Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXXII, Dominican Republic; Cuba; Haiti; Guyana

126. Telegram From the Embassy in the Dominican Republic to the Department of State¹

Santo Domingo, August 25, 1965, 2130Z.

525. From Bunker. Re Deptel 278.²

1. I am fully in agreement on necessity apply maximum pressure to induce Imbert fulfill his commitment sign “act of reconciliation.” Excuse that GNR only accepted “act” on basis that not one word would be changed is patently phony and we have no intention allow him use that line.

2. Revisions in “act” were worked out by committee, not by CG, and we believe they have improved and strengthened act as a whole without altering its basic substance or objectives. New language of Article 4³ is stronger and more precise from point of view Imbertʼs own frequently reiterated concern as to future of “Communist focus” in CG. Perimeter around zone will now be maintained until Communists and others have given up their arms. The other changes in “act” should also be welcomed by Imbert and armed forces chiefs as strengthening PGʼs authority to deal with problems of constitutionalists and their zone free of hampering prior commitments. Article 8⁴ in particular is now more favorable from that standpoint.

3. Revised text has been accepted by CG and committee is now using all avenues of persuasion and pressure open to it in effort obtain agreement from other side. Principle external pressure is economic, represented in committeeʼs decision withhold financial assistance and retain OAS control of Central Bank. Other pressures, means of persuasion—individual and group—are being employed to fullest extent possible.

4. I believe problem of Imbert is complicated by fact he continues receive bad advice from friends, hangers-on, self-serving politicians and professional anti-Communists—all of whom put personal interest ahead of country. (Imbert is a rather unsophisticated man and his attitude often seems to be influenced by what the last person he saw had to say.) In addition, it must be recognized that he himself has never fully accepted necessity for establishment of provisional government.

I am hopeful, however, that appeals to Imbertʼs patriotism and pride, combined with pressures on both him and the military chiefs will obtain desired results.

5. Problem of armed forcesʼ chiefs is more difficult and more important. They apparently entertain some suspicions about Garcia Godoyʼs intentions and are reluctant put too much of their future or that of their institution in his hands. They also seem to suspect—completely without reason as far as we know—that he has made secret commitments to Caamano and company. With valuable assistance of Embassy attachés, we are making intense effort reassure chiefs of our own and Garcia Godoyʼs firm intention to preserve integrity of armed forces. (Embtel 520)⁵

6. In event GNR/armed forces acceptance of “act” not forthcoming within few days, Committee contemplates issuing another declaration to Dominican people reporting on status of negotiations. Because virtually all communications media are in hands of CG and GNR, this step may be necessary in order further mobilize public opinion. Fortunately, there obviously now is mounting public pressure for a settlement which should have its effect.

7. I am aware of feeling exasperation and frustration on part of USG at delays caused by constant manuevering for advantage by both CG and GNR and by childish refusal of each side to deal with or even recognize existence of the other. This is a feeling fully shared by myself and my colleagues. However, given mandate under which we are operating, I see no alternative to continuing along course we have set, combining patience with pressure and persuasion to achieve our objectives.

Bennett

1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964–66, POL 23–9 DOM REP. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Passed to the White House, DOD, and CIA.
2. Telegram 278 to Santo Domingo, August 23, informed Bunker: “With Caamano forces on board highest authority feels now is time apply maximum persuasion get Imbert carry out his commitment sign Reconciliation Act.” It “seems to us GNR simply stalling for reasons which are not clear and we believe ad hoc committee should now use all available bargaining levers force acceptance. We think public opinion throughout hemisphere would support such pressure.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65–9/65)
3. See footnote 2, Document 123.
4. See footnote 3, Document 123.
5. Telegram 520 from Santo Domingo, August 25, recounted Bunkerʼs efforts during a 11?2 hour meeting with Rivera Caminero and three service chiefs of the GNR to convince them that Garcia Godoy intended to carry out the three objectives supported by the Ad Hoc Committee and the United States: 1. “To deal effectively with the Communist problem; 2. to maintain the integrity of the Armed Forces; and, 3. to establish a stable government that could lead the country to free elections and the re-establishment of democratic institutions.” (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Dominican Republic, Vol. X, 8/65–9/65)