Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

103. Minutes of a Meeting of the Senior Review Group¹

Washington, January 15, 1971, 4:49–5:59 p.m.

SUBJECT

• NSSM 99 (Southeast Asia Strategy) and NSSM 96 (Laos)²

PARTICIPATION

• Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger
• State
  • Under Secy. John N. Irwin
  • Mr. U. Alexis Johnson
  • Mr. Arthur Hartman
  • Mr. James R. Wilson
• Defense
  • Mr. David Packard
  • Mr. Armistead I. Selden
  • Rear Adm. Wm. R. Flanagan
• CIA
  • Mr. Richard Helms
  • Mr. George Carver
• JCS
  • Gen. Wm. C. Westmoreland
  • Brig. Gen. Foster Smith
  • Brig. Gen. Adrian St. John
• AID
  • Mr. Maurice Williams
• OMB
  • Mr. James R. Schlesinger
• NSC Staff
  • Col. Richard T. Kennedy
  • Dr. K. Wayne Smith
  • Capt. Robert Sansom
  • Mr. John H. Holdridge
  • Mr. D. Keith Guthrie

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

1. MR Studies.³ The VSSG Working Group will prepare a study of alternatives for remedying the force deficits in Vietnam anticipated in 1972. As a basis for its study, the Working Group should obtain recommendations from the Department of Defense. Among the measures to be analyzed are (1) creation of new units by splitting existing ARVN divisions, (2) deployment of a Korean division in MR 1, and (3) transfer of ARVN units from surplus to deficit MRs.

The VSSG Working Group will also extend its analysis of force deficits by military region through 1973.

2. Training for Cambodian Forces. On the basis of consultations with MACV, the Defense Department will prepare recommendations on measures to improve professional capabilities in the Cambodian armed forces. In this connection, the feasibility of employing Vietnamese units as demonstrators through joint Cambodian-Vietnamese operations should be investigated.

3. Enemy Strategy Study.⁴ The CIA will extend its analysis of possible enemy strategies through 1972.

4. Strengthening Thai Forces. The SRG agreed that it is essential to push forward rapidly with programs to build up Thai forces in order to meet the President’s desire to keep open the option of employing Thai troops if required to prevent a collapse in Cambodia in 1972. It was understood that for legal reasons, US assistance to the Thai Armed Forces might have to be justified on the basis of providing for the defense of Thailand.

The SRG also agreed that further study is required of conditions under which Thai troops might be employed in Cambodia and of the long-term US-Thai defense relationship after the end of the war in Indochina.

5. Strategic Thrusts Study.⁵ The State Department will revise the Strategic Thrusts Study with a view to defining more specifically actions to be taken to implement the diplomatic and political elements of the various strategies.

6. Laos. The SRG approved a State Department proposal to solicit Ambassador Godley’s views on the desirability of approaching Souvanna to suggest an initiative on limitation of air activities in North Laos as a means of facilitating progress in the talks between the RLG and the Lao Patriotic Front.

Dr. Kissinger: I suggest we take the factual part of the study first. We want to see whether we all agree with the analysis of where we stand in the various military regions. We can then use this as a point of departure for discussing the strategies.

As I remember, this is about as far as we got in discussing this study previously.⁶

Mr. Packard: We will get all the way through this time.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Gen. Westmoreland) Would you like to comment on the factual basis as set forth in the MR studies and tell us how you see the situation developing in the next year or two?

Gen. Westmoreland: I think the analysis is valid although the methodology is terribly oversimplified. Nevertheless, the conclusions are correct: that there will be a deficiency in military strength in MRs 1 and 2 and that there could be a surplus in MRs 3 and 4. There are, of course, a lot of factors that have to be considered other than the number of battalions. You have to take into account the requirements for fighting in Cambodia, the quality of command in the various regions, and the ability to maintain the strength of the various units. If you are thinking in terms of moving battalions and divisions around like checkers, you have to remember that when a Vietnamese unit is transferred to another area some distance away, it will suffer massive desertions, amounting to as much as 50% of its strength. Alex Johnson will remember when we moved the 25th Division to Quang Ngai province in 1964 and wound up with a corporal’s guard. It took two years to build up that division again. In addition, the 25th Division, which spoke a different dialect, antagonized the local populace.

