477. Telegram From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations 1
2335. Re: UN Cyprus Force.
Resolution passed today2 creates presumption that costs of Cyprus Force will be borne by nations providing contingents, with possible voluntary contributions from others. In confirmation Cleveland-Stevenson telecon,3 U.S. willing consider contribution on following basis where this necessary to effective operation of force.
We see three possible levels on which SYG may ask our assistance:
- Transport. We see no problem supplying troop airlift free of cost to UN where countries contributing forces unable furnish own transportation. To extent British can handle airlift particularly of non-British forces from Europe, we should of course press for that to be first option. Would hope Canadians would also be in position to transport at least their own contingent. We would therefore want to be reasonably forthcoming on this level and with President’s approval, you may at your discretion inform SYG.
Supply of equipment and logistic support. Seems likely we be asked by SYG supply such things as helmets, perhaps communication equipment, vehicles, helicopters or other items not quickly obtainable elsewhere. We would be much more reluctant engage in this sort supply where we would be asked bear cost without reimbursement. Furthermore, we do not believe situation justifies argument for uniformity of type of equipment, which almost surely would mean greater requirement placed on us. Request you consult with UK as well as SYG with a view to assuring that UK equipment used to maximum.
We would want therefore consider such requests on individual basis and would scrutinize them carefully with view assuring ourselves there no reasonable alternative source of supply for UN.
If proposals are made for urgent supply particular items, military staff group attached to USUN (supplemented as necessary by people from DOD) should develop detailed requirement rationally related to total military planning. US decision to participate in furnishing supplies [Page 1014]and equipment would be made only on basis of demonstration that reliance on US is really only feasible recourse.
FYI: Funding presents most complicated legal and financial problems on any considerable logistic support. Modest voluntary contributions in kind can be made if absolutely necessary. End FYI.
Financial contribution. There already indications we might be asked make monetary contribution for payment peacekeeping forces from areas such as Brazil. We would not be agreeable to undertake fulfill such request. Would reopen whole question percentage contribution to peacekeeping forces with attendant difficulties. We would hope therefore no such requests would be made of U.S.
In talking with SYG you authorized use above in manner you believe tactically most advantageous.
We note SYG thinking in terms of peacekeeping force of about 7000 and that he envisages new UN forces of about 4000 as substituting for equal number British troops. We believe SYG and British should be strongly discouraged from acceptance this principle of substitution, certainly at least for initial stage and until situation on ground with respect restoration of law and order and ability maintain law and order is more apparent. We inclined agree with Gyani estimate that at least 10,000 are needed. Would be unwise in view difficulties UK already experienced with present force level of about 7000 to begin to build UN force by substituting for UK troops.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Secret; Immediate. Drafted by Cleveland and Jones; cleared in NE, DOD, and AID; and approved by Cleveland. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, London, Ottawa, Stockholm, Dublin, and New Delhi.↩
- See footnote 2, Document 472.↩
- No record of this conversation was found.↩