311. National Intelligence Estimate1

NIE 85–67

KEY ISSUES AND PROSPECTS FOR Castroʼs CUBA

The Problem

To estimate the outlook over the next two years.

Conclusions

A.
The Castro revolution has survived adversity, but it has not prospered. Increasingly the regime is keying its hopes for major material progress to the more distant future, when it expects the economic and social impact of its large-scale education and long-term economic programs to be felt.
B.
The level of the economy in 1966 was only slightly above that reached in 1958, the last prerevolutionary year; per capita private consumption was down nearly 25 percent, though favored groups in the population were better off. Economic gains in 1967 and 1968 will probably be minor, with little or no improvement in living conditions.
C.
Fidel will almost certainly persist in providing encouragement and training support to “anti-imperialist” and insurgent movements abroad, and in extending material aid to a few of them. Poor prospects for success in Latin America help to account for his increased support to revolutionary elements in Africa, where there are more opportunities and fewer risks.
D.
Differences about Communist revolutionary tactics and the amount of aid required by Cuba will continue to produce frictions in the Cuban-Soviet relationship. But Cuba remains important to the Soviets; they have little practical choice except to keep backing Fidel.
E.
Castro has continued the process of institutionalizing his revolution and has talked of sharing more responsibility with his inner circle of colleagues. We believe that he will remain clearly preeminent, however, and his hold on power will remain strong.
F.
In the unlikely event of Fidelʼs death or incapacitation during the next two years, a collegium headed by his brother Raúl and President Dorticós would probably take control. We doubt that this arrangement could long endure; at some point it would probably give way to a power struggle of unpredictable outcome. However, we know of no basis for supposing that a resulting new government would fundamentally change the domestic political and economic system. The effect on Cubaʼs foreign affairs is beyond useful speculation.

[Omitted here is the Discussion section of the estimate.]

  1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, NIEs, 85, Cuba. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet this estimate was prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency with the participation of the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency. The United States Intelligence Board concurred in this estimate on March 2.