Dr. Kissinger: How do the North Vietnamese lick this problem?

Gen. Westmoreland: They speak a decidedly different dialect.

Dr. Kissinger: In other words they are foreigners any place they go.

Gen. Westmoreland: Yes.

Mr. Packard: Isn’t it true that some of the things that inhibit movement of Vietnamese units have changed since 1964?

Gen. Westmoreland: Yes, but we still can’t move them around like our troops.

Dr. Kissinger: Where does this leave us?

Gen. Westmoreland: One way of taking care of the projected deficiency in MRs 1 and 2 would be to split the Vietnamese 1st Division in two and create new divisions from each half. Also the 57th Regiment at Da Nang might be expanded to division strength. Of course, whether you can expand Vietnamese forces generally is debatable. Considering the economic and manpower base, I have some doubts about this. What we have to do is build up the units in the Delta and create new forces in MR 1. If we wanted to pay the price (which would probably be a big one), we could get a Korean division deployed along the DMZ.

Mr. Johnson: Would there be a price?

Gen. Westmoreland: Yes. Korean inertia is great. It would cost us perhaps $100 million. They would demand all sorts of things.

Dr. Kissinger: Like what?

Gen. Westmoreland: Additional equipment, tanks, APCs, an accelerated modernization program for the ROK forces in Korea. It could be done, however, and I think it would be worth the price.

Mr. Packard: There is some talk that the Koreans are not doing well where they are. Why is this?

Gen. Westmoreland: The Vietnamese are not happy to have them in populated areas. They are sometimes ruthless in dealing with the populace. But they are good troops and well disciplined. If deployed in unpopulated areas such as the region south of the DMZ, they could help. They are not particularly good offensive troops but are good on defense. They would be doing the same thing at the DMZ that they do on the 38th parallel.

What this all boils down to is that there is going to be a deficiency in strength in MRs 1 and 2. The point of the exercise is to find means to provide the necessary forces.

Mr. Packard: Although there is excess capability in MRs 3 and 4, it may be just as well to leave existing forces there, since that area is the population and economic center of the country and it might be well to have a little more margin of security there.

Dr. Kissinger: If we spread ourselves too thin, we might lose everything.

Mr. Irwin: What degree of troop use in Cambodia are we anticipating?

Mr. Packard: That is another important problem.

Mr. Irwin: It would be good to have a margin of safety to take care of that too.

Gen. Westmoreland: There is always going to be a surplus of forces in the Saigon region. The Vietnamese will never move troops away from the capital as long as a threat exists.

Dr. Kissinger: If we don’t do anything more than we are doing right now, the situation will be as described in the MR studies. All of the measures we have talked about—building up new divisions, moving the Koreans—are not in the present program. We need suggestions on how to implement these measures.

Gen. Westmoreland: Making up the deficiencies involves raising the military ceiling deploying units subject to the risks I have discussed, or revamping the Vietnamese military structure on a trade-off basis.

Mr. Johnson: I have never heard the Korean proposal before. I don’t think it should be dismissed.

Gen. Westmoreland: It was discussed when I came back from Vietnam in July.

Mr. Irwin: Where is the Korean unit now?

Gen. Westmoreland: In the coastal region of MR 2 around Nha Trang.

Dr. Kissinger: We will have a major force deficit even if things go favorably in Laos and other places.

Gen. Westmoreland: I presume we are assuming that the North Vietnamese will violate the DMZ.

Capt. Sansom: The study assumes a small-scale (one division) offense in 1972 but not a 1965-type offensive.

Dr. Kissinger: I imagine that splitting the First Division in two would be about a one-year program.

Gen. Westmoreland: It would take about nine months. We have to start now.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, or the forces won’t be ready for the threat that might develop during the dry season next year. It would be easier to move existing units, except for the problems you mention.

Mr. Packard: There has been some talk about measures, such as housing, that might make it easier to move Vietnamese units. (to Gen. Westmoreland) Wouldn’t that help?

