72. Draft Memorandum of Meeting1
PARTICIPANTS
- Commodore Francisco Rivera Caminero, Secretary of State for the Armed Forces, Government of National Reconstruction (GNR)
- Brig. Gen. Juan de los Santos Cespedes, Chief of Staff, Dominican Air Force, GNR
- Brig. Gen. Jacinto Martinez Arana,2 Chief of Staff, Dominican Army, GNR
- Commodore Ramon Emilio Jimenez, Chief of Staff, Dominican Navy,GNR
- Under Secretary of State Thomas C. Mann
- Ambassador W. Tapley Bennett, Jr.
- Assistant Secretary of State Jack H. Vaughn
- Lt. General Bruce Palmer
- Lt. Colonel Thomas Fishburn
- Lt. Colonel Ralph Heywood (USMC)
- Harry W. Shlaudeman
Under Secretary Mann opened the meeting by thanking the Dominican officers for their courtesy in attending. It was necessary, if inconvenient, to assemble at San Isidro in order to avoid publicity and potentially damaging speculation in the press.
Mr. Mann explained that he had been sent to the Dominican Republic by the President of the United States and was speaking for the President. A solution to the Dominican conflict must be found quickly. It was particularly urgent to get the Dominican economy going again. In this context, the Dominican officers were surely aware that basic Communist tactics aimed at bringing the economy of a target country to a standstill so as to promote general chaos and suffering.
If order could not be restored rapidly, Mr. Mann continued, fighting might break out in the provinces. The United States would then [Page 174] probably have to use force to a much greater degree and a full-scale occupation could result. Faced with this problem, the United States Government had been giving careful and continuing study to various means of ending the fighting. It was recognized that the use of force to clear the rebels from Santo Domingo might ultimately be necessary. However, the United States Government was not prepared to consider this alternative except as a last resort. The rebel forces included many well-intentioned youngsters who had been tricked by the extremists. The Communists were now in the background while these innocents played an increasingly important role. The shedding of their blood would be a tragedy.
Finally, Mr. Mann said, the United States Government had come to the conclusion that the Dominican people were tired of government by oligarchy, unjustified privileges for the few and general corruption. They wanted equality, reforms and constitutionality. President Johnson, for himself and for all of his government, had made United States support for these aspirations absolutely clear. At the same time, Mr. Mann commented, the Dominican officers should have no misapprehensions regarding the anti-Communist commitment of the United States Government. He personally could speak with full authority and excellent credentials on this point, having been subjected to incessant attack by Castro and all his supporters.
Rivera Caminero spoke at this juncture, first summarizing Mr. Mannʼs remarks as he understood them and then expressing doubts as to the validity of the argument against using military action to end the rebellion. It was his opinion that such action offered the most rapid and practical way to a solution.
In responding, Mr. Mann pointed out that the creation of martyrs was a basic element of Marxist-Leninist tactics in any conflict situation. He further explained that complicated international problems made it essential to search for a peaceful solution. Obtaining a bare two-thirds vote in the OAS for the concept of an Inter-American force had been a difficult struggle. The intervention had been attacked heavily in the United Nations, and the United States and its allies were hard put there to defend the right of the hemisphere to deal with its own affairs.
Mr. Mann then turned to specifics. In view of these various considerations, the United States Government had decided that the best solution lay with the formation of a government of national unity. Unofficial contacts with Bosch and Balaguer had led to a concrete proposal for such a government to be headed by Antonio Guzman. No firm agreement had yet been reached, but it now appeared close. The patriotic support of the Armed Forces would be needed and the United States Government expected that support to be forthcoming in the best interests of the Dominican Republic and the hemisphere.
[Page 175]There were to be no reprisals or vengeance, Mr. Mann continued. Bosch would have the responsibility of controlling Caamaño and the rebels. The Communists were to be eliminated from the political life of the nation—this being a firm condition for United States support of the proposal. For their part, the Armed Forces would accept and support the new government in return for the recognition of the principle of the integrity of the Armed Forces. The right of the military to exist as an integral institution with a voice in the future of the nation was to be clearly established with the formation of the new government. As added insurance, it had been agreed that a man specifically acceptable to the Armed Forces would be chosen for a Cabinet or sub-Cabinet position.
Mr. Mann emphasized that under this formula the Armed Forces would be in a solid position to defend the security of the nation. The United States would assist in this task, President Johnson already having made clear his determination to prevent the Dominican Republic from falling to communism whatever the cost. The United States would also be prepared to help the Armed Forces to reform and modernize. The Dominican Navy obviously needed patrol boats, not overage destroyers; the Army required mobile units with modern arms, not masses of untrained men; in general, it was time for the Dominican Armed Forces to reorient toward professionalism and the modern age. Perhaps training under Inter-American auspices could be arranged.
