram 657 from Phnom Penh, February 13, Swank reported that the GKR had been contemplating recruiting men for the Laos operation was fulfilling its pledges to the RLG at a leisurely pace. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 CAMB)
8. Not found.