Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

70. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, May 15, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Contact with Dr. Joaquin Balaguer

During the evening meeting of the Bundy Committee held May 14² it was decided that the time has come for a direct meeting with Dr. Balaguer. He should not be caught unawares by the recent turn of events in the current maneuvering aimed at resolving the political impasse in the DR.

I was instructed to carry out this mission observing the following ground rules:

1) Dr. Balaguer was not to be told about our negotiations with Juan Bosch;

2) Dr. Balaguer was not to be told anything about the nature of the new political grouping which we hope will emerge;

3) Dr. Balaguer was to be reassured insofar as our attitude toward him is concerned;

4) Dr. Balaguer was to be made aware that he is likely to receive a telephone call with relation to the currently evolving situation.

5) He was to be given no indication from whom this call would come nor, for that matter, what the subject might be;

6) I was to obtain Dr. Balaguerʼs assurance of full cooperation when the time comes for him to bring his own influence and that of his followers into play.

7) The meeting was to be arranged so that it would remain completely secret.

I have not been in direct contact with Dr. Balaguer except on irregular occasions. In order to arrange a secret meeting, it was therefore necessary to work through my intermediary of the last few months, Washington lobbyist Irving Davidson.³ There was no other way of going about this, particularly in the time frame called for by my action assignment, since I do not have Dr. Balaguerʼs home address nor know how he can be reached except through Davidson.

On May 14 I called Davidson at home at 8:30 p.m. and told him that I wanted to arrange a secret meeting with Dr. Balaguer for that same evening. Davidson reminded me that Balaguer is always surrounded by people like Enrique Garcia and other hangers-on. If a truly secret meeting was to be carried out, we would have to make some unusual arrangements. After some discussion, Davidson and I agreed on the following plan:

1) Davidson would contact Balaguer in New York by telephone and tell Balaguer that a mutual friend (of Davidsonʼs and Balaguerʼs) wished to come to New York to see Balaguer that evening;

2) That the nature of the discussion to be undertaken would be such that it would be necessary for Dr. Balaguer to meet with Davidson and the mutual friend at some place other than Balaguerʼs headquarters;

3) To this end Davidson would suggest to Dr. Balaguer that he wait for Davidson and “the mutual friend” in the lobby of the Regency Hotel at 11:45 p.m. May 14;

4) If Balaguer was willing to go ahead on this basis and would not insist on the “mutual friend” being identified, the deal was on;

5) Davidson and Crockett would take the 10:00 p.m. Eastern Airlines shuttle to New York to arrive at the Regency Hotel no later than 11:30.

Davidson called back very shortly to inform me that he had been able to make arrangements with Balaguer in strict accordance with the terms on which agreement had been reached, as outlined above.

Davidson was not sure, but gathered from a comment Balaguer made during their conversation, that Balaguer probably thought the “mutual friend” who was coming was General Gleason. In any event, Balaguer did not question the arrangement but readily agreed to it.

I met Davidson just in time to catch the 10:00 p.m. Eastern shuttle to New York and we worked out a scenario for the meeting during the course of the flight. We both agreed that the talk should be informal and leisurely, in keeping with all of the earlier meetings I have had with Balaguer. We also agreed that Balaguer should be suitably impressed by the surroundings in which the meeting would take place. To this end we arranged for a rather elaborate suite of rooms at the Regency.

Davidson and I made it to the Regency before Balaguer turned up and I went immediately to the suite we had reserved (room 1061). Davidson waited in the lobby for Balaguer to make sure that he had, in fact, come to the meeting alone before bringing him up to see me. Balaguer and Davidson joined me at about midnight.

After an exchange of the traditional formalities which the proprieties require in meeting with a Latin American and particularly one who has been a president of a country, I opened the conversation by apologizing to Dr. Balaguer for having asked him to come to me. I told him that I regretted very much the necessity of arranging the meeting in this manner since it would have been much more proper and respectful on my part to come to see him at his own headquarters. I asked that he forgive this impropriety and that he understand that I suggested we meet in this manner only because I felt it would be dangerous for Dr. Balaguer for me to come to his headquarters at this time and in the current circumstances.

To prepare the way for getting into the substantive stage of our conversation, I asked Dr. Balaguer if he would be kind enough to: a) give me his views on the current situation as it has evolved in the DR over recent weeks and b) outline to me any program which he felt might offer promise of contributing to the solution of the current political impasse there. I told him that I and the people with whom I work have a great deal of respect for him as a statesman and that we felt it would be very much to our advantage to have his thoughts on these and any other points he might like to cover. I stressed at this point and on various other occasions during the course of the conversation the importance which I attached to our meeting and the substance of our discussion being held in complete confidence between only the two of us. He not only agreed, but said that he, too, felt this would be in everyoneʼs interest.

As Dr. Balaguer is an intellectual and a gentleman, productive talks with him must be carried out with dignity and tact. The introductory exercise which I have just described took the better part of 45 minutes.

Dr. Balaguer opened his presentation by recalling his announcement earlier this week to the effect that he and his people would cooperate with the OAS in every way in order to restore tranquility in the DR. He said that the first indispensable step must be formation of some sort of national coalition which can command respect and qualify for recognition. While Dr. Balaguer and his group would be willing to work with Imbert and/or Caamaño to this end, Dr. Balaguer was afraid that neither Imbert nor Caamaño could organize a government which would command support in the country as a whole.

