Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

80. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 18, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Contact with Dr. Joaquin Balaguer

REFERENCES

• My Memoranda for the Record of May 15² and May 17³

At about noon on May 17, Mr. Arnold⁴ called me by telephone to say an unexpected crisis had arisen in connection with our negotiations. At his request, I met with him in the Situation Room at the White House as soon as I could get there. Mr. Arnold briefed me on recent developments and we reached agreement on the strategy for attempting to prevent a break-down in the negotiations. The text of our agreement as written up at that time is quoted below:

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Situation

San Isidro group will accept deal only if new government, at the time it takes office, adopts 1963 constitution but concurrently calls for a plebiscite on the constitution to be held within 30–60 days.

Problem

To get Balaguerʼs support in swinging this with Bosch.

Tactics

1. Brief Balaguer on problem, emphasizing its delicacy insofar as dealings with Bosch are concerned.

2. Get Balaguerʼs assurance that he will keep completely secret the fact we have briefed him.

3. Get Balaguerʼs commitment to support plebiscite plan if Bosch broaches it to him.

4. Develop with Balaguer a “safe” means whereby Balaguer will bring this subject up in his discussion with Bosch (if Bosch does not broach it) in such a manner that Bosch will have no suspicion that Balaguer is serving as our instrument in executing this tactic.

The nature of the plebiscite is not yet finally decided, but it would probably be a yes or no vote with the 1962 constitution coming into effect automatically in the event the vote goes against continuation of the 1963 constitution.

Mr. Arnold and I agreed that it would be necessary to tell Balaguer that tentative agreement had already been reached on Guzman as a single interim president to serve out the remainder of Boschʼs term.

With respect to item 4—Tactics, Balaguer might bring this subject up himself (if Bosch failed to do so) in the following manner:

After he and Bosch had reached general agreement on a plan for establishing a government of national concordance:

a) Balaguer would say that it would be highly desirable to give the people an opportunity to express their satisfaction with the arrangements.

b) It would also be highly desirable to bring the people around to thinking about “constitutional acts” rather than acts of violence.

c) Since no election will be held until 1966 under the arrangement that has been agreed to, a referendum or plebiscite might serve both of the foregoing objectives.

d) Since the establishment of the government would be a fait accompli, a referendum or plebiscite could be held on the question of acceptance or rejection of the 1963 constitution.

e) Given the popular sentiment in favor of the 1963 constitution, the outcome of the referendum or plebiscite would be a foregone conclusion.

f) However, there would be some limited campaigning of a political nature which could serve as a safety valve to relieve tensions which have developed because of the armed conflict.

g) People could make speeches, get a little practice in politics, and once the constitution had been ratified the government would have additional claim to complete legitimacy and constitutionality.

Only one question arose in considering the practicality of this approach: At the time it was being developed, neither Mr. Crockett nor Mr. Arnold knew whether Dr. Balaguer was for or against the 1963 constitution.

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It was 1:30 p.m. by the time the foregoing agreement had been reached. If Balaguer was to be contacted to enlist his cooperation prior to his departure from New York at 5:00 p.m. (en route to Puerto Rico), it was necessary for me to catch the 2:00 p.m. Eastern Airlines shuttle. Even this would allow very little margin in the time frame in which the mission had to be carried out. Accordingly, I called Irving Davidson⁵ and asked him to stand by his telephone for the next half hour. I asked him to locate Balaguer in New York and have him stand by his telephone also. Meanwhile, Mr. Arnold sought clearance for the plan through Mr. Moyer.

At 1:45 p.m., Mr. Moyer informed Mr. Arnold that approval had been granted for execution of the plan. I called Mr. Davidson to tell him that I wished to meet with Dr. Balaguer in New York prior to his departure for Puerto Rico. I asked Mr. Davidson to arrange for Dr. Balaguer to meet me in the lobby of the Regency Hotel in New York at 3:45 p.m. Balaguer was to be alone at the time of our meeting. I would undertake to deliver him to Kennedy Airport in time to make his 5:00 p.m. plane to Puerto Rico.

By holding the 2:00 p.m. Eastern Airlines shuttle to New York for a few minutes, I was able to get aboard.

As the Eastern shuttle approached New York, the Captain called me into the pilotʼs compartment to tell me that a representative of the New York Port Authority would meet me when the plan landed to give me a message. I was to get off the plane before any of the other passengers and go to the Port Authorityʼs offices for this purpose.

