Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

108. Minutes of a Meeting of the Washington Special Actions Group¹

Washington, January 21, 1971, 4 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Laos

PARTICIPATION

• The meeting was restricted to principals only.
• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• CIA
  • Richard Helms
• JCS
  • Admiral Thomas Moorer
• State
  • U. Alexis Johnson
• Defense
  • David Packard
• NSC
  • Alexander M. Haig

Dr. Kissinger opened the meeting by expressing his concern about the story written by Getler referring to Thai SGU’s in Laos.² Under Secretary Johnson theorized that the story might have come from the field where some of the wounded Thais had been exposed to the press. Secretary Packard then interjected that he was particularly concerned because Secretary Laird’s trip report made mention of the highly sensitive operation in Tchepone and therefore he was taking special precautions with respect to the circulation of that report and asked the principals to do the same.

Continuing the discussion of the Getler article, Mr. Helms asked who Getler was and with whom he generally worked. Admiral Moorer answered that Getler was normally active in the Pentagon. Dr. Kissinger remarked that Getler had been the source of several serious leaks, including the 5000 tanks in Europe and a recent decision memorandum. Mr. Helms asked whether or not the Thai SGU issue had been discussed in any other forum. Dr. Kissinger replied that he was not aware that it had been and that this made the leak all the more serious.

Under Secretary Johnson then stated that, although he would defer to Mr. Helms, he believed that the leaking situation was just about the same as it has always been. He noted that the Cuba situation in 1962 was the best handled, security-wise, but even then Mr. Reston had the story a full three days before the fact. Fortunately, however, he had not used it. Dr. Kissinger asked whether or not Mr. Johnson was referring to the Bay of Pigs operation. Under Secretary Johnson said he was referring to the 1962 missile crisis.

Dr. Kissinger said that the Cambodia operation last spring had been held very well, but that it was difficult with the kind of coordination being attempted to insure on this operation that security was held properly. Dr. Kissinger stressed that it was most important to maintain security on Phase One of the Tchepone operation at least until the fire bases had been established.

Dr. Kissinger then asked Admiral Moorer whether or not he had received confirmation that coordination had been effected with the Cambodians on the Chup situation. Admiral Moorer answered that he had sent a list of five questions to General Abrams but had not yet received a reply. Admiral Moorer explained that General Abrams was probably awaiting the completion of the meeting between Lon Nol and President Thieu. He assumed that at this meeting Thieu would discuss with Lon Nol the forthcoming campaign along Route 7.

Dr. Kissinger asked all of the participants to bring to the next meeting of the WSAG their list of individuals who would have access to the plans.

Dr. Kissinger then turned to the diplomatic scenario covering the Chup and Tchepone operations. The first problem mentioned was that of U.S. handling of Souvanna. Should we tell him before the act and, if so, when would we tell him and in what form? One the pro side, Dr. Kissinger indicated that if he was not told, Souvanna could make the point publicly that he was unaware. If he was told, we risked the fact that he would blow it and deprive us of the option. He might condemn the operation or the very fact of having told him might weaken his position domestically and subject him to unacceptable pressures within Laos itself. Dr. Kissinger stated that the diplomatic scenario should list specifically the pros and cons of handling Souvanna. If the answer was yes then we should be specific in the plan as to how and when this should be done.

Under Secretary Johnson stated that he was convinced that we would have to go to Souvanna before the operation and prior to the time that we must make a go or no-go decision. Dr. Kissinger then asked what the latest acceptable date could be for a go, no-go decision assuming that Souvanna was opposed. Admiral Moorer replied that he believed that 48 hours before commencement of Phase Two would be adequate.

Dr. Kissinger then stated that the way we described the Tchepone operation would be important. In the meeting with the President on Wednesday it had been suggested that we describe it as a raid of limited duration.³ Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard said that he agreed with Dr. Kissinger and asked Mr. Helms to comment. Mr. Helms stated that he agreed with the general line on the description of the operation but confirmed that he also agreed with Under Secretary Johnson that we must approach Souvanna on the operation and in sufficient time to insure that we could safely call the operation off.

Dr. Kissinger asked how much lead time he felt was involved. Mr. Helms indicated that four days before the commencement of Phase Two was probably needed. Secretary Packard commented that this meant sometime around February 1. On the other hand, Secretary Packard stated, it meant it would be better to do it before we started to move the ARVN troops from III to I Corps since this would become known to Souvanna. Under Secretary Johnson indicated that he agreed, for not only were we going to be moving ARVN forces into I Corps but we would be attacking west along Route 9 with U.S. forces during Phase One. Admiral Moorer noted that the operations would start on about the 30th. Dr. Kissinger stated that this was a healthy aspect of Phase One since once these forces started moving, the enemy would be inclined to slow the movement of logistics and personnel through the trail.

