Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume VII, Vietnam, July 1970–January 1972

102. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, undated.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

Brief analytical summaries of the five NSSM 99² papers follow.

A. Friendly Strategy Alternatives³

Introduction—Four strategic thrusts are presented with associated military and political courses of action and variants. These strategies are still at the conceptual stage, but clear differences are discernible and the issues emerge. The main deficiency is that the political alternatives provided by State are so vague as to be meaningless. There is also an interests section in this paper which Under Secretary Irwin may use to remind you of the “costs” to U.S. interests for the various strategies and the risks associated with involving the Thai in Indo-China.

The Strategies

• Strategy 1—This is a military strategy that seeks to defeat Hanoi’s forces outside North Vietnam. The specific action contemplated is an overt pincer movement in South Laos using Thai and South Vietnamese forces to cut off the flow of men and supplies into Cambodia and South Vietnam. A political variant to this strategy calls for a formal alliance among the non-communist Indo-Chinese states.

• Strategy 2—This is primarily a military strategy with some possible political variants (which are not yet adequately developed). The military strategy is to build up indigenous capabilities to frustrate the enemy’s military hopes over the long term. Two military variants are proposed:

  • —(A). A force diversion strategy relying on Thai, Lao, and Cambodian forces to occupy Hanoi’s forces on every front to the fullest extent possible. This could encompass Thai overt or covert forces in South Laos, expanded Laotian operations in North Laos, Cambodian offensives in northern Cambodia, etc.
  • —(B). A defense in depth strategy relying on RF–PF forces with a maneuver force shield in South Vietnam and a strong territorial defense in Cambodia to make enemy attacks on population concentrations so prohibitive as to force the enemy to recognize that the manpower costs of achieving his ultimate objectives by military means are prohibitive. This strategy would not employ Thai forces in Indo-China except in a limited covert role nor would it call for offensives by Cambodian or Laotian forces. Only vital enclaves would be defended in Laos and Cambodia. Air interdiction would be relied on in South Laos.

  The political variants to strategy 2 are platitudes (see p. 22, for example). We were unable to persuade State to develop interesting political variants. I understand Under Secretary Irwin has acknowledged this serious shortcoming of the strategies paper. For example, what internal political initiatives could the GVN take to undermine the VC politically or promote an accommodation? With regard to China, what could be done to develop a basis for eventual Chinese acceptance of a settlement in Indo-China?

  Would we be willing to remove our bases in exchange for a settlement? The whole question of SEATO and Rusk–Thanat⁴ should be assessed because Thai involvement is called for by the high variant of this strategy. Could we modify our interpretation of the Treaty to involve our ground forces only against a Chinese attack and employ the Nixon Doctrine with assurances to the Thai of our support against threats from Hanoi?

• Strategy 3—This is primarily a political strategy which seeks to establish a mutual accommodation. This is done by de-escalation of the war by our side on the assumption that “at least the minimal interests of those states involved in Southeast Asia can be reconciled.”

  This odd concoction assumes Hanoi wants a settlement. But this won’t do. It might be somewhat plausible if the strategy set out political conditions Hanoi might accept, but the political actions contemplated are so vaguely developed (see pp. 29–30) that there is no basis for saying Hanoi might be lured into a settlement.

  More fundamental is why a diminution in the level of violence would be an incentive for Hanoi to settle. If plausible political actions were developed these would make more sense as political variants to the military actions of Strategy 2 which have some clout.

• Strategy 4—This is a throw away strategy that calls for immediate and complete U.S. withdrawals. It is put forward as a contingency strategy in the event that a peace government comes to power in Saigon, but the real reason for its inclusion is that State wanted a lower strategy than Strategy 3 which it favors.

[Omitted here are Kissinger’s talking points on the issue for the January 15 Senior Review Group meeting.]

B. The MR Studies⁵

Introduction—These (and the program budget) are the basic analytical accomplishments of the study thus far. For the first time we have a quantitative grasp on the main force war. Unfortunately the summary does not do justice to the four MR studies. Below I attempt to bring the countrywide results into focus by a table that projects the friendly force situation into 1972 assuming there are 14 maneuver battalions still in South Vietnam (the current Fiscal Guidance assumption).

TABLE

FRIENDLY BATTALION SURPLUSES AND DEFICITS IN 1972 BY MR UNDER ALTERNATIVE CAMBODIA–LAOS OUTCOME ASSUMPTIONS (Friendly Battalions Required to Maintain a Main Force Stalemate)

	Case A (South Laos)	Case B (Force Diversion)	Case C (Defense in Depth)
MR 1	-15	-15	-20
MR 2	-11	-11	-15
MR 3	+11	+5	0
MR 4	+26	+13	0
Countrywide Surplus(+) or Deficit(-)	+11	-8	-35

The table considers three cases:

• —Case A: a very favorable outcome in Cambodia and South Laos similar to that which result if Thai and South Vietnamese forces backed by U.S. support were to successfully mount an offensive to cut off the flow of enemy resources through South Laos.
• —Case B: an indecisive outcome in Cambodia and South Laos that might approximate the evolution of our current force diversion strategy. Thai, Cambodian, and Laotian forces would secure important areas in Laos and Cambodia and harass enemy activities on the trail.
• —Case C: the outcome we can expect if the Cambodian and Laotian governments are all but defeated and the enemy’s diverted forces return en masse to South Vietnam.