Returning to the question of the proposed new government, Mr. Mann described Antonio Guzman as a moderate, honorable and stable man who could give the country responsible leadership. Balaguer had promised to participate, perhaps not personally, but at least through one or more representatives in the Cabinet. This would give the new government balance and help insure its commitment to national unity.
General De Los Santos asked if the proposal meant reinstatement of the Constitution of 1963. Commodore Rivera described that Constitution as “atheistic” and said any new government that might be formed should write its own constitution.
In reply, Mr. Mann observed that politics is always the art of the possible. The 1963 Constitution was obviously not ideal but its acceptance seemed to offer the only way to pacify and unite the country. In any case, Mr. Mann continued, it was difficult to believe that this question had very great importance. Various methods would be available to change the Constitution if that proved necessary. The Dominican officers should turn their attention to fundamental issues. The proposal dealt satisfactorily with these: the Armed Forces would be preserved; the country would have a moderate president and a balanced Cabinet; the way would be open to maintain the Inter-American force [Page 176] until peace could be assured; a beginning would be made on the crucial task of economic development; and the means would be at hand to deal intelligently with the Communist threat.
Mr. Mann also pointed out that what was actually under discussion was a provisional government of approximately 17 months duration. Under the 1963 Constitution, elections would then be held. The OAS would supervise these elections, making certain they were truly free. There were strong indications that Dr. Balaguer could expect to do very well indeed in honest elections.
In addition, Mr. Mann emphasized, the Dominican officers must realize that national unity was essential. He well understood the profound hatreds caused by the conflict, knowledge of his own familyʼs experiences in the American Civil War having prepared him for such understanding. He also understood, however, that the country could only go forward if hatreds were laid aside. As part of the process of creating national unity, the Armed Forces would have to accept the reincorporation of the rebel officers and men. In the end, this would be the least painful course they could adopt. Finally, the reunited Armed Forces would have to change their ways. The goal must be a respected, honorable institution enjoying the support of the people and dedicated to the role of guardians of the nation. When this goal was achieved, the Armed Forces could count on the support of the United States, not before.
Commodore Rivera said he could not accept Caamaño back because Caamaño had sacked his house. Mr. Mann observed that vengeance should be avoided and the law applied in cases of this kind. He also stressed that Caamaño would not be in the new government. In response to a question from De Los Santos regarding the political composition of the government, Mr. Mann said that it was not yet known in detail which specific parties and men would participate. The important thing was to have a broad government of national unity. General De Los Santos remarked that the Communists always call for governments of national unity. Mr. Mann again explained that the establishment of the government was conditioned on the removal of the Communists from the political arena.
He also reiterated the absolute commitment of the United States to prevent a Communist takeover in the Dominican Republic. The Dominican officers should attempt to understand that their best guarantee in this regard was provided by the determination of the United States to protect its own national interests. A Communist victory in the Dominican Republic would have doubled the potential capacity of the Soviets to kill North Americans. It was not a question of ideology but of security against Sino-Soviet aggression.
The discussion then turned to the problem of the leadership of the Armed Forces under the new government. Mr. Mann mentioned that [Page 177] Bosch had suggested a Colonel PRD The former went on to remark that it was none of Boschʼs business who headed the Armed Forces, while the latter expressed the opinion that the Armed Forces should select their own chief. The Dominican officers all agreed with this point of view. Mr. Mann replied that Corominas had only been a suggestion and observed that there could be no objection to the Armed Forces coming up with their own man, always providing he was apolitical, respected, honorable and professional.
Mr. Mann then returned to his thesis that the Dominican officers should concern themselves with fundamentals. The proposal he was advancing offered the Dominican Republic a chance to return to security and peace. The integrity of the Armed Forces would be preserved and the Communist threat would be eliminated. It would be well to think back to the immediate past—to how the country arrived at this crossroads. The revolt created a vacuum; Communists—armed Communists—filled that vacuum. For a time they were the only real organized force. In order to meet this danger, the United States had taken and was continuing to take great risks. It would be a disgrace for the Armed Forces and Dominicans in general if the United States was forced to extend its intervention. The Dominican officers understandably found it difficult to make concessions but under the circumstances they must.
General De Los Santos asserted that the 1963 Constitution could not be accepted because its reinstatement would force all decent Dominicans as good Catholics to emigrate. Commodore Rivera added that to accept the 1963 Constitution was to accept the government of Juan Bosch, an impossibility. Mr. Mann suggested that acceptance could be provisional. If persecution of Catholics resulted, Bosch and his supporters would be put on the defensive and corrective action could be taken. He once more pointed out that elections would be coming in 17 months and that there was reason to believe the majority would not vote for Bosch. The latter claimed to be the voice of the people. Why not let him try to prove it? In addition, Bosch and Caamaño had made the 1963 Constitution a symbol. Why not accept this symbol—only a symbol—in order to end the fighting?
