122. Memorandum for the Record1

SUBJECT

  • Latest Developments in Foreign Affairs Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (FA–PPBS) (Formerly Foreign Affairs Programming System)
1.
In a conversation on 20 July 1967 with Mr. Robert Bonham, Director of the Office of FA–PPBS, Department of State, the latter confirmed what I had already heard a week ago, i.e., that Mr. Tom Schelling had turned down Under Secretary Katzenbach’s job offer. Schelling was, with White House approval, to have become an Assistant Secretary of State for FA–PPBS.
2.
Bonham had expected Schelling to accept the appointment and to push for the realization of some form of programming system under the auspices of Mr. Katzenbach. Schelling explained his decision to Bonham in terms of his conviction that the Department of State was simply not organized and managed enough along Defense Department lines, where PPBS had originated, and that it would be impossible for the [Page 282]Department to call the turns on foreign affairs agencies in the McNamara manner. McNamara had sought out a system (i.e., PPBS). However, FA–PPBS was unfortunately, in his view, a system in search of a leader. He also felt that Mr. Katzenbach was unwilling to give him enough latitude for independent action and that under the circumstances he would be in a difficult position from the very start. He had no alternative but to opt out.2
3.
Bonham further advised me that his office had just been formally disestablished and that he was looking for other employment. What time he has left before his departure would be taken up with the interment of FA–PPBS, which he claimed would be without benefit of obituary notice or funeral service. A small PPBS office, which he felt would be a “window dressing” effort by the Department, would be set up either under Mr. Katzenbach or in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary for Administration.
4.
With regard to the ARA originated programming system which began operation in January 1967, a series of Country Analyses and Strategy Papers (CASP) have been prepared by the various Country Teams in ARA and are now being reviewed. Bonham characterized them as “uneven” in their approach. He did not know what ARA intended to do about further refining its programming system and ventured the guess that if the Assistant Secretary for ARA found the data produced thus far useful, he would probably continue it for another year.3
[name not declassified] 4
  1. Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Executive Registry, Job 80–B01580R, FAPS. Secret.
  2. Katzenbach’s efforts to hire Schelling and Schelling’s decision to withdraw are also discussed in Mosher and Harr, Programming Systems and Foreign Affairs Leadership, pp. 181–184. According to Mosher and Harr, Schelling had a number of discussions with officials at State, BOB, and the various foreign affairs agencies and decided that the situation offered little prospect of success within the year he planned to serve.
  3. For more information on CASP, see Document 136.
  4. Printed from a copy that indicates [name not declassified] signed the original.