The message turned out to be a request that I telephone Mr. Arnold at the White House. When I was able to get through to Mr. Arnold, he informed me that the plebiscite problem had been resolved. It would not be necessary to sell Balaguer on this. I should limit my talk with him to providing him with a background briefing on where things stood as of that time. “Do it lightly and get him to go along if you can. If not, at least get him to agree not to raise objections.”

I arrived at the Regency Hotel at 3:40 p.m. Dr. Balaguer was not there. At 3:50 p.m. he had still not appeared on the scene, but Irving Davidson had some how managed to get to New York and joined me in the lobby of the Regency Hotel.

Balaguer turned up at about 3:55 p.m. I told him time was short—I had a cab standing by—I would brief him on developments since our last meeting as we drove to Kennedy Airport. Balaguer said we would have to wait until 4:00 p.m. as his suitcase was in the car which had dropped him off at the hotel and it would not be back until 4:00 p.m. He suggested we ride out to Kennedy Airport in “his car”. I objected, pointing out that I did not want to have anyone else listening in on our conversation. He said this would not be a problem as “his car” had been provided by the FBI at his request. I let my cab go.

“Balaguerʼs car” turned up at 4:00 p.m. sharp. It was driven by Special FBI Agent Nick F. Estame. The senior Special Agent accompanying him was Heinrich Von Eckardt.⁶ After examining each otherʼs credentials, we all climbed aboard and started for Kennedy Airport. I briefed Balaguer along the lines agreed upon with Mr. Arnold and invited Balaguerʼs comments and/or questions.

Balaguer wanted to know how Guzman would be selected or elected, as the case might be. I told him I wasnʼt sure, but given Boschʼs strong feelings on the question of constitutionality, it might be necessary to have whatever there was left of Boschʼs Congress “elect” Guzman. This didnʼt seem to present a problem for Balaguer. However, he had some very firm ideas about the plebiscite or referendum.

Balaguer said that he saw two serious problems in holding a plebiscite. First, if the plebiscite went in favor of the 1963 constitution, as he supposed it would, then the 1963 constitution would be set in concrete for the future. Balaguer thought some of its provisions should be modified. He agreed that except for a few sections, the 1963 constitution wasnʼt really a bad document.

Balaguer felt much more strongly about the holding of a plebiscite of any kind than he did about its possible consequences as far as it might affect prospects for future amendments to the constitution. According to Balaguer, politicking, electioneering and voting should be avoided at all costs until 1966. He felt that far from serving as a means of letting off steam, a vote and the preliminary politicking that would have to precede the plebiscite would increase passions and should be avoided at all costs.

I argued that this was a matter of judgment and in any event, the plebiscite was a condition precedent set by the San Isidro group for going along with the whole deal.

Balaguer said he could swing the San Isidro group away from this position without any trouble if this was necessary. As for the question of judgment on the ultimate consequences of politicking and voting under present circumstances, whoever it was that thought this would reduce passions rather than exacerbate the situation just didnʼt know his (the Dominican) people. I pressed the point, making a strong case against his trying to un-stick something that had already been agreed to in the delicate state of negotiations as they then existed. He agreed that both Imbert and Bosch are not rational men, although they are irrational in different ways. He thought he could bring them both around and outlined his ideas of how to go about this.

If the San Isidro group could not be budged from its position on the holding of a plebiscite, then Balaguer would go along. But he would go along on the basis of an agreement with Bosch that he (Balaguer) would join with Bosch in supporting ratification of the 1963 constitution, provided Bosch would agree to two conditions:

1) The plebiscite would confirm the 1963 constitution as the law of the land for the remaining period to be served out by Guzman.

2) When a new congress took office in 1967, it would be free to amend the 1963 constitution in whatever manner it might see fit.

Meanwhile, Bosch and Balaguer would reach a private agreement that certain controversial provisions of the 1963 constitution would not be implemented during the interim. By doing it this way, the plebiscite might be carried out without doing too much damage and the country would be protected from those provisions of the 1963 constitution which inhibit private investment and are otherwise unacceptable to the men whose cooperation must be obtained if the national economy is to be resuscitated.

I was unable to bring Balaguer any further along on this particular point and had little time left to cover the remaining ground before we reached Kennedy Airport. I therefore decided to change the subject, but before doing so, I got Balaguer to promise that he would consult with me before breaking off talks should he reach an impasse on the issue of the 1963 constitution and the plebiscite in his discussions with Bosch. I offered to come to Puerto Rico for this purpose if necessary.