Dr. Kissinger then asked Secretary Johnson whether or not he thought we should notify Souvanna before Phase One began. Under Secretary Johnson stated that he felt that this should be done. Mr. Helms agreed that this should be done since once Phase One started the whole operation would acquire a momentum of its own which would suggest possible operations in Laos. Therefore, Souvanna must have some notification. Secretary Johnson said that he was concerned about the momentum issue and asked whether it wouldn’t be wise to determine Souvanna’s attitude even before commencement of Phase One. Dr. Kissinger replied that the President would never make a decision on Phase Two simply as a result of the momentum that had been generated because of the initiation of Phase One. It should be recognized that Hanoi might start yelling during Phase One and therefore the question was whether Souvanna would be better off not knowing about Phase One so that he could take an uninformed attitude. In any event it would be difficult to do Phase Two if Souvanna objected. For this reason, it might be best to go as late as possible. If we went early, security would become a problem and Souvanna would find himself implicated. If we went late, we were then confronted with a momentum problem generated by Phase One itself.

Mr. Helms then stated that he thought Souvanna would lie even if we went to him earlier. Therefore, he would favor going to Souvanna early because the key issue was having Souvanna with us and not alienating him at the outset.

Dr. Kissinger again asked what specifically would be gained by going to Souvanna then rather than waiting until three days before Phase Two. Secretary Packard answered that an early approach would give us time to regroup and call off the operation gracefully. Secretary Johnson indicated that he was concerned that we not go any further without at least starting a dialogue with Souvanna since we would be flying blind. Furthermore, he continued that Souvanna would become increasingly wary. Secretary Johnson stated further that the first conversations with Souvanna could be general in nature and sufficiently vague to avoid getting locked into a protagonist posture. Obviously Souvanna would be interested in the size of the operation, its duration and depth.

Mr. Helms stated that he agreed completely that we should go to Souvanna now. Admiral Moorer pointed out that he also agreed since at that time Souvanna was already greatly concerned about the operations of the North Vietnamese 312th Division in Laos and that this might be helpful to Souvanna’s attitude.

Dr. Kissinger then asked who would be with Souvanna when Ambassador Godley made the approach. Secretary Johnson answered that it would probably be Sisouk. Dr. Kissinger then asked whether or not an approach to Souvanna now would not be immediately translated to Hanoi. Dr. Kissinger agreed that Souvanna must know before a final decision was made, but suggested that Godley be queried immediately and his views obtained on the timing for an approach.

Secretary Johnson stated that perhaps we should send someone from MACV to brief Ambassador Godley on the operation and ask Godley to tell us immediately what he thinks about an approach. Admiral Moorer stated that Ambassador Godley was pretty well acquainted with the operation already and that he had talked to him during his visit to Southeast Asia. He added that Godley seemed to be most concerned about the duration of the operation and how it would impact on Souvanna. Secretary Johnson stated that Godley had informed him the previous week that the southern rightists in Laos were already plotting with the Vietnamese to move into a four-power alliance against the Communists at the expense of Souvanna.

Mr. Helms stated that he believed we should move with Phase One and not permit it to be stopped because of the impact it would have. Secretary Johnson stated that he knew that Ambassador Godley favored the operation. Dr. Kissinger then theorized that perhaps the best bet was to tell Souvanna very little since in the worst situation it could blow and therefore we did not want to be in the position of having given too much.

Secretary Packard stated that he agreed that we should give a little bit at the first contact with Souvanna and then provide more details later on as we assessed his attitude. Secretary Johnson commented that it was important in any event that we give Souvanna at least enough so that he would get a grasp of the scope of the operation. Admiral Moorer stated, “I think that if we contact Godley now and ask his views he will come back and inform us that Souvanna is only worried about the duration of the operation.”

Dr. Kissinger then stated that the group should not set a deadline for itself. He noted that the CIA assessment on the value of the Tchepone operation indicated that this could be a decisive element and that it was important that if the operation were to go that it last at least two months.⁴ Secretary Johnson stated that he had drafted a message to Bunker outlining some of the considerations.⁵ He noted that he had used the term “a raid in force for a limited duration” designed to disrupt the flow of supplies, equipment and personnel and to insure the safety and security of U.S. forces remaining in South Vietnam, emphasizing, of course, that U.S. forces were threatened by the enemy’s ability to reestablish sanctuaries along the borders of South Vietnam.

