Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

125. Minutes of a Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, February 9, 1971, 3:15 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Military Operations in South Laos

PARTICIPANTS

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • Amb. U. Alexis Johnson
  • Amb. William Sullivan
• Defense
  • Mr. David Packard
  • Mr. Dennis Doolin
• CIA
  • Mr. Richard Helms
  • Mr. George Carver
• JCS
  • Admiral Thomas Moorer
  • Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt
• NSC Staff
  • Mr. John H. Holdridge

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS²

Dr. Kissinger: (to Adm. Moorer and Gen. Vogt) I’d like you to tell us where we stand. Could you say something about the weather?

Gen. Vogt: I’ll take up the weather first.

Adm. Moorer: It never rains in the operational area this time of year. In Khesanh at sunrise and sunset the visibility drops down to ½ mile, and this was the basis of the press reports about bad weather. The road into Khesanh is surfaced, so there is no supply problem. Once the helicopters are there in the operational area, they are in sunshine. TACAIR is radar controlled.

Dr. Kissinger: Is this theory or practice?

Adm. Moorer: This is the way it’s worked out. It is not true that the helicopters and TACAIR have been grounded. There is radar control for the TACAIR.

Dr. Kissinger: I saw reports this morning that the ARVN had been stopped, and where air support had been grounded. Were these reports from Saigon?

Adm. Moorer: The weather over Khesanh is pretty good now—I had an exchange of messages with General Abrams on this subject this morning.

Mr. Packard: General Cushman verifies the weather situation in Khesanh from his own experience.

Dr. Kissinger: I’m not criticizing the weather reports, I just want to know whether the ARVN has been stopped.

Gen. Vogt: In the last 24 hours there were 640 helicopter sorties for logistical support, 33 for medevac, and 44 for troop lift. On TACAIR, there were 30 B–52 sorties, 6 A–4, 2 F–4, and 3 B–57 sorties.

Adm. Moorer: There were over 1,000 air sorties all together.

Gen. Vogt: This was not very heavy, but there has been no real requirement yet.

Dr. Kissinger: There was no rainy weather?

Adm. Moorer: There has been rain, but not in the operating area. The troops are already in the area, where there is no rain.

Gen. Vogt: 6,200 troops are now inside Laos. They are moving along the road as fast as the engineers can repair it—resurfacing and cutting bushes, etc. Airborne units have been air-lifted onto Route 92, cutting the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This involved the 3rd Airborne Battalion, and the Brigade Headquarters. There have been no major engagements, but some trucks have been knocked off. The enemy has been picking at supply routes, but the U.S. and ARVN losses have been low. Four choppers were downed, but two were recovered. There is nothing to be alarmed about, and things are all on schedule. There are no indicators of any major enemy concentrations moving in.

Dr. Kissinger: How do you explain the lack of enemy reaction?

Adm. Moorer: The enemy doesn’t have the mobility to get into position, and doesn’t know what our plans are yet. However, once we get 15 miles in, we’ll have plenty of reaction.

Mr. Helms: They’re worried about an invasion near Vinh or from their backside. They are trying to force supplies down the Trail, and to do this must keep the Binh Trams in place to handle the traffic.

Gen. Vogt: The ARVN is now 12 miles deep into Laos.

Mr. Helms: If this were happening to us in reverse, we’d sure be sweating. They don’t know who will be hit next.

Adm. Moorer: They have been using Route 92 as a main artery.

Gen. Vogt: Route 99 parallels Route 92, and they also hope to open up Route 23. However, this is open country, and can be worked over with TACAIR.

Amb. Sullivan: South of Route 9, Route 92 runs through narrow valleys and there are no alternative roads.

Adm. Moorer: It will take three to four days to get going. We don’t want to rush things.

Dr. Kissinger: Are the ARVN units doing well, and fighting well?

Adm. Moorer: They are when they get a target. We expected the first 12–15 miles of road to be the most difficult part since the road had to be repaired.