Footnotes to Table on preceding page:⁶

Assumptions:

• MR 1: All cases assume a 1972 dry season NVA offensive in MR 1 after a one division NVA reinforcement.
• MR 2: All cases assume the enemy will mount a highlands offensive in MR 2 during the 1972 season, redeploying the 3 regiments now diverted to South Laos to MR 2 for this purpose. They also assume RVNAF performance increases of 25% and that ARVN reinforcements (from MRs 3 and 4 for cases A and B) are 100% more effective than current MR 2 units.
• MR 3: Case A assumes friendly side success in Cambodia forces Hanoi to maintain present diversions. ARVN performance continues to improve.

Case B assumes an indecisive outcome in Cambodia that allows the enemy to free up a division presently diverted there for redeployment back in to MR 3. The presumption is that this division is now occupied in restoring disrupted supply lines and can be freed later. However, no concerted main force attack is assumed in MR 3.

Case C assumes a disadvantageous outcome in Cambodia such that the enemy redeploys all his diverted forces back into MR 3 and halts pacification progress in the Delta. RVNAF performance continues to gain.

MR 4: Case A assumes the Cambodian outcome continues to be favorable to the GVN causing the enemy to be unable to halt GVN pacification in MR 4. One ARVN division would be freed from MR 4 in 1971 and another in 1972.

Case B assumes an indecisive outcome in Cambodia such that the enemy is able to prevent his total defeat in MR 4 by 1972. This would mean that one ARVN division could be freed from MR 4 in 1972.

Case C assumes a disadvantageous outcome in Cambodia such that the enemy redeploys all his diverted forces back into MR 4 and halts pacification progress in the Delta.

Table 1 shows the main force outcome in 1972 for each strategy case: Case A a surplus of 11 battalions; Case B a deficit of 8 battalions; and Case C a deficit of 35 battalions.

These results assume continued improvements in ARVN and RF–PF performance at current rates. If performance gains were accelerated the outcomes would improve markedly.

The enemy’s options turn on how well he does in Cambodia and Laos. If he restores his access to MR’s 3 and 4 without a requirement for continued force diversions, i.e. forces Lon Nol into an enclave this dry season, then we can expect no surpluses from MR’s 3 and 4 for deployment to MRs 1 and 2. If, however, the outcome is indecisive in Cambodia, allowing the enemy to free only a portion of his diverted forces, roughly two ARVN divisions can be freed from MR’s 3 and 4. Success in Cambodia would place ARVN in a very strong position to divert forces to MR’s 1 and 2 to replace departed U.S. units.

[Omitted here are Kissinger’s talking points on the issue for the January 15 SRG meeting.]

C. 1971 Enemy Strategy Alternatives⁷

Introduction—This analysis is the first product of a concerted effort on our part to get CIA to systematically analyze the enemy’s strategy alternatives in terms of manpower (infiltration), unit deployment, and logistic considerations.

Major Findings—The war has cost Hanoi heavily in manpower. Over the last decade roughly 800,000 have been lost causing the able-bodied manpower pool to shrink by 600,000 from 1.8 to 1.2 million, whereas otherwise it would have increased by 200,000. Even though 150,000 enter this pool every year, manpower considerations seem to have played an important role in Hanoi’s choice of a protracted war strategy.

Hanoi has cut its losses as far as it can hope to with its protracted war strategy. Nearly 100,000 will have to be infiltrated in 1971, compared with 60,000 in 1970, to maintain a credible protracted war posture. Otherwise enemy force strength will decline. Enemy KIA per attack, which fell sharply in 1969–70 over 1967–68, has reached an apparent floor. Most important, the enemy is not mounting attacks with sufficient frequency or intensity to turn back pacification.

The enemy strategy study’s conclusions on alternative strategies in 1971 are summarized in the following chart.

[Omitted here are a chart entitled, “Hypothetical Enemy Strategies in Indochina for FY 1971; Section D, a summary of the Program Budget of the projected total cost for U.S. and RVN forces for FY 1971–1973; and Section E, a summary of an economic analysis of the South Vietnamese economy.]

1. Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–51, SRG Meetings, SEA Strategy (NSSM 99 Pt. II), 1–15–71 AM (1 of 2). Top Secret. K. Wayne Smith forwarded the paper to Kissinger under a January 13 covering memorandum.
2. For NSSM 99, see Document 25.
3. This section summarizes the Interests and Strategic Thrusts section of the response to NSSM 99, Part II, November 25. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–51, SRG Meetings, SEA Strategy (NSSM 99 Pt. II), 1–15–71 AM (2 of 2))
4. The March 6, 1962, Rusk–Thanat communiqué on U.S. defense of Thailand is printed in American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1962, pp. 1091–1092.
5. This section summarizes the undated paper that analyzes each Military Region in South Vietnam. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H–51, SRG Meetings, SEA Strategy (NSSM 99 Pt. II), 1–15–71 AM (2 of 2))
6. There are no footnotes marked on the table in the original.
7. This section summarizes the Enemy Capabilities and Strategies section of the NSSM 99 Part II study, November 25. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box SCI–23, National Security Council, 1969–1975, Committees and Panels, Senior Review Group, 1970–1972)