Secretary Johnson commented further that the main problem with the Tchepone operation would be an explanation of why we had not done it before. Admiral Moorer stated that to this time the South Vietnamese had not been strong enough to conduct an operation of this type. Dr. Kissinger commented that the fact that the enemy’s infiltration had been so high this season also justified the action. It was important that we interdict this movement now at the crucial point in the withdrawal of our own forces. Secretary Johnson added that not only could it be portrayed as a help to Vietnamization but it also would buy time for the Cambodians to build their strength and also inhibit the reestablishment of the sanctuaries in Cambodia. Secretary Packard remarked that he had some doubt that we should play very heavily on the Cambodian issue.

Returning to the question of contacts with Souvanna, Dr. Kissinger commented that the best bet was to deal with him privately and not to put him on a public frying pan. Admiral Moorer asked whether or not State was preparing guidance for Godley. Secretary Johnson confirmed that a message was being drafted and that two things were important with respect to the approach to Souvanna. The first was what to tell him privately, and the second was what he said publicly about what he had been told privately. Secretary Johnson also pointed out that he had been preparing a message for Bunker so that positions could be completely coordinated with President Thieu. He also agreed to eliminate reference to Cambodia.

Admiral Moorer asked if it would not be better to go to Godley first, find out Souvanna’s attitude and then go to Thieu. Secretary Johnson answered that the Tet holidays would make this difficult and tricky timing since it would be hard to get to Thieu once the holiday began.

Dr. Kissinger stated that the President had asked that we try to handle Souvanna on the Cambodia model; that is, much the way we had done with Lon Nol. The President at this point was very anxious that the Tchepone operation go and he wanted the attitude taken interdepartmentally that we should remove the obstacles to the operation and not generate a process which would build pitfalls and difficulties. Dr. Kissinger suggested that the group prepare a message immediately to Ambassador Godley conveying the idea that it had been concluded that we must bring Souvanna in early and requesting Godley’s views on how best this could be done and what should be said. Based on this reply we could then go to Bunker and ask him to contact Thieu, after Tet. If it was found that Ambassador Godley needed more information and a second approach to Souvanna, then they would have to go back to Thieu again. Secretary Johnson indicated that he felt this was the best way of handling it. Dr. Kissinger reiterated that Souvanna was the key issue, and not Thieu.

Under Secretary Johnson again asked whether or not the momentum that we were generating would set us on a course from which we could not recoil. Dr. Kissinger stated that this would never be a controlling factor with President Nixon, and that unless the President decided to go against Souvanna, an affirmative decision would not be based on momentum alone.

Dr. Kissinger then asked Under Secretary Johnson to prepare the message in such a way that we would approach Godley first and obtain his views and asked that Secretary Johnson clear such a cable with the participants in the WSAG.⁶

Secretary Johnson then told the group that he was concerned that we had accepted the conclusion that we could handle Laos like Cambodia. He pointed out that Laos was an entirely different situation, emphasizing that it was held together by mirrors. Laos had represented an extremely delicate political balance for an extended period. The operation proposed against Tchepone would change the status quo in Laos drastically. The other side could claim that we had upset the balance in Laos and that therefore they could feel less constrained to unleash the 312th North Vietnamese Division. Furthermore, the Chinese Communists would start making noises and we could have a major donneybrook develop in Southeast Asia. For all of these reasons, it was essential to consider carefully the implications of the Tchepone operation. All of this underlined the need to approach Souvanna before going much further.

Dr. Kissinger asked whether or not Hanoi could accept another major campaign in Laos on top of all the other obligations they had already assumed. Secretary Packard stated that this was not necessarily the key question since we must be ready in any event. Dr. Kissinger agreed. Secretary Johnson stated that the North Vietnamese could also move strenuously into Southern Laos or the Chinese Communists could attack into Northern Laos.

Secretary Packard stated that we were also now finally achieving great success in our interdiction campaign against rolling stock. In the last days we had been getting 100 trucks per day. For this reason the value of the operation and its importance might be somewhat lessened. Dr. Kissinger stated that the counter-argument is that the Tchepone operation would add further to the enemy’s problems. Admiral Moorer added that Tchepone is the hub and nerve center of their entire logistic system.

Secretary Johnson stated that he agreed that the operation was militarily advantageous but that the political risks were overriding and for this reason he was strongly opposed to it. Secretary Packard stated that, on balance, he favored the operation and Mr. Helms confirmed that he, too, favored the operation. Admiral Moorer stated that he was only in favor of the operation because it would be the last solid opportunity for the U.S. to permit the South Vietnamese to operate outside of South Vietnam. During the next year our withdrawal rates would make this kind of flexibility impossible.

Secretary Johnson stated that he could see some gains in the operation, but subjectively, he was very skeptical. Dr. Kissinger asked Secretary Johnson to elaborate on his political fears. Secretary Johnson stated that the operation could cause Souvanna to resign or cause his government to collapse. If this were to occur we would be in worse shape in Laos.

