Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

358. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 86.1–66

Washington, October 27, 1966.

SITUATION AND PROSPECTS IN HAITI

The Problem

To estimate the situation and outlook in Haiti over the next year or so, and to consider what might happen in the event of President Duvalierʼs death or overthrow.

Conclusions

A. Duvalierʼs position still seems fairly strong, despite the sporadic plotting and political tension normal in Haitian affairs. We think the chances are better than even that he will remain in power during the period of this estimate. If he does, there will be continuing political repression and economic stagnation or decline.

B. Duvalierʼs overthrow would probably have to be largely an inside job, with some key members of the security forces—and especially the Presidential Guard—participating. We doubt that any now in a position to organize such a coup has the will or the courage to attempt it. None of the many small groupings among the divided, bickering Haitian exiles could succeed in overthrowing Duvalier without decisive help from the US or some other foreign government. The Haitian dictator might, of course, die suddenly of natural causes, though he is only 59 and in reasonably good health; assassination is also a possibility, though he takes unusual precautions.

C. Duvalierʼs departure would probably be attended by some acts of violence in Port-au-Prince and other towns. Whether this violence was limited and sporadic or became widespread and intensive would depend in large part on the manner of his going. The danger of widespread hostilities would probably be greatest in the event Duvalier were assassinated in public. A coup attempt that failed at the last minute could produce equally nasty results.

D. The most likely successor to Duvalier would be a military junta which might or might not choose to exercise power behind a civilian front. Initially at least, such a government would probably not be stable, and there would likely be maneuvering for power among its members.

E. The two Communist parties are too small and weak to be able to contend for power even in a disorderly situation following Duvalierʼs departure. We doubt that outside Communist support—from Castro, the Soviets, or Haitian Communist exiles—would be forthcoming on a Significant scale. We believe that the Haitian Communists themselves would see their best chance of gaining influence as coming through offers of their administrative assistance to new government leadership rather than through any attempt to seize power on their own, and we think they would act accordingly.

F. In a situation where order had completely broken down, the Organization of American States (OAS) would almost certainly acquiesce in action by the US to evacuate foreign nationals. Any proposal for US or OAS intervention to restore order and establish an effective government, however, would encounter strong opposition within the OAS. Any contention that such intervention was necessary in order to forestall a Communist takeover would be disbelieved by many OAS members unless the supporting evidence was incontrovertible. Whatever the purpose for intervening, the US would face considerable criticism internationally.

G. The initial Haitian reaction to the landing of a US force would probably be favorable, but if a military occupation were at all prolonged, opposition would develop. Nevertheless, the problems in Haiti are such that it might prove more difficult to get a force out than to put it in, as was the case in 1915.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV. Secret. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State, Defense, the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force and the Joint Staff. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on October 27. The estimate was attached to a November 4 memorandum from Bowdler to Rostow that summarized the NIEʼs conclusions.