Dr. Kissinger: When will the air drops come?

Adm. Moorer: When the ground forces are so far west that they will need these for support. We are giving consideration to carrying out a river crossing the other side of Tchepone. The ARVN would go for the airfield there.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there any civilian population in Tchepone?

Gen. Vogt: Zero. A couple of buildings are still standing, but the town has been bombed out.

Adm. Moorer: However, BT–33 is in the enemy vicinity, and this has truck parks and storage areas.

Dr. Kissinger: I saw reports that trucks have been turned back from BT–33.

Adm. Moorer: This is correct. The operation has already been well worthwhile.

Dr. Kissinger: The reports also said that they were ordering their units to put fragmentation bombs on all airfields.

Gen. Vogt: We achieved a major objective with the units on Route 92.

Dr. Kissinger: What’s going on in the Chup area?

Adm. Moorer: Most of the action is on the periphery of the Chup plantation area and around Snuol. In one engagement 400 enemy were killed at a loss of 50 ARVN, though the pattern which we have been mostly following since February 4 has been sharp clashes between small units as the ARVN sweeps. We have found some supplies, and will find some more. The operation will continue until June 1, and will be a very deliberate sweep of the entire area. Whenever there is a sharp encounter, the ARVN comes out way ahead, as was the case for the Route 4 operation.

Gen. Vogt: We have reports that the 96th Regiment, consisting of artillery and sapper units, is moving out, probably because its rear area was cut off. The FANK caught up with it and killed 50.

Adm. Moorer: Earlier it was moving on the east side of the Mekong to threaten Phnom Penh, but now is pulling back.

Dr. Kissinger (to Mr. Helms): What can you tell us about enemy activities, Dick?

Mr. Helms: I’d like to mention two or three things. It is clear that the rush of enemy supplies is still above Tchepone. There was a report from BT–33 that 80 vehicles and 330 tons of supplies would be expected by the end of the month to transit Ban Karai. So if all goes well, our timing will be very useful.

Dr. Kissinger: A newsman asked me why the operation hadn’t begun on January 1 when the supplies would have been greater. Someone in the Pentagon had spoken about this.

Mr. Helms: Our intelligence shows that the supplies coming down in November and December were for the enemy troops in the Panhandle, and that the real thing has only come since January.

Mr. Packard: The ARVN airborne division was also occupied in January.

Gen. Vogt: The Route 7 operation in Cambodia wound up in early December.

Amb. Sullivan: We didn’t know until January that it was legal for us to engage in the sort of operation which is now taking place in south Laos.

Mr. Helms: I’d like to call attention to some interesting diplomatic facts of life—the Soviets are still attempting to maintain their role as a Geneva Co-chairman, and are disregarding Pathet Lao pleas for taking a stronger stand against us. Their attacks on us are no worse than usual, and their attacks on the Chinese are about the same thing, also.

Dr. Kissinger: Do you attach any importance to the fact that some Chinese broadcasts call this operation a threat to China?

Amb. Sullivan: Our Consulate in Hong Kong says that the Chinese response is “strong but measured,” and notes that while Laos is a neighbor of China, there is no reason for the Chinese to feel threatened.

Dr. Kissinger: How did it go before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee?³

Amb. Johnson: The results were excellent, and the Secretary came back very pleased.

Gen. Vogt: The Committee was almost friendly. Javits was the most outspoken. He wanted to know future plans, and said that the Committee should have some rights to chart our future course diplomatically. The Secretary side-stepped this. Fulbright said very little.

Amb. Johnson: Fulbright said he would say publicly it was the judgment of the President that the Laos operation was in the public interest.

Dr. Kissinger: Good for him. What about Symington?

Gen. Vogt: Symington said he had proposed the same thing three years ago, and thought the operation was a good move.

Mr. Helms: For once Symington feels that air power is being properly used.

Dr. Kissinger: What about Muskie?