Gen. Westmoreland: It might, but lead time and cost are involved with this also. There is also the requirement for dependents’ housing. It took several years to remedy all the problems created by moving the 25th Division.

Dr. Kissinger: I remember about that. It was reputed to be a lousy division.

Gen. Westmoreland: It had been one of the best, and it now is again.

Dr. Kissinger: It is imperative we find out right away what is involved in making up these force deficits. (to Dr. Smith) Could we get the Working Group to look at various alternatives, based on recommendations from Defense, for remedying the military deficiency? The alternatives should include that of moving Vietnamese units, although I think that CINCPAC may have a point in warning about maintaining control of the key areas. I have always thought we would be better off with 100% control of 60% of the country, rather than with 60% control of 100% of the country. The Working Group could look into various schemes, such as moving the Korean division and splitting a South Vietnamese division.

Gen. Westmoreland: We might also be able to cut out portions of some units.

Dr. Kissinger: If we have the alternatives available, then we can assess the timing problem, that is, the lead times required for each measure. Do we need further discussion of the MR study? How about having a few words on the subject of enemy strategy alternatives? One interesting thing about this project is that the analysis of most of the questions halts in 1972. Some people plan to be around here after 1972. Where will we be in Vietnam in 1973?

Dr. Smith: The study of alternative enemy strategies is only for 1971.

Dr. Kissinger: One more thing on the MR studies. (to Sansom) Can we project these to 1973?

Capt. Sansom: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s take up the enemy strategy paper. (to Helms) Dick, this is a very good study. Can somebody sum it up for us?

Mr. Helms: (to Carver) George.

(Mr. Packard left the meeting at this point.)

Mr. Carver: The paper argues that the enemy has certain manpower constraints which are going to inhibit his taking any large-scale action in the next few months, especially considering the additional duties which enemy troops have in South Laos and Cambodia. Hence, we don’t look for too much of a radical change in the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the enemy facing in Cambodia that he was not counting on?

Mr. Carver: He is having to use troops there that he had planned to use in Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: Is the same thing true in Laos?

Mr. Carver: There is the same problem of total dependence on the supply routes from the north. In addition, the enemy has to protect against serious ground incursions in this area. His behavior suggests that he considers such probes a very real possibility. He senses a threat that didn’t exist previously.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Gen. Westmoreland) What do you think?

Gen. Westmoreland: I agree with that analysis.

(Mr. Packard rejoined the meeting at this point.)

Dr. Kissinger: As I understand, the enemy will need to infiltrate 100,000 men this year in order to keep up the present level of activity. Is that about what the present rate is if figured on an annual basis?

Mr. Carver: If the present rate were sustained, annual infiltration would be about 100,000. However, as you know, the rate went way up in October and November and then dropped off in December.

Dr. Kissinger: If this rate is not sustained, then the enemy offensive capability will diminish.

Mr. Helms: If the annual rate falls below 100,000.

Dr. Kissinger: That means they can’t mount a major offensive in Cambodia.

Mr. Carver: That depends on how you define major offensive. If you mean that the enemy can move against the Cambodians fully supported by the South Vietnamese, then he does not have the capability. But he can do such things as harass Routes 7 and 4.

Gen. Westmoreland: You are assuming that the enemy will continue to fight in Cambodia.

Mr. Carver: The tables in the study have an aura of precision that is perhaps misleading. There are many intangible factors that are difficult to evaluate and which would affect the enemy’s disposition to fight. These include the degree of success in the military operations he does undertake, the political situation in South Vietnam, and the state of South Vietnamese morale.

Gen. Westmoreland: More important factors are logistics and ammunition resupply.

Dr. Kissinger: If there is no major push in Cambodia by June, can we assume that the rainy season will close down major operations for the balance of the year?

Mr. Carver: Probably. It depends partly on how much they are willing to risk by undertaking operations. If they can’t mount an offensive in the dry season, the chances are not very good that they can do so in the wet season.

Mr. Packard: Also the Cambodians are continuing to improve.

Dr. Kissinger: That was going to be my next question. Are we assuming the Cambodians will still be around in June?

Gen. Westmoreland: June is too early a time to fix for the end of operations.

Dr. Kissinger: Then let’s say July.

