343. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee1

SUBJECT

  • Haiti—The Threat and Possible Pre-emptive Measures
[Page 794]

I. Alternative Sources of Political Power

There are no alternative sources of political power in Haiti today. The army, stripped of its best officers, is powerless to act against the regime and its armed rabble, the National Security Volunteers (VSN). There are no political parties other than the two communist parties which operate clandestinely. All power rests with President Duvalier who has relentlessly smashed all overt opposition.

II. The External Threat

No presently established group of Haitian exiles in the United States is capable of invading Haiti.

A potential threat to the Duvalier regime exists in the Dominican Republic. There, several Haitians who have long been identified with anti-Duvalier activities are known to be serving with Colonel Francisco Caamano. It is reliably reported that arms have been put at the disposal of these men. One of them has stated that these arms are to be used to liberate Haiti. They are trained guerrilla fighters and four of them are known to have participated in two previous invasions of Haiti.

It is further reported that nearly all of the trained men (30–60) who took part with them in the previous invasions are also with the rebels and have their own Headquarters in Santo Domingo. From the reservoir of 80,000 Haitians in the Dominican Republic they can probably build a new invasion force of as many anti-Duvalierists as they can arm and lead.

Equating these facts with the belief that a well-armed and determined force of from 200 to 300 men, well-trained and well-supplied, could overthrow the Haitian government, the danger should not be minimized. The Communists inside the country, although few in number—approximately 500 hard core—are the best organized and best disciplined of all opposition elements and can be counted on to attempt to seize power in the period immediately following Duvalierʼs disappearance. They could also be counted on to capitalize on an invasion attempt, especially if it came from leftist-led elements in the Dominican Republic. There is indication of outside direction from international communism through Haitian party members in Mexico City, Paris and Moscow. They have sympathizers in cabinet positions in the present government. The masses, long-suffering and apathetic, and exhorted daily by Radio Havana Creole language broadcasts, could likely be swung behind the leaders. Those in the provincial areas, especially the southern peninsula, are reliably reported to be tense, and ready for a revolt with racial implications at the slightest opportunity.

If the new government of the Dominican Republic assumes a posture unfavorable to the exiles, their capability to mount an effective invasion of Haiti will be diminished. If the new government is of leftist persuasion, action against Duvalier may be expected. In that case Haiti [Page 795] might fall quickly to the Dominican-based rebels and their Communist-oriented associates.

III. The Problem

An attempt to overthrow the Duvalier government by effective forces of Haitian, or other, leftist elements now in the Dominican Republic, would demand pre-emptive action.

Internal revolt by disgruntled members of Duvalierʼs entourage, which is an accepted possibility, would likewise call for pre-emptive action to forestall accession by undesirables, unless an understanding had been reached with the Haitian Army leaders to the effect that order would be maintained until acceptable exiles could be returned.

Sudden deterioration of Duvalierʼs health, which is known to be poor, would precipitate a crisis in which similar immediate action would be necessary.

The above conclusions are drawn in the belief that no individual, or group of individuals, now in Haiti or outside it, with enough power to seize control, is free of Communist influence, or acceptable to the U.S. Government by any standards applicable to its own, or hemispheric, interests.

IV. Proposed Alternatives for Pre-emptive Action 2

[6 paragraphs (64 lines of source text) not declassified]

V. Preparations for New Regime

By direction CIA has conducted an intensive survey of Haitian individuals of influence, both inside and outside the country, in order to pinpoint those best suited, in terms of U.S. interests, for inclusion in a post-Duvalier provisional government. Factors considered in selection of potential participants have been political ideology, responsiveness to U.S. direction, influence inside Haiti, experience and stability. A suitable group is at hand and could be activated in a matter of hours. Included would be Marcel Fombrun, Louis Roy, Robert Bazile, Francois Latortue, Raymond Joseph, Luc Fouche, Joseph Dejean, Paul Magloire and Jean Elie. They are all known to each other and have shown signs of being capable of working together.

Haitian army officers in exile have been carefully screened and enough have been selected for a rapid reconstruction of the Haitian army along lines consistent with U.S. interests.

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VI. Suggested Action in a Crisis Precipitated by Duvalierʼs Health Failure

The political vacuum created by Duvalierʼs disappearance would almost certainly necessitate quick action. The least exceptionable form of action would be for the U.S. Ambassador to make immediate contact with General Gerard Constant, the Army Chief of Staff, and tell him that if he can keep the army together and maintain order, the U.S. will guarantee his safety, and arrange the arrival in Port-au-Prince of Haitian civilian leaders now in exile in accordance with a listing to be negotiated with him on the spot.

  1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, Country Files, Haiti. Secret. Drafted in the Western Hemisphere Division, forwarded with a June 3 covering memorandum through the Deputy Director for Plans and the Director of Central Intelligence, with the signed concurrence of Thomas H. Karamessines, Assistant Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency. The covering memorandum stated that this CIA–State coordinated paper was the response to McGeorge Bundyʼs May 13 request for a plan of pre-emptive action in Haiti; see footnote 1, Document 342. The covering memorandum was attached but not printed.
  2. A June 10 memorandum from Vaughn to Thompson expressed Vaughnʼs concurrence with sections I, II, and III of the CIA paper, but noted his disagreement with sub-paragraphs (a) and (b) of section IV. [text not declassified] (Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records)