Gen. Vogt: His reaction was moderate, and he asked factual questions. He had a great interest in enemy strengths, logistics flow, and requirements in South Vietnam and Cambodia. The Secretary stressed that the enemy was limited to a single lifeline. Muskie contended that guerrilla warfare doesn’t take much in the way of supplies, and that terrorism could go on for years.

Amb. Johnson: Mansfield’s pitch on moving westward didn’t come up.

Gen. Vogt: This was preempted. I showed him the map with the routes, and that there were no longitudinal roads short of Route 13.

Amb. Johnson: He mentioned this to me yesterday.

Adm. Moorer: I had a session with Hebert⁴ and the House Armed Services Committee. I never attended a more friendly committee meeting—the whole group was very, very friendly, and in favor of the operation.

Amb. Johnson: Secretary Rogers was impressed with Senator Spong.⁵

Dr. Kissinger: When I think of the worries we had about Cambodia . . .

Amb. Johnson: The House Foreign Affairs Committee said it wasn’t interested in a session.

Amb. Sullivan: Senator Case cautioned against losing Souvanna Phouma.

Gen. Vogt: The Secretary was asked by Case if the Laos operation was coordinated with Souvanna Phouma. The Secretary said that Souvanna Phouma had issued a public statement, but did not answer Case’s question directly in his reply.

Amb. Sullivan: There wasn’t one single remark from Senator McCarthy.

Amb. Johnson: There were a lot of other things in the news that afternoon—the Apollo 14 splashdown and the Los Angeles earthquake, which helped to divert attention.

Dr. Kissinger: Now did we come out on the Chup operation as compared to the Route 4 operation?

Mr. Helms: It was very clear that we had thought out all of the answers for press questions in advance.

Amb. Johnson: There was nothing there for the newsmen to discover.

Mr. Packard: There is something to be said about a news blackout.

Dr. Kissinger: Some say that the blackout was a master stroke. When we deny that it was done for this purpose here, they think it’s just modesty.

Gen. Vogt: One question to consider regarding newsmen is, “What about when the South Vietnamese go into North Vietnam?”

Dr. Kissinger: What is the status of the PT-boat operations?⁶

Gen. Vogt: These are scheduled for tonight.

Adm. Moorer: There are two separate operations: a PTF will strike coastal shipping in North Vietnam, and an amphibious feint will take place tomorrow. This will be Thursday and Friday⁷ their time. The amphibious operation is for deception, but the PT operation will be the real McCoy.

Dr. Kissinger: Are there any other reactions from our foreign friends which we should consider?

Amb. Johnson: Pompidou and U Thant called it “deplorable” that the South Vietnamese and “others” had moved into Laos.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do we have to take this from U Thant?

Amb. Johnson: We asked him whether “others” would include North Vietnamese, and he said yes.

Amb. Sullivan: The Canadians have called for an ICC investigation, which is o.k. with us. The Indians came out with another one of their deplorable statements. We should go back to them and tell them to do their ICC duty.

Dr. Kissinger: Dick, what’s happening in north Laos?

Mr. Helms: In north Laos, two battalions of Thai SGUs can move to Long Tieng between the 15th and the 19th (BIs 603 and 604) provided we decide now what pay scale can go into effect. The difference in pay scale between Thai regulars and irregulars has caused problems. The Thai have recommended that the irregular pay should go up, and the regular pay down, in which case the U.S. comes out ahead by $1 million per year.

Mr. Packard: That’s o.k. by me.

Amb. Sullivan: Unger has already said that this should be approved.

Mr. Helms: If you say it’s approved, you can get a bonus.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s do it.

Adm. Moorer: There was a three-plane B–52 strike on the west edge of the Plain of Jars today.

Amb. Johnson: On that, I was going to suggest a brief report from Bill Sullivan, who had a meeting of his working group. (To Gen. Vogt): are strikes authorized to be carried out without reference to Washington?

Gen. Vogt: No, Secretary Laird has not approved this.