Gen. Westmoreland: It will not be until July that the roads will really be impassable.

Dr. Kissinger: Will the Cambodian army improve sufficiently to provide a significant additional obstacle to the enemy in 1972?

Mr. Packard: They can make a great improvement and still not be very good.

Gen. Westmoreland: We should do more to train leaders.

Mr. Johnson: Do we have any experience factor yet that would serve to evaluate the results with those Cambodians that have been trained in South Vietnam?

Gen. Westmoreland: No, they have not been back long enough for us to judge.

Mr. Packard: The Cambodians have a lot of shortcomings. They don’t know how to lay out a defensive position. Their equipment is not right. Their machine guns don’t work. Don’t expect them to turn into first-class units in six months. Nevertheless, they have come along fast and will continue to improve.

Dr. Kissinger: Will they be able to offer appreciably more resistance?

Mr. Carver: They already can prevent the North Vietnamese from picking up victories on the cheap, especially when they are backed up by the South Vietnamese. The enemy would have to mount a major effort in order to make gains, and that would detract from his effort in Vietnam.

Mr. Helms: All of this discussion indicates to me that now is the time to go ahead on training for the Cambodians in Vietnam.

Mr. Johnson: We are doing it right now.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no longer any training being done in Thailand?

Gen. Westmoreland: Some is being done there. Another technique that might be useful is one which we applied in South Vietnam with the ARVN. This was to commit US troops in an effort to demonstrate leadership by example. The Vietnamese could do the same for the Cambodians.

Dr. Kissinger: It would give the Cambodians an incentive to get the hell out.

Gen. Westmoreland: It’s true there have been some problems with the South Vietnamese troops in Cambodia, especially when they get to looting and raping. But perhaps it would be possible to move individual battalions in for five-day operations; for example, flying one in to help defend a beleaguered town. They could lead by example.

Mr. Packard: Isn’t that what is going to happen with the current operation on Route 4?⁷

Gen. Westmoreland: That is a sizable operation, much larger than what I was thinking of. However, it will provide some of the same benefits. It would be possible to bring the Vietnamese battalions in to operate for about five days even if the Cambodians being helped were not under pressure. The Vietnamese would give the Cambodians a pattern of professionalism higher than their [the Cambodians’] own.

Dr. Kissinger: How would you go about getting this done?

Gen. Westmoreland: You would have to sell it to Thieu and Vinh. It would augment the training of non-coms and officers being done by attachés.

Mr. Packard: One thing we should do is get MACV’s recommendations.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we act on that?

Gen. Westmoreland: Yes. We can ask MACV what more needs to be done in the way of training.

Mr. Irwin: When you request recommendations, you can at the same time suggest using Vietnamese units as demonstrators.

Gen. Westmoreland: Yes.

Mr. Packard: I’ll discuss this with the Admiral Moorer when he gets back.

Capt. Sansom: This [training method] was suggested in Part 1 of the NSSM 99 study with regard to the territorial forces.

Dr. Kissinger: I have thought that the North Vietnamese might want to give the South Vietnamese a blow during the 1971 election campaign. Also they might want to do the same to us in 1972. But from your projections, they won’t be able to do it.

Mr. Carver: They would like very much to do just that, but they can’t.

Dr. Kissinger: You don’t think they can give a major blow this year?

Mr. Carver: They don’t presently seem to have the forces or the disposition to do so. A major military offensive does not seem to be in the cards.

Dr. Kissinger: They could be building up for a major offensive next year.

Mr. Carver: There are no signs yet.

Dr. Kissinger: When did you first pick up indications of the Tet offensive?

Mr. Carver: The build-up started in October 1967. The first manifestation appeared in September; then the build-up proceeded through October, November, and December. Thus, we had indications about four months ahead.

Dr. Kissinger: In that case, there is no conceivable way we could know now whether there is going to be an offensive.

Mr. Carver: That’s true. However, the longer the enemy goes without a major military success, the more he will have to exert himself to boost the morale of the populace and the cadre. Yet, there are risks if he tries anything.

Dr. Kissinger: Then things will continue about the same in the absence of an initiative on their part.