Balaguer then raised the problem of how to deal with the communists and the “agitators”. I told him what I understood had been more or less agreed to. He immediately spotted the weak point, i.e., the problem is not where you put them, but how you identify them and reach agreement on the definition of a communist and/or an “agitator” (Balaguerʼs term) who may not be a communist but who is more dangerous from the practical standpoint than a clearly identifiable communist. After much discussion, I had to fall back on the point Mr. Mann made to me when we discussed this by telephone (KY–9), i.e., the key is the man or men who do the job. Balaguer agreed that this might be the answer. He pointed out, however, the men can be appointed or removed very easily once a government has been installed.

I attempted to counter this by pointing out that we would have a great deal of leverage, given the magnitude of the aid program we planned for the Dominican Republic once an acceptable government had been installed. Balaguer picked this up immediately. He said massive aid was really not much of a lever. It would, however, help the Bosch-dominated Guzman government consolidate itself through patronage and otherwise, thus amounting to a US subvention of the forces against which he would have to contend in the 1966 elections. I attempted to reassure him as best I could, taking into account that there were three other people in the car at that time, at least one of whom spoke fluent Spanish. Balaguer understood, but was not perceptibly reassured.

We arrived at the airport at about that point in the conversation and it developed Balaguer had a reservation but no ticket and no money. Irving Davidson bought Balaguer a round-trip ticket.

There was opportunity for me to speak completely alone with Balaguer for about five minutes before he boarded his plane. I stressed two specifics during this brief interlude:

a) Balaguer must respect my (our—the USG) confidence in talking to Bosch. He gave me categoric assurances which I believe were sincere.

b) Balaguer must have confidence in my (our—the USG) conviction that he was the man of the future in the DR and we would do nothing that did not take into account both his short and his long range value for both the USG and the Dominican people—these interests being in every way compatible and consistent in our view.⁷

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. IV, 5/12–19/65. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Crockett. Copies were sent to Mann, Vance, Helms, Vaughn, and Bromley Smith for Bundy.
2. See Document 70.
3. In the May 17 memorandum Crockett describes steps taken that morning to arrange a meeting between Balaguer and Bosch in Puerto Rico later that evening. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. IV, 5/12–19/65)
4. A pseudonym for Abe Fortas.
5. Another pseudonym for Abe Fortas. In a telephone conversation with Bundy at 11:55 a.m., May 18, President Johnson instructed Bundy to refer to Abe Fortas “hereafter, under all circumstances as … Mr. Arnold, nothing else, ever.” According to the President “a lot of confusion” had surfaced over the use of Fortasʼs pseudonyms in the reports he had seen. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson, and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.33, Side A, PNO 3) For a detailed account of the confusion over Fortasʼs pseudonyms, see Bruce Allen Murphy, Fortas: The Rise and Ruin of a Supreme Court Justice (New York: William Morrow & Co., 1988).
6. At 3:02 p.m. on May 17 Hoover telephoned President Johnson to inform him of Crockettʼs meeting with Balaguer in New York City. Hoover told President Johnson that an “I. Irving Davidson” arranged this meeting and described Davidson as “a con man in Washington.” Johnson explained to Hoover that “Davidson” was a pseudonym for Abe Fortas who was under his orders to work the “left wing” and Tom Mann to work the “right wing” in the Dominican Republic negotiations. Hoover replied that he did not know this. President Johnson further explained that he wanted the FBI involved to “check the people” referred by former Governor of Puerto Rico Munoz-Marin and other Fortas contacts. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and J. Edgar Hoover, Tape F65.30, Side A, PNO 2)
7. Fortas informed Bundy that Bosch and Balaguer were to meet in Puerto Rico between 10 and 10:30 p.m. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation among President Johnson, McGeorge Bundy, and Abe Fortas, May 17, 2:50 p.m., Tape F65.30, Side A, PNO 1) At 3:36 a.m. on May 18 Munoz-Marin telephoned Fortas to report on the conversation between Bosch and Balaguer. Munoz-Marin said he learned Balaguer would not accept Bosch as a member of the new Dominican Government but would accept a friend of Bosch whom Balaguer did not identify. Under this condition Balaguer would support the new Dominican Government. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between Abe Fortas and Luis Munoz-Marin, Tape F65.32, Side A, PNO 2) President Johnson reiterated this understanding to Bundy during another telephone conversation on May 18 at 3:47 a.m. (Ibid., Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and McGeorge Bundy, Tape F65.32, Side A, PNO 3)