Dr. Kissinger: I’ll speak to the President about that.

Amb. Sullivan: I had a session with the working group on contingency planning in which three levels of possible concern were laid out: enemy continuation of hostilities in north Laos at about the present level; some step-up in enemy hostilities and diplomatic pressures; and a major change in the enemy’s whole pattern of operations in Laos, diplomatically and politically. Each of these must be considered in terms of our military and diplomatic responses. From the map, it appears that our first area of concern is Luang Prabang. The general situation seems to be that the Communist forces are there not in greater numbers, but are closer.

Dr. Kissinger: We have defensive forces there, don’t we?

Mr. Helms: Yes, but these will not be adequate if the North Vietnamese attack in strength.

Amb. Sullivan: The airfield is on one side of the river and the town on the other, so that the airfield is vulnerable. This will be a problem if we need to evacuate U.S. personnel.

Dr. Kissinger: How many U.S. personnel are there?

Amb. Sullivan: Less than 100. We have helicopters which are left there overnight. I have asked Godley about the status of the King,⁸ who is the main concern.

Amb. Johnson: If the airfield becomes unusable, we will form chopper pads throughout the city. This will take about two weeks.

Amb. Sullivan: We have to go back to Vientiane on forming concrete plans for evacuating the King and the Royal Family. On the Long Tieng–Sam Thong front, two more battalions of Thais will be moved in between the 14th and the 19th. We also have a problem of civilian refugees—10,000 have left Long Tieng in good order and are now on a ridge line about seven miles south. They are adopting a wait-and-see attitude.

Dr. Kissinger: Has AID finished that road into Long Tieng?

Amb. Sullivan: It’s finished except for one gap.

Dr. Kissinger: Why is AID building the road through at this time?

Amb. Sullivan: It was conceived four years ago when the situation looked good, but was actually stopped last year. A big gap exists across the river.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we making sure that it is not being continued?

Amb. Sullivan: We can make sure about this.

Dr. Kissinger: Are we still expecting an attack on Long Tieng?

Mr. Carver: Yes, within the next several days. The enemy is carrying out probing and harassing actions.

Amb. Sullivan: This is the area of maximum concern, where we want the freest hand. We will need first to move in the two new battalions, then take care of the refugees, next get a free hand in the use of B–52s against areas calibrated by the MSQ radar, and finally get a handle on the monthly ceiling on air operations in this area. The JCS has reported back on NSDM 77⁹ and had discussed a ceiling of 14,000 TACAIR sorties per month, which can’t be exceeded.

Dr. Kissinger: If there is a request for authorization of a surge, I know that the President will authorize it. If there are people who are opposed, I will get a decision but I know what his answer will be. We can get it settled right here.

Gen. Vogt: There is additional capacity beyond 14,000 sorties.

Dr. Kissinger: We should assume that this will be necessary. If we need a new NSDM, I can get this done. If we don’t do it here, the President will. If you want, I will send in a memorandum to the President and see how he responds.

Amb. Sullivan: According to the JCS memorandum, an increase can take place only with SecDef’s approval.

Dr. Kissinger: Is there a problem on exceeding 14,000?

Mr. Packard: There is no question on getting the authority; there is only a question of what assets are on hand.

Adm. Moorer: We must change the instructions to Abrams, who won’t order an increase without them.

Mr. Packard: We have contingency funds to cover an increase.

Mr. Doolin: A request has gone to CINCPAC and CIA for an estimate of what operational levels will be needed for the next 16 months.

Dr. Kissinger: If we have the resources, we should go ahead. I can take this to the President.

Mr. Packard: That won’t be necessary.

Amb. Sullivan: Other Washington action will be needed on giving Godley and Abrams the freedom to hold B–52 operations without coming back.¹⁰ The three problems are air support, the new battalions, and the refugees. Vientiane remains calm.

Dr. Kissinger: Have the Lao said anything?