Mr. Carver: The longer the South Vietnamese can keep things from getting worse, the more it is up to Hanoi to move.

Mr. Irwin: They might be able to concentrate their forces to make what could give the appearance of being a significant attack in MR 1.

Mr. Carver: Yes, but we could detect this in advance if they tried it.

Mr. Packard: What about the condition of our forces? Do we have the troops and the firepower? How do they shape up relative to 1968?

Gen. Westmoreland: It would be fair to say that our strength is comparable.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Helms) Can you provide us a projection of enemy strategy alternatives in 1972? I recognize that you can’t say precisely that they will mount a large-scale offensive or that they will do something else, but we would like to have your estimate.

Mr. Carver: We have to understand that what they can do in 1972 depends on what they do in 1971.

Mr. Helms: We will do the best projection we can.

Dr. Kissinger: Now we come to the political strategies. I understand this paper was mainly prepared by State.⁸ (to Irwin and Johnson) Can one of you brief us on this?

Mr. Irwin: Alex [Johnson] is the expert.

Mr. Johnson: I have been out. (to Wilson) Can you do it?

Mr. Wilson: The paper discusses a combination of political and military considerations; the strategies set forth vary in terms of their political and military components.

The high option would attempt to induce Hanoi, principally by military means, to terminate rapidly its military effort.

The second strategy has two options—A and B. Both of them seek, by a combination of political and military measures, to erode North Vietnam’s determination and ability to dominate Indochina. This strategy also seeks to maintain viable anti-communist governments in South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Thailand and an acceptable military-political balance in Laos. Option A would attempt to tie down enemy forces in as many areas as possible and to exhaust North Vietnamese capabilities to achieve a decisive success in any critical area. Option B would focus on the defense of the most important areas and seek to exhaust the North Vietnamese by exacting a high cost if they attempt to enter the defended areas. This option has two variants. Variant 1 would seek to inhibit enemy operations in South Laos. Variant 2 would establish a defense in South Vietnam and critical portions of Cambodia. The emphasis in Strategy Two would be on the protection of population. It would entail devoting more resources to pacification and counter-insurgency.

Strategy Three is principally political. It would seek by reducing the level of violence to shift the conflict to the political arena and to arrive at a framework for mutual accommodation. It would seek to maintain an anti-communist government in Thailand and non-communist governments in Cambodia, South Vietnam, and Laos.

Strategy Four would seek to extricate US military forces from South Vietnam as rapidly as possible while attempting to maintain US credibility.

Dr. Kissinger: How would you do that? Everyone here is all for it if you could find a way.

Mr. Wilson: That’s the weakness of this strategy. Maintenance of independent governments in parts of Laos and Cambodia would be part of this strategy.

Dr. Kissinger: As an abstract statement no one would quarrel with Strategy Four. The question is: what do you propose to do?

Mr. Johnson and Mr. Irwin: This strategy is not realistic.

Mr. Wilson: The Working Group thought that it was not realistic but felt that the option ought to be presented because it represents the thinking of a sizable group in this country.

Mr. Irwin: It doesn’t even represent their thinking. They don’t care about credibility.

Running through all of this strategy discussion is the question of what our overall policy toward Thailand should be. We [the State Department] come out supporting a combination of Strategies Two and Three on the assumption that you can’t do much on Strategy Three until you have achieved something on Strategy Two. But we have to decide what we prefer Thailand to do and also what it is possible to get the Thais to do.

Dr. Kissinger: The President has ruled on the first question several times. In extremis he wants to use Thai forces in Laos and Cambodia. In fact, he has done it.

Mr. Irwin: He has done it in Laos.

Dr. Kissinger: The story of trying to make arrangements for using Thai forces has been my great bureaucratic saga. If it hasn’t been done, it isn’t because the orders haven’t been given. Speaking seriously, there are two key questions with regard to Thailand. One is what we do while the war is going on in Indochina. If it comes to a choice between the collapse of Cambodia and the use of Thai troops, I can say with assurance that the President would rule in favor of using Thai troops. It is also important to discuss what happens with Thailand after the war. This has not been discussed. It is something that should go to the President.

Mr. Johnson: Yes, it should go to him.

