73. Telegram From the Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs (Mann) and the Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaughn) to the White House 1
68. May 65. For White House from Mann and Vaughn. For Acting Secretary of State2 (RUEHC). This afternoon and this evening Vaughn, [Page 180] Shlaudeman and Mann had three principal conversations. First with the Secretary of State for Armed Forces Rivera Caminero, Chief of Staff of Air Force de Los Santos Cespedes, Chief of Staff of Navy Emilio Jimenez, and Chief of Staff of Army Jacinto Martinez. In two hour discussion we outlined our views of current situation and expressed opinion. This was moment for government of national unity which would hold office for 17 months period preceding next elections. We said we are exploring with Bosch and other political leaders possibility of a coalition but made clear we did not yet have firm agreement. The four expressed opposition to Bosch or to 1963 constitution. Objected to reintegration of or any other accommodation with rebel officers. Specifically rejected Corominas. Said he was former Ramfis Trujilloʼs chauffeur with fourth grade education. Our feeling is that all four are opposed to proposed coalition but will ultimately go along. Question is whether they will really try to control their officers in the three services and if they do, whether they can succeed in bringing armed forces along.
Personal hatreds obviously run very deep. These officers are, in opinion of Embassy, cream of the crop and the only ones among top officers willing with Imbert to take personal risks to actively oppose rebel movement.
We did not see Wessin, whose staff said he was fighting, but who we are informed by Rivera was hiding from us. We do not believe we should overestimate Wessinʼs strength as he has lost stature as a result of his vacilating timidity and indecision. Wessin is described as having said he would prefer to be pushed out rather than voluntarily resign and believe it probable that this could be accomplished if necessary.
Imbert made good impression. Shlaudeman says that whatever his faults—and they are considerable—he is man that has never double-crossed us. Imbert strongly expressed his disappointment. He said that he had no political ambition (probably only partially true) and would have stepped down yesterday morning, if he had been told. Said his forces had taken three hundred and forty prisoners; made considerable advance north of LOC yesterday and today and inflicted numerous casualties. Said this cut his ties with all anti-US elements and left him in isolated and exposed position. Said he had spoken to Embassy of possibility of resigning before and would do so at any time. Said occupation by US troops was preferable to Commie take over, that if his loyal forces suffer another serious setback they would cease to exist as effective fighting unit and we would then be faced with necessity of occupying entire country for many months to come. Claimed rebel forces were weary and dispirited and that without excessive bloodshed he will be able to take capitol within four or five days. Denied there was any unrest in countryside. We believe there is substantial unrest in [Page 181] countryside and while giving Imbert credit for pulling armed forces together and instilling fighting spirit doubt that he has strength to do anything more than achieve stalemate in the city at probable cost of weakening loyalists military strength in interior.
Imbert is obviously very pro US but is typical Latin American reactionary in his approach to political, economic and social problems. We told Imbert we are merely consulting and promised to let him know Washingtonʼs views tomorrow. Meeting with OAS committee was depressing. Argentinian and Colombian representatives expressed their displeasure at lack of creature comforts. Committee obviously deeply hurt that UN has intervened in situation.3 Said they plan to return tomorrow to Washington to discuss with meetings of Foreign Ministers. Questioned whether they had legal authority to do anything other than investigate and report. I made obvious answers and urged that OAS could best reply to UN initiative by doing effective job instead of debating legalistic and theological problems in OAS. I informed them of opportunity which our current efforts to establish coalition government might give them to reestablish OAS prestige by reporting success instead of failure. Promised to get in touch with them again tomorrow and hope to be able to keep them on the job.
It is obvious they shrink from assuming responsibility and almost pathetic in hope that non-violent solution can be found. Doubt they will approve use of force by US or loyalist forces without full and lengthy debate and meeting of Foreign Ministers in Wash and without detailed instructions from their government. Their mood is one of depression and defeat. Have not seen Vance and Bundy yet although understand they made progress with Bosch. Will meet tomorrow at 7:30 Washington time and will report joint appraisals. Meanwhile it is clear we must make our decision very soon or risk falling between stools.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Top Secret; Flash; Exdis. Also sent to Rusk and McNamara. The telegram, sent over Defense communications channels, was received in the Department of State at 3:47 a.m.↩
- On May 15 Rusk was in Vienna to commemorate the Tenth Anniversary of the Austrian State Treaty. George Ball was Acting Secretary.↩
- At 10:30 a.m., May 14, the UN Security Council met and unanimously approved a resolution calling for a cease-fire and inviting Secretary General U Thant to send a representative, Jose Mayobre, to observe and report on the situation. The Secretary Generalʼs advance team arrived in Santo Domingo the afternoon of May 15; Mayobre arrived on May 18.↩