Amb. Sullivan: Not much. In south Laos, if the North Vietnamese start to move across Route 9 to Muong Phine and Muong Hene, I have asked for a study of what resources are available to put in a blocking force, both regular and irregular. My first thought is that I don’t expect the North Vietnamese to come so far west, but just up to the ridge line. West of there, they have no logistics. (Admiral Moorer: They would also be out in the open.) If needed, BV–31, BT–19, and BV–201 could be brought in from Seno and BP–101 and others from elsewhere.

Dr. Kissinger: Do the Lao have transport planes?

Amb. Sullivan: Yes. Interestingly enough, some of their pilots were trained by the French. There are other Lao ground forces. CAS has about 2,000 more in Souvannaket. In Thailand there is one RCT in Ubon and one RCT in Korat which would physically come, but the question is: could we legally pay for these forces? If we assume that their function would be to establish a line of communications on the Thai side, we could justify it.

Amb. Johnson: If Tchepone was legal and this is in support of Tchepone, then it should be legal too.

Amb. Sullivan: We could also justify the move in terms of stopping infiltration.

Mr. Doolin: We’ll check this out with our General Counsel.

Dr. Kissinger: We don’t really expect the North Vietnamese to do this, do we? It would be a fantastic endeavor for them to establish a LOC that close to the Thai border.

Adm. Moorer: I hope they do so—we would put in the South Vietnamese.

Amb. Sullivan: The next question in the south concerns the Bolovens. If the Lao operation against Route 92 should slow the North Vietnamese down, they might launch attacks against our bases at PS–22¹¹ and PS–26, and open Route 23 to Paksong, because from Paksong they could then transit the Bolovens. The response from the field has been that Lam Son 719 will reduce and not increase the threat to the Route 92 operation. However, as a contingency one battalion of Khmer Krom and one regular Khmer battalion might be brought in. Sisouk has visited Lon Nol on this, and Lon Nol agreed. The JCS is reluctant about this, though. There is a legal question about the use of MASF funds for the Khmer retrained at Long Hai. CIA doesn’t particularly want to take on this operation.

Dr. Kissinger: Why is CIA reluctant?

Mr. Helms: Lon Nol hasn’t designated the battalions yet.

Amb. Sullivan: I told Swank that as a result of Lam Son 719, he should move more rapidly on this.

Dr. Kissinger: What good would these Khmer units do?

Me. Helms: Nothing at this time.

Amb. Sullivan: They would go into the Bolovens. One thing would be compelling: if we put two Khmer battalions into Ban Houay Sai, we could take the two Thai battalions out of there and put them in Long Tieng.

Mr. Carver: We’re getting two other Thai battalions into Long Tieng, and these shouldn’t be mixed up.

Amb. Sullivan: As a worst case on the refugee problem, we need $1.5 million more, and in any case $200,000 more, and should put in a few more AID personnel out there. If we evacuate the Meo and put them in Sayaboury as a last resort, we would never get them back. The only other thing we need to discuss is the diplomatic scenario. The Canadians have asked for ICC action . . .

Dr. Kissinger: I have one other question on the military situation. If things really go bad in Long Tieng, is there another Thai RCT to put there?

Amb. Sullivan: There are RCTs in Ubon and Korat, but perhaps the Thai wouldn’t want to put them in.

Mr. Helms: Other RCTs are on track.

Ambassador Sullivan: The attack on Long Tieng should begin in the next two or three days.

Adm. Moorer: They’re about three weeks ahead of last year’s schedule.

Dr. Kissinger: Was this schedule fixed some weeks ago?

Mr. Carver: Yes, they could turn it up a bit, but it was actually laid on some months back. There were signs of an offensive as early as October and November of last year, and the enemy probably felt that north Laos was vulnerable.

Amb. Sullivan: I have one last problem. I had a back channel from Godley about the 1040 ceiling.¹² He doesn’t know if this is fixed or flexible; if flexible, he would like to have additional people there, but if fixed, he wants an adjustment in the ceiling.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we send people in on TDY? That’s what we’re doing in Phnom Penh.