Secretary Packard asked what the impact of Souvanna’s fall would be? Secretary Johnson replied that this would cause the southerners to split off from Souvanna. Dr. Kissinger asked if this would be a great disaster. Secretary Johnson answered that it would result in the loss of Vientiane and possibly a greater portion of northern and central Laos. Secretary Packard stated that this might be so and that the enemy could also make this happen by attacking in strength in northern Laos, but on balance it appeared that their plates were pretty full at that time. Mr. Helms commented that he was rather confident that the enemy would fight strongly in Tchepone and elsewhere. Admiral Moorer stated that that was his assessment also and that there we would have a great advantage where we could inflict casualties with our air.

Dr. Kissinger then stated that it was important that the diplomatic scenario be completed and that there was only about a week’s time to get the issues resolved. He pointed out that it was necessary to have a fully integrated diplomatic public affairs and Congressional scenario. Secretary Packard commented that we should not permit the public relations people to start discussing this issue until the very last minute. Dr. Kissinger agreed and asked Secretary Johnson to prepare the scenario to include who says what to whom, and assuming that Souvanna gives an affirmative response.⁷

Secretary Johnson said it was probable that we would be attacked in the U.N. by the Soviets if we moved without Souvanna’s endorsement. Furthermore, in any event they might take the Geneva Accords issue to the United Nations.

Dr. Kissinger remarked that that was precisely why we should prepare our plans with the assumption that we had Souvanna on board.

Secretary Packard stated that it was equally important that an effective and frank Congressional liaison plan be prepared. Secretary Johnson stated that this would be one of the greatest problems since Senator Javits has also raised the issue of U.S. support for our operations in Laos and he did so in front of Senators Stennis and Ellender who seemed to agree with Javits that it would not be wise. Then there was the problem of Cooper–Church and the strong feelings that would come from the Foreign Relations Committee. Dr. Kissinger interjected he couldn’t understand the difficulty since Cooper told the President that he could bomb anywhere as long as ground troops were not involved.

Secretary Johnson then commented that within the confines of the WSAG forum he would like to make the comment that the problem along Route 4 and the credibility problem in Cambodia was one of our own making. It looked to the Congress and to the press as though they had had to drag out of us what we were doing. It would have been far better had we come clean initially and called a spade a spade. Dr. Kissinger stated that he agreed completely with that assessment, and then asked what the group’s view was on briefing Senators on the operation. Secretary Johnson stated that he believed that this was precisely what we should do and that we should let General Vogt and Marshall Green inform the Senators and the Congressmen exactly what we were doing. He stated that it was somewhat disconcerting to read Ron Ziegler’s briefing last week on Cambodia and then to read Secretary Laird’s the following day. He did not understand what Secretary Laird was driving at with respect to the Nixon Doctrine and airpower.

Dr. Kissinger then said that he would advise the group shortly of the next WSAG meeting, and the meeting was adjourned.

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–115, WSAG Meetings Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. It ended at 5:23 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76, Record of Schedule)
2. In an article entitled, “U.S.-Backed Thai Buildup Seen in Laos,” Michael Getler wrote that Thailand was sending “special guerilla troops into the southern Laos Panhandle for the first time as part of a U.S.-backed plan to harass expanding Communist supply lines.” He attributed the information to Congressional sources. (The Washington Post, January 21, 1971, p. A1)
3. In the meeting described here, which took place on January 18, a Monday, one of the subjects the meeting focused on was the nature of the Tchepone operation. See Document 104.
4. The intelligence assessment prepared by the CIA on January 21 is summarized in Document 111.
5. Rogers forwarded a draft of the telegram to Nixon under a January 21 covering memorandum, noting that as a result of a “long, careful briefing at the Pentagon yesterday, it is my opinion that it is necessary to get Thieu’s full support and Souvanna’s quiet acquiescence if we are to avoid major diplomatic and domestic problems.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 83, Vietnam Subject Files, Special Operations File, Vol I)
6. Telegram 12344 to Vientiane, January 23, included a general description of the operation and asked for Godley’s recommendations on how to approach Souvanna: specifically, whether it would be best to inform him in advance and acknowledge his acquiescence publicly; inform him but not acknowledge this fact publicly, thus allowing him to preserve his public neutrality; or present him with a fait accompli. The telegram was sent “Nodis/Ashau,” a special handling requirement directing that only Bunker, Godley, and their senior communications officers could receive it. (Ibid., Box 80, Vietnam Subject Files, Ops in Laos and Cambodia, Vol. II)
7. Johnson sent an initial draft of the diplomatic, Congressional, and public relations scenario to Kissinger under a covering memorandum, January 22. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1, US/NIXON)