Mr. Packard: What the Thais do now depends on what we are willing to do for them in the long term. We are going to a lot of effort and getting very little capability. Strategy Two, Option A is the one I think we ought to do.

Dr. Kissinger: As I understand George Carver’s analysis, we can proceed this year on the basis that nothing is going to happen that can’t be handled by South Vietnamese and Cambodian troops.

Mr. Carver: This is the conclusion one comes to on the basis of what has happened to date.

Mr. Packard: We should not attempt to plan the use of Thai troops in Cambodia at this time. We ought to get them to concentrate on their own defenses. If we need Thai troops in Cambodia later, we can use them.

Mr. Johnson: For legal reasons the rationale for doing anything with the Thais has to be the defense of Thailand.

Mr. Irwin: We have checked this out. We have no alternative but to focus our effort on the defense of Thailand.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s get this to a WSAG meeting this coming week.

Mr. Packard: What we are proposing is all we can do legally.

Dr. Kissinger: The legal situation should not determine the pace.

Mr. Packard: No. We can more ahead just as fast [regardless of the legal question].

Dr. Kissinger: We must be in the maximum position to prevent a Cambodian collapse in 1972.

Mr. Packard: What we do is move ahead [with building up the Thais]. Then at the time when they are needed in Cambodia, we have them available.

Dr. Kissinger: That is not what Jack [Irwin] said.

Mr. Irwin: I agree with Dave [Packard].

Dr. Kissinger: Then I misunderstood you.

Mr. Packard: We can get the Thais ready just as fast this way as the other way.

Dr. Kissinger: If the issue is the legal justification, then that is not a policy matter. But if, as I suspect, the issue is a slowdown on the Thai program, then we need to have a look at it.

Mr. Irwin: It is not a slowdown. The question is how much we should push this with the Thais.

Dr. Kissinger: That’s the same thing. I am not interested in the justification used. However, to be consistent with what the President has repeatedly stated, the pace [of our efforts with the Thais] must be kept up at a fast rate. We must make sure that we still have the option.

Mr. Packard: We are quietly negotiating with the Thais. I think we can arrange funding.

Mr. Helms: If the money is available, there will be no problems.

Dr. Kissinger: There is a philosophic difference on this question in this group. For more than a year this difference has never been made explicit. All I can do is transmit my clear understanding that the President wants to have Thai troops available if necessary to prevent the collapse of Cambodia. This is not the preferred course of action. I know that there are those who have strong feelings against using the Thais outside of Thailand. But we should not foreclose this option. If we are all agreed on doing this, then I don’t care about the justification.

Mr. Packard: That is exactly what we want to do.

Dr. Kissinger: Then let’s move ahead on it.

Mr. Johnson: I think it would be useful to have this group think through how we go about employing the Thais in extremis.

Mr. Irwin: This would be a question of coming up with a definition of when the situation is extreme enough to bring in the Thais.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to have a paper on Thailand, so that we can raise this issue.

In connection with the Thrusts Paper, there is a statement on page 22 that we should “accelerate political and diplomatic efforts to show our peaceful intentions and willingness to solve the conflict if the other side really wants peace; this could include further explicit statements at Paris”. In the abstract this doesn’t bother me. However, I would appreciate it if someone could tell me what the hell our statement is going to be.

Mr. Johnson: (to Wilson) Can you adumbrate that?

Mr. Wilson: No, I can’t.

Mr. Johnson: We have said about all we can say.

Dr. Kissinger: Similarly, there is the discussion of Thrust Three on page 26, which speaks of “direct pressures on the GVN to increasingly broaden the base of their government and begin a process of mutual accommodation with the PRG and DRV”. To my more literal mind, this doesn’t say anything other than that we should accept most of their [the North Vietnamese] proposals.

Mr. Wilson: That is the “sell-out” strategy [i.e., Strategy Four].

Dr. Kissinger: I am speaking of Strategy Three.

Capt. Sansom: Strategy Three is the “sell-out”. Strategy Four is the “bug-out”.

Mr. Wilson: This [the language on page 26] would imply somewhat greater pressure than we are presently putting on the GVN.