I told Balaguer that while we wished to avoid making judgments on any political figures or groupings in the DR, except the communists with whom we could not work under any circumstances, I felt his assessment of both the Imbert group and the Caamaño group was quite close to our own. At the same time, I pointed out that Dominican figures of prestige who possess real leadership potential have been extremely reluctant to take any active part in Dominican politics. I asked Dr. Balaguer if he thought there was any realistic prospect for bringing men of stature, good faith, and high motivation together in this hour of great trial for his country.

Dr. Balaguer felt that prospects for achieving this were probably better now than at any time in the past. He pointed out that the DR stands on the edge of a precipice and faces the dire prospect of ceasing to be an independent nation. Unless Dominicans can find some way of working together in governing their own country, they will be governed by someone else, such as the OAS, Muñoz Marin, Betancourt, or perhaps even as a UN trusteeship. He therefore felt that the point has been reached when it would be impossible for Dominicans of stature to refuse a call to serve their country.

I responded that Dr. Balaguerʼs views were most heartwarming to me. I asked him if he had any particular people in mind who might be willing to come forward in the circumstances he has just described.

Dr. Balaguer said there were many, ticking off a list of perhaps a half-dozen names, none of which were very inspiring as far as I am concerned. I consequently made no comment on the names but sought to turn the discussion in another direction.

I told Dr. Balaguer that I was sure he understood the great price the US had paid in reaching its decision to land US forces on Dominican soil. I “guessed” that it was probably the hardest decision with which this country has ever been faced in its dealings with Latin America. I told him that one of our primary objectives is to help promote, by all means at our disposal, the creation of a stable and prosperous Dominican Republic so that we may withdraw our forces at the very earliest possible date.

Dr. Balaguer interrupted at this point to say that while he, too, was heart-sick over the fact of his countryʼs occupation, he nonetheless recognized that there had been no alternative to the landing of US troops under the circumstances. He felt that it would be a mistake for the US to withdraw its forces prematurely as the communists would surely gain control of the country if we did. Further, Dr. Balaguer felt that the time has now come for a complete restructuring of the Dominican armed forces. Once this has been accomplished, then the time will have come for a gradual withdrawal of foreign forces.

In response to my query, Dr. Balaguer outlined his views on the most desirable form that a restructured Dominican armed force might take. His ideas were so close to those we have developed in the Bundy Committee meetings that I have wondered at one stage whether someone might not have already briefed him about what we have in mind. Consequently, I reacted to his proposal only to the extent of nodding my head affirmatively as he outlined it. At the end of his presentation I told him that it seemed to me this was something for Dominicans themselves to work out but I was sure the DR could count on the full cooperation and support of the US if, in fact, events should evolve in the way he had just outlined.

At this point, I got down to the business of carrying out the remainder of my assignment. I told Dr. Balaguer that:

1) We are aware of diplomatic initiatives now underway aimed at breaking the present impasse;

2) We hope these will bear fruit because we are in general agreement with Dr. Balaguerʼs assessment of both the Caamaño and Imbert groupings;

3) We anticipate that Dr. Balaguer will be approached very shortly and asked for his collaboration in and cooperation with the diplomatic initiatives to which I had just referred;

4) Since this is a highly sensitive negotiation, we entreat Dr. Balaguer to keep completely secret the discussions he and I are conducting;

5) We believe that Dr. Balaguer and his group have a large part to play in the interim and long-term political evolution of the DR;

6) We are prepared to support Dr. Balaguer and his group in their constructive efforts;

7) We fervently hope that if Dr. Balaguer is not able to respond affirmatively to the approach which we feel will shortly be made to him, he will at least not respond negatively until he has again given us the opportunity to consult with him;

8) I sincerely regretted finding myself in the position of asking so much of Dr. Balaguer while I was limited by my instructions to tell him so little;

9) I reiterated the extreme importance, both from his standpoint and ours, of keeping our meeting entirely secret;

10) Without naming any names, I said I was sure he would understand how difficult it was to deal with some of the individuals who must be involved in any meaningful solution. I again underscored the delicacy of this entire operation from that standpoint.

At this point, I asked Dr. Balaguer if he felt we had understood each other, despite the elliptical nature of our conversation. If not, did he have any questions to ask?

Dr. Balaguer said that he felt there was a clear understanding between us and that he had no doubts as to the meaning of my various comments and suggestions nor, for that matter, my failure to react to some of his comments and suggestions. He said that the really serious problem from his standpoint was a basic one for which he saw no solution. He protested that he is a man without ambition and that he is beginning to feel the weight of his years (salt to taste).

I took this up immediately by repeating my earlier statements, emphasizing the Dominican Republicʼs great need at this time for the help and support of its leading statesmen. I said that for my own part, Dr. Balaguer headed that list. I was confident he would not fail his country in this hour of need despite the heavy price I realized he would have to pay in again taking up an active role in Dominican politics.

I really think Dr. Balaguer swallowed this one hook, line and sinker. At least tears came into his eyes.

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 15–1 DOM REP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Crockett.
2. No record of this meeting has been found; but the Presidentʼs Daily Diary (Johnson Library) suggests that this meeting probably took place at the conclusion of the 5:51 p.m. meeting in the Cabinet Room on the Dominican Republic, see Document 69.
3. A pseudonym used by Abe Fortas.