127. Diary Entry by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Moorer)1
[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Laos and Cambodian operations.]
1220
Received telephone call from Dr. Kissinger who said that he had just been with the President who is agonizing over a number of things. First is the ABC report last night, alleging that a dead US soldier in a South Vietnamese uniform was brought out of Laos in a helicopter. [Page 395] Told Kissinger that I could not conceive of this being true but that I would send out a message and follow through.
The President wants to be sure that no American television or news correspondents ride on American helicopters. The President also wants to start discouraging the South Vietnamese from taking them on board their helicopters.2 We should clamp down on it slowly so that it does not become too obvious. The President feels we can not gain anything from having reporters and news men running loose in the battle zone sending back all these gory pictures of people being wounded. If they did the same thing for automobile accidents, I am sure we could get people to stop driving also.
The President also wanted Kissinger to check with me to find out how the operation is going. The President wants to be sure that I understand how much we have riding on this one and Kissinger had told him he didn’t have to confirm that because I knew. I told Kissinger that the operation seems to be going satisfactorily without question. I think, however, that there is going to be some fighting soon because of the way the North Vietnamese are posturing themselves. We know they are having a bad time with their supplies and that they are already trying to readjust their system and reroute the trucks and things of that sort. Some of the North Vietnamese are complaining that they have not received certain supplies but the operation is still in the initial stages. Told Kissinger that when I talked to McCain last night about midnight he pointed out to me that the roads that the ARVN are proceeding along east of 92 have very deep ruts to be filled up and this is one of the causes of their problem. However the ARVN are managing all right and are on the western side of the intersection. The weather is good so we will see much more air activity now which will be helpful.
Kissinger then asked if we are getting at the trucks and I replied that we did very well last night and reiterated that the operation is going very satisfactorily. However, by the nature of this operation it will be a series of isolated contacts and we have to judge the operation over all by the cumulative effect that we see. The people in the field are satisfied. We will have the airfield at Khe Sanh in good shape by Sunday3 and this will have an impact on the logistics and will help to alleviate some of the problems with the muddy roads.
Kissinger then asked if Abrams was aware that our big objective was to stop the supplies and that we are not as interested in body count as we are the supplies. I told him that Abrams does know that and that this was the plan to start with. But at the same time the ARVN are establishing [Page 396] positions so that they will be in a strong posture as they move across the panhandle. Therefore I think they are moving more or less deliberately and in very careful fashion so they do not get caught out on a limb. But Abrams does understand what the problem is. However, I will talk to him. Kissinger then asked if I expected holdups which will result in the supplies getting past Tchepone. I said certainly some have already gotten past Tchepone but I think Helms overplays this thing a little bit and actually the majority of the supplies have not gone south.
I told Kissinger that I see indications that the North Vietnamese are trying to move to the west to Highway 23 but this will take time to reorganize and direct. At the same time the air activity at night is being pursued to the maximum. The weather is good now and it might be good for two or three days and this will be very helpful.
Kissinger then observed that the PTF operation went well and asked if we could do another one. I replied that we could. Kissinger said that is what the President would like to do. I told Kissinger that we were going to recommend it right away and we were preparing a paper along those lines. Kissinger asked if they could hit some shore installations the next time and I replied that they could. I told Kissinger that apparently they ran out of ammunition before they reached their shore targets on the last run. I told him that he should bear in mind that this is the first time they have done this on their own and that they did very well. Kissinger said that the North Vietnamese have really squawked about it.
Then Kissinger asked about Abrams’ mood. I told him that Abrams was up in Military Region I yesterday and that his mood is good. He thinks we are doing okay. He really went up there to check on the road.
Note to the Diary: Subsequent to this telephone conversation, I released a message to McCain and Abrams asking for the feasibility of follow-on operations which would complement and capitalize on the current on-going operations in Laos and Cambodia. (Copy attached.)4
[Omitted here is material unrelated to the Laos and Cambodian operations.]