Dr. Kissinger: When we discuss this again, could you spell these things out operationally so that they won’t be so vague? Then if the President says “I take this option”, he will know what he is choosing.

Mr. Johnson: Yes, then he will know what we mean.

Dr. Kissinger: He will know what you mean. (to Smith) I would prefer to schedule a discussion of the economic papers separately.

Can we spend ten minutes on Laos? (to Johnson) Can you bring us up to date?

Mr. Johnson: The two princes are still fencing over arrangements for the next talks at Khang Khay. The Pathet Lao demands have been gradually cut back from a complete cessation of bombing in Xieng Khouang (where Khang Khay is located) and Sam Neua provinces to a cessation in Xieng Khouang. There has been no dialogue recently. The question is whether we should go out of our way to suggest to Souvanna that he take the initiative to move the talks ahead. Should we put up any suggestion for a ceasefire in the Khang Khay area in order to help get the talks going? The talks could perhaps turn to our operations in the South over the longer term. Our thought is that we might well go to Souvanna and specifically suggest that we stand down air operations in Xieng Khouang.

Mr. Packard: Except for reconnaisance.

Mr. Johnson: There would be a standstill on the ground with a cessation of reinforcement and resupply. Our proposal is to go out to Ambassador Godley and see what he thinks. Then depending on his reaction, we could decide whether to go further.

Mr. Helms: On the theory that you don’t catch any fish if you don’t go fishing, I think we ought to put this to Godley.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Gen. Westmoreland) What do you think?

Gen. Westmoreland: I think it’s a good idea.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Irwin) Jack?

Mr. Irwin: I agree.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we can certainly ask Godley what he thinks. If we can get some scaling down in Northern Laos, it could be a plus.

Gen. Westmoreland: The only disadvantage is that it might free North Vietnamese troops for use elsewhere.

Mr. Johnson: Not many.

Gen. Westmoreland: The 312th Division is on its way back to North Laos. However, any disadvantage of this sort could be more than outweighed by the lessening of pressure in North Laos. We really have to give Vang Pao a break.

Dr. Kissinger: It would take three months for the division to move south.

Gen. Westmoreland: Probably they could move faster. Since they are already on the move, presumably they are in good shape.

Dr. Kissinger: Let’s approve the cable.⁹

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Top Secret. The meeting took place in the Situation Room of the White House. All brackets are in the original.
2. For NSSM 99, see Document 25. For NSSM 96, see Document 3. The response to NSSM 96, August 6, 1970, is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–51, SRG Meeting, Laos, 1–15–71. An analytical study of the paper, prepared by the NSC staff, December 4, 1970, is ibid.
3. For a summary, see Document 102.
4. For a summary, see Document 102.
5. For a summary, see Document 102.
6. Kissinger is referring to the discussion of the NSSM 99 (Part II) Southeast Asia Strategy study at the December 14, 1970, SRG meeting. At the outset of the meeting, Packard, the JCS representatives, and Irwin objected that MACV did not have an opportunity to give its input into the study, so Kissinger adjourned the meeting after 16 minutes, noting that it would be rescheduled after MACV contributed. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–111, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1970) K. Wayne Smith, in a December 16 memorandum to Kissinger, described the meeting as a “fiasco,” noting that Irwin’s chief concern was that Kissinger was directing the discussion to quantitative issues at the expense of important non-quantitative ones. (Ibid., Box H–50, SRG Meetings, Laos NSSM 99, 12–14–70)
7. Reference is to Operation Cuu Long 44/02, an RVNAF–FANK action with U.S. air support to clear the Pich Nil Pass and open Route 4 between Kompong Som and Phnom Penh. According to a January 16 memorandum for the record prepared in the National Military Command Center, the operation began at 12:18 p.m. on January 16. Pursley forwarded a copy of the memorandum to Eliot under a covering memorandum, January 19, noting that Laird had suggested it be held closely. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 6 CAMB)
8. This refers to the Strategic Thrusts study summarized in Document 102.
9. The cable authorizing Godley to suggest to Souvanna Phouma a cease-fire in Khang Khay to get the talks between the Royal Lao Government and Pathet Lao moving has not been found.