Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

310. Memorandum Prepared for the 303 Committee¹

Washington, November 18, 1966.

SUBJECT

• CIA Survey of Its Cuban Operations

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform the members of the 303 Committee of the results of a survey of CIAʼs Cuban operations undertaken in recent months, and to solicit the Committeeʼs ratification of the proposed amendment in the program.

2. In February² 1966, the 303 Committee ratified the Agencyʼs program of action³ against the Castro regime. This program consisted of the following courses of action:

a. Covert collection of intelligence for strategic requirements.

b. Covert collection of counterintelligence and the use of this information to counter Cuban efforts to export the revolution.

c. Intelligence and covert action operations; the former designed to detect, and the latter to exploit discontent, within the military and other key power centers.

d. Economic warfare operations designed to further weaken the economy.

e. Covert actions, including propaganda, designed to stimulate discontent, to maintain the spirit of resistance, at least to some degree, and to maintain the isolation of Cuba.

3. It should be noted that, in contrast with earlier CIA programs, the objective of the program described in the February 1966 memorandum was to contain the Castro regime rather than to undermine it.

4. The CIA survey concluded that the courses of action approved by the 303 Committee in February 1966 are still valid, but that a change in emphasis on certain aspects is required. Specifically as a result of the survey, CIA plans to take the following actions:

a. Increase emphasis on the collection of intelligence and counterintelligence through operations in third countries. This is necessary because of the quantitative and qualitative improvement in the Cuban security services which has resulted in increasing difficulty in creating and maintaining in-place assets in Cuba. The decline in the productivity of agents recruited by means of infiltration operations exemplifies this problem.

b. Because of the decreasing effectiveness of intelligence infiltration operations it is planned to limit these to those essential to exfiltrate agents who are in difficulties in Cuba, to provide support to inside assets, and to infiltrate teams for intelligence purposes only on limited occasions in order to gain access to high priority targets.

c. To revise the total output of written and radio propaganda directed at Cuba, retaining those portions of the current program which are currently effective, and eliminating those portions which have become outdated because of the erosion of time and changes in the situation. The revision of the program will involve an overall quantitative reduction, but is not expected to affect the impact within Cuba appreciably. The proposal envisages elimination or reduction of support to certain specialized exile groups, such as jurists, students, and teachers. Also under active consideration is the possibility of substituting use of commercial radio stations located in the U.S. for the present radio broadcast facility maintained [less than 1 line of source text not declassified].

d. No changes in other aspects of the program are contemplated.

5. The proposed changes in emphasis will not materially affect CIAʼs capability to accomplish the limited containment objective cited above. They will result in significant savings in money and manpower, however.⁴

6. The Castro Government and the exile groups, as well as the Latin American republics, may note and incorrectly interpret this change in emphasis as a reduction in U.S. determination to restore Cuba to its rightful position as a member of the Western community of nations. It is believed that such an interpretation can be effectively thwarted in part by more sophisticated radio programming and by one or more authoritative restatements of policy by appropriate U.S. officials.

7. It is recommended that the 303 Committee ratify the proposed changes⁵ in emphasis in the CIA program.

1. Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, 5412 Special Group/303 Committee Records. Secret; Eyes Only.
2. “22 March” is handwritten above this date in the memorandum.
3. In a March 23 memorandum to Gordon, Koren noted that “The following item is contained in a Memorandum for the Record, dated 22 March 1966, subject: Telephonic Approvals by 303 Committee Principals: ‘The CIA paper “CIA Program of Action against Cuba” dated 21 February 1966 was noted without comment.’” (All ibid.) The February 21 CIA paper informed the members of the 303 Committee that the CIAʼs program of covert actions, including propaganda, covert collection of intelligence, covert collection of counterintelligence, and economic warfare against Cuba continued, despite “apathy and disillusionment” being “particularly noticeable in agent motivation.” It noted that two related programs had “met with success during the past year,” including “an energetic effort to encourage the defection of key personnel such as diplomats, industrial and commercial experts, and merchant marine officers.” It also noted that “Limited financial assistance is provided to several émigré political organizations, with 303 Committee approval, to keep these nuclei of resistance alive.”
4. In a November 23 memorandum to Thompson, Gordon recommended that the CIA proposal be supported in the 303 Committee. Gordon noted that the CIA intended to cut down its 24-hour-a-day propaganda broadcasts to Cuba to 4–6 hours of comparatively high-quality material. Gordon also noted that the Agency intended to maintain “on an active basis six highly trained and expert infiltration teams (out of a one-time maximum of 25) on which it can rely for intelligence collection purposes.” (Ibid.)
5. According to a November 28 memorandum for the record, the committee approved the paper as presented. [name not declassified] of the CIA answered questions about the paper and, according to these minutes, estimated that the finely honed program would result in savings of approximately $2,000,000. (Ibid.)