Mr. Doolin: Godley has said he could live with 1100. It’s o.k. on the military side, but he needs additional civilians.

Amb. Sullivan: He wants six more requirements officers immediately.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we see if we can do this within the 1040 ceiling by assigning them on TDY?

Amb. Sullivan: The 1040 figure includes those on TDY.

Dr. Kissinger: The President said in his statement that’s what we had there then.¹³ I don’t recall that the figure was fixed. I’m sure that what the President intended was to explain exactly what was in there. If the figure was tripled, he would have concern, but I can’t believe that adjusting from 1040 to 1100 would cause trouble. Read the statement carefully, please. The President didn’t intend to fix the number forever.

Mr. Packard: DOD just got rid of manpower ceilings.

Dr. Kissinger: We’ll check the text and as long as we are staying within a few percent, I wouldn’t worry.

Mr. Doolin: Godley doesn’t want military people, just a few civilians.

Dr. Kissinger: Just check the statement to see that there are no problems.

Amb. Sullivan: I have come into this group with request for decisions on the personnel ceiling, TACAIR, refugees, B–52s, and funding the RCTs. We can defer a decision about the Khmer coming in.

Mr. Helms: Anyway, I want to check some questions about the status of the Khmer.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you let me know at the next meeting?

Mr. Helms: Yes.

Amb. Sullivan: We also should check on the position of the King (of Laos).

Dr. Kissinger: Sometime you must explain the King’s position to me. How old is he?

Amb. Sullivan: Three years younger than Souvanna Phouma. This would make him 63–65.

Dr. Kissinger: Is the position hereditary?

Amb. Sullivan: Yes, he is descended from the first king and Souvanna from the second king. Souvanna regards his position as somewhat hereditary too.

Dr. Kissinger: You’ve done a first-class job on the contingency paper.¹⁴ It’s really outstanding.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Nodis. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. According to Kissinger’s Record of Schedule, the meeting ended at 4:37. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76)
2. The original contains no text for the summary of conclusions.
3. Rogers appeared before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on February 8, accompanied by Green and Abshire.
4. Congressman Edward F. Hebert (D–LA), Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.
5. Senator William B. Spong, Jr. (D–VA), member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
6. Reference is an operation, set forth in memorandum CM–567–71 from Moorer to Laird, February 5, to use PTF boats with South Vietnamese crews and CIA command and control and radio in the Philippines to communicate with MACV, to attack the North Vietnamese coast and ships in order to force the DRV to divert resources from Laos. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 80, Vietnam Subject Files, Viet Operations in Laos and Cambodia, Vol. II) Pursley forwarded Moorer’s memorandum to Haig under a covering note, February 5. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, Box 66, Indochina 381)
7. February 11 and 12.
8. In telegram 21613 to Vientiane, February 9, the Department asked Godley to consult King Savang Vatthana to find out if he were amenable to a U.S. plan to evacuate him and key members of the Royal family from Luang Prabang “should necessity arise.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 LAOS) Godley responded in telegram 777 from Vientiane, February 9, that he was uncertain whether the issue was raised with the King and that he doubted that the Lao had any plans to ensure the King’s safety. (Ibid.)
9. Document 20.
10. In memorandum CM–566–71 to Laird, February 6, Moorer recommended that Godley and Abrams be allowed to bypass obtaining approval for B–52 strikes in northern Laos from the Chairman of the JCS and Secretary of Defense and seek only CINCPAC’s concurrence, with the JCS having potential to veto. According to a handwritten note on the memorandum, Laird disapproved the request. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330–76–197, Box 69, Laos 385.1)
11. Pakse Site (PS)
12. Not found.
13. Nixon issued a statement on Laos, March 6, 1970, in which he asserted that there were 1,040 Americans, both U.S. Government and contract employees, in Laos. The text is in Public Papers: Nixon, 1970, pp. 244–249.
14. Not found.