Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

357. Memorandum From William G. Bowdler of the National Security Council Staff to President Johnson¹

Washington, October 5, 1966, 6:30 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Current Situation in Haiti

You asked for an assessment of the situation in Haiti and the status of our contingency planning. The attached memorandum covers both matters.

I have asked Linc² to take a hard look at Galo Plazaʼs proposal for expanded aid administered through an OAS Mission in Haiti. It would enable us to do more for the Haitian people than we are doing under present guidelines. We and the other hemisphere countries have a humanitarian responsibility to lessen their plight if means can be devised which ensure that the assistance goes to the people and not the Duvalier crowd. The proposal would also establish an OAS presence which might prove handy should collective action become necessary.

WGB

Attachment

HAITIAN SITUATION

Duvalier continues to maintain an iron grip on Haiti. The surface appearance that he has ameliorated the ruthlessness of his regime is misleading—he has physically eliminated the opposition or driven it from the country and for the time being no one is opposing him.

The general economic and social situation continues to deteriorate. Although Haiti has maintained a reasonably sound financial situation, there has been no significant new investment in the country. Successive hurricane disasters over the last several years have also adversely affected the Haitian economy. Preliminary reports on the damage done by Hurricane Inez indicates that it has not been too serious. We are providing emergency relief.

Our ability to assist Haiti is limited. We terminated our bilateral economic programs in 1963 when it became obvious that Duvalier would not permit AID to operate except under his political control. We have continued minimal indirect assistance ($3.3 million in FY 66) through multilateral and United States voluntary agencies.

We have followed basically two objectives with regard to Haiti: (1) assisting the Haitian people as much as possible without giving direct assistance to Duvalier and (2) establishing a greater international presence in Haiti and a greater awareness among the American Republics of the situation there in case contingencies should arise which would require action by the OAS or U.S.

We have tried to increase assistance through third agencies to the extent we have considered possible without assuming unacceptable political liabilities. We have urged Chile, Mexico, Venezuela, and Colombia to give technical assistance. Israel and the Republic of China are considering small technical assistance projects if ways can be found to cover the dollar costs.

The IDB is considering a $1.3 million project to improve Haitiʼs education facilities. The loan has the approval of all of the Latin members of the IDB Board. The project is stalled because Treasury is reluctant to vote for the project in the IDB at the same time AID is unwilling to provide assistance on a bilateral scale. Secretary Rusk has discussed this loan with Secretary Fowler. I have asked State for a memo so we can get this impasse resolved.³

Dr. Galo Plaza Lasso, ex-President of Ecuador, recently visited Haiti and has proposed an enlarged program of technical assistance and some capital development for Haiti to be conducted by the OAS under strict controls. Duvalier indicated to Galo Plaza, and his Foreign Minister stated to Secretary Rusk, that Haiti would accept international control of the program. The Galo Plaza plan anticipates a large OAS presence in Haiti to be available when a major political crisis occurs. State is staffing out this proposal and will be making recommendations on it in the near future.

State, Defense and CIA have prepared a comprehensive contingency plan for Haiti.⁴ It considers all currently anticipated contingencies, including the employment of United States forces to evacuate Americans and other foreign nationals from Haiti. It includes up-to-date lists of acceptable Haitians inside and outside Haiti who could be used in forming a new government and of U.S. civilian and military personnel with Haitian experience who could be mobilized to work in Haiti as we had to do during the early days of the Dominican crisis.

We are also consulting on a regular basis with the large American countries about conditions in Haiti, but we have not discussed specific contingencies or possible United States and OAS reactions because such discussions would inevitably become public knowledge.

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV. Secret.
2. Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs.
3. Ruskʼs October 14 memorandum to the President requesting approval of his loan argued that multilateral assistance was a good way of getting aid to the people of Haiti without providing political benefit to Duvalier. The approval line of the memorandum is checked. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Haiti, Vol. IV)
4. See Document 353.