Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXIII, Organization and Management of Foreign Policy; United Nations

452. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State (Ball)¹

Washington, February 6, 1964.

SUBJECT

• Points to Make to Denis Greenhill-U.K. Embassy

1. We have sent to London our suggestions on how the U.S.-U.K. plan should be revised.² I want to stress the importance of the U.S. and the U.K. speaking with one voice on this matter.

2. In this connection, we are deeply concerned over the conversation which Sandys had with Kyprianou.³

3. While Sandys admittedly was speaking on a personal basis, he made specific reference to willingness to include territorial integrity in the terms of reference for the Peacekeeping Force which would undoubtedly result in the Turks going up in smoke. Moreover, this is an obligation which the United States itself would not be prepared to undertake if it were committing troops to this exercise. I think many other NATO members would feel the same way.

4. You have made clear to Ormsby-Gore⁴ and there was an understanding with him that Sandys would not talk to the Cypriots, at this stage, about a Security Council resolution. Sandys, in fact, not only talked about a Security Council resolution but also talked in terms of “approval” of the Peacekeeping Force. With American inclusion in such a Force, it is extremely doubtful that the Soviets could swallow this by allowing any resolution to go through. For this reason, we have stressed and are stressing the necessity of a pre-arranged deal with Makarios which would be “taken note of” by a “consensus” of the Security Council.

5. We are deeply concerned about the Turkish attitude. Frankly, the Turks have been highly suspicious of the UK in this matter and knowledge of the Sandys conversation with Kyprianou will undoubtedly increase the nervousness in Ankara. The Turks have been very strong against putting the Peacekeeping Force under Security Council control.

6. We agree fully that the U.K. should continue to take the lead in negotiating this delicate matter. However, positions put to Makarios must be fully concerted so that Makarios is not given any opportunity to make a difficult situation even more difficult by exploiting differences among us.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP. Confidential.
2. See footnote 3, Document 453.
3. According to a February 6 memorandum from Komer to President Johnson: “Sandys suggested we could live with (a) SC resolution ‘approving’ international force; and (b) due recognition that mission of force would include preserving territorial integrity of Cyprus, i.e. against Turks. We’d specifically warned against both.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Komer Files, Cyprus)
4. According to telegram 4904 to London, February 6, Ball told the British Ambassador: “We thought it would be a formidable error to hold meeting scheduled February 7 between Sandys, Bruce and Kyprianou. We urged strongly postponement of meeting until US and UK in position [to] present agreed position.” (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–8 CYP)