At this point, Mr. Mann repeated his explanation of the international difficulties posed by the Dominican crisis. He described in detail the difficult situation in the United Nations where the United States had to counter attempts by the Soviet Union to mix in the Dominican affair. The Dominican officers should bear in mind these important factors, realizing that the fight against communism is not just a narrow, national struggle.
[Page 178]General Martinez Arana responded with the observation that he had nothing personal against Bosch but [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. Guzman, in his opinion, was an honorable man and might be acceptable if he were not under the influence of Bosch. Mr. Mann observed that the United States would have considerable influence with the new government and, again, that elections would be coming, with Boschʼs chances to win distinctly poor. It was important to separate Bosch from the Communists. The establishment of a new government under Antonio Guzman would accomplish that purpose. General De Los Santos objected that the Communists would somehow get into and exploit the elections. Mr. Mann assured him this would not be possible, emphasizing again that the United States had just as much interest in preventing such a development as did the Dominican military.
He further urged De Los Santos and the others to think in flexible terms. Why could not they be as clever as the Communists in protecting their long-term interests? Here was an opportunity to take the initiative for once. Nothing would be frozen. On the contrary, acceptance of the proposal would bring a great opportunity to work for truly basic solutions to the countryʼs problems.
Finally, Mr. Mann asked, what were the alternatives? The Dominican Armed Forces did not have the capacity to restore order by themselves. The general situation was increasingly serious. Every hour lost was crucial to the future of the country. Ambassador Bennett at this point added his personal plea. Obviously, given the vilification to which he had been subjected by the rebels, the proposal was difficult for him, just as it was for the Dominican officers. Nevertheless, he recognized as they should that peace must be restored and a beginning made on the task of reunifying the country.
General De los Santos said he still could not understand why it was necessary to accept the 1963 Constitution. To do so would put the Armed Forces in an “undignified position.” The Armed Forces had deposed Bosch. Giving in now on the question of the Constitution would leave them “naked” and logically lead to the dismemberment of the Armed Forces. Commodore Rivera added his opinion that to accept the 1963 Constitution would be the equivalent of declaring the cause for which he and his comrades had fought to be unjust—that the rebels had been right. Also, it was well known that Bosch was an enemy of the Armed Forces and that the Communists were behind the PRD. It was the opinion of Commodore Rivera that the best political party was the Union Civica Nacional.
Mr. Mann responded that he still held the view that the constitutional question meant very little. The real cause, the real mission—both of the Armed Forces and the United States—was to preserve the Dominican Republic from communism. What he proposed would serve [Page 179] that cause. The Dominican officers should look to the future, keep their people together, keep the chance to give the country a decent future. Otherwise, all might end in chaos and hatred—hatred for the military and for the United States. Now was the time to act.
General De los Santos predicted that the proposed new government could only last three months and that by the time it reached its end he and his colleagues would have been eliminated. Mr. Mann conceded that this might happen and that there were, in the very nature of the difficult Dominican situation, possibilities for other unfavorable developments.
Commodore Jimenez then proposed that he and his fellow officers withhold judgment until more specific details of the proposal were available, including the names of those who were to serve in the government. He said the Dominican officers recognized the sacrifices made by the United States and were deeply grateful. He felt it necessary, nevertheless, to point out that the formula proposed by Mr. Mann posed a number of difficult problems. The political parties not involved would resist the formation of a Guzman government, as would many democrats and non-Communists in general.
There was agreement among the Dominican officers that Commodore Jimenez was correct in urging delay in reaching a final decision until more detailed discussions could be held. At this point, Mr. Mann asked to speak privately with the officers, and the meeting was adjourned.
- Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, ARA/DR Files: Lot 70 D 442, POL 15–1 Head of Government. Secret. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The exact time of this meeting has not been determined; however, during a brief telephone conversation between Bromley Smith and President Johnson at 11:25 a.m., May 15, the former told the President that Mann and Vaughn were expected to arrive at the San Isidro Air Base at approximately noon. (Johnson Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of telephone conversation between President Johnson and Bromley Smith, Tape F65.26, Side B, PNO 2)↩
- General Martinez Arana arrived after the meeting had been underway for approximately thirty minutes. He came from the northern zone of the city where he had been leading troops in the assault on rebel positions along Maximo Gomez Avenue. Martinez reported the going to be tough and progress slow, in part, he asserted, because cooperating units of the National Police were proving [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. [Footnote in the source text.]↩