Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

342. Intelligence Memorandum¹

OCI No. 1754/65

Washington, May 13, 1965.

INSTABILITY IN HAITI

1. Since Francois Duvalierʼs accession to power in 1957, he has attempted to destroy every force which could possibly overthrow him. The military, which has been the traditional kingmaker in Haiti, lost most of its power in 1958 when the National Security Volunteers (VSN-Militia) and the secret police (Ton-Ton Macoute-bogeymen) were created as counterforces. Since that time there have been repeated purges within the military. Those who have been purged have been replaced by Duvalier favorites who owe their positions to him. A civil service does not exist. All government employees are hired on the basis of their loyalty to Duvalier. Even cabinet officers are changed frequently to prevent their building up any following. Discontent is believed to be widespread, but opposition, both real and imagined, is ruthlessly and immediately suppressed.

2. Over the years there have been numerous incursions by anti-Duvalier Haitian exiles. In August and September 1963 several incursions took place on the northern border area, the last with a force of over 100 men. These expeditions met with failure, however, because Duvalier was alerted and because of the poor leadership of the exile commander, Brig. Gen. Leon Cantave. Cantave has since lost exile support.

3. From June to September 1964 two separate groups invaded Haiti. One group of about 30 came from the Dominican Republic and operated in the southeastern portion of the southern peninsula for several weeks, then crossed back into the neighboring republic where they were temporarily interned by Dominican officials. The other group landed on the southwestern portion and was comprised of 13 men. This group was probably the best trained and equipped that has operated in Haiti. The Haitian military were unable to engage them for several months, but the group was finally worn down until all had been captured and killed. It is significant to note that a force of only 13 men operating in the countryside were capable of running the Haitian Armed forces (FAdH) ragged for several months. The FAdH was demoralized at its inability to engage the enemy. There were complaints that the army lacked good field support and sufficient supplies. Another widespread complaint was that the VSN—Duvalierʼs favorite—was not up to the task of fighting for the country.

4. The last two incursions were eventually beaten back, but only at great cost to the economy. Haiti has been unable to recover fully and is now in serious economic straits. Government employees are not paid for months on end. The Duvalier government has repeatedly asked for US economic aid. Following its vote in the OAS to back the US in its actions in the Dominican Republic Haiti may seek “its reward.”

5. Although Haitian exiles are agreed that Duvalier must be overthrown, they are divided amongst themselves. The exile factions work singly without overall direction and therefore are unable to put large groups in the field. Last yearʼs defeats also have served to dampen exile spirits.

6. During the past several weeks we have had reports that some Haitian exiles are fighting with the rebels in the Dominican Republic. These exiles are probably led by Andre Riviere, a French soldier of fortune. He is reported to have fought in Indochina, and is an expert in guerrilla tactics. In the past several years Riviere has instructed anti-Duvalier exiles—numbering about 70–100—in the Dominican Republic. Those Haitians presently fighting with the rebels may be some of those which he has trained. One of the exilesʼ perennial complaints was that they lacked arms; however, they may have acquired some from the Dominicans. At present Riviere—who reportedly has had Communist ties in the past—is a translator and military adviser to Manuel Montes Arache—one of the leaders of the Dominican rebel command.

7. [16 lines of source text not declassified] Radio Havana has long been trying to incite the Haitian people to overthrow the dictatorship. Recently these broadcasts, in the Creole language, have included excerpts from “Che” Guevaraʼs guerrilla warfare book. [2½ lines of source text not declassified]

8. Should exiles be able to mount an incursion on several fronts simultaneously, with small, well-trained groups who could be resupplied, the Duvalier regime could be overthrown. Depressed economic conditions in Haiti limit the governmentʼs ability to finance protracted military operations.

9. This paper has the concurrence of WH/DDP and O/NE.

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 303 Committee Records. Secret. Prepared in the Office of Current Intelligence of the CIA. Secret; No Foreign Dissem.; Controlled Dissem. A May 14 memorandum from Murat W. Williams (INR) to Vaughn noted that this memorandum was circulated at the May 13 meeting of the 303 Committee. The Committee agreed that “a small group of determined insurgents could unseat Duvalier.” Bundy directed that State and the CIA “coordinate on investigating alternative sources of political power in Haiti,” since Duvalierʼs days might be numbered and the United States “should not be caught short.” (Ibid., Country File, Haiti)