Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

99. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, August 27, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Meeting on China Study²

PARTICIPANTS

• State
  • The Secretary
  • G—Ambassador Thompson
  • FE—Mr. Berger
  • S/P—Mr. Yager
  • G/PM—Colonel Lewis
  • White House—Mr. Bundy
• Defense
  • The Secretary
  • Mr. Vance
  • ISA—Mr. McNaughton
  • JCS—General Wheeler
  • JCS—General Spivy
  • JCS—General Hightower

1. The Secretary opened the meeting by commenting that the study was a very useful piece of work. He stated, however, that there are certain aspects which require further thinking through. In this connection, he mentioned to Ambassador Thompson that the Soviet position requires further thought. It is possible the Soviets may not prefer to see a settlement in Southeast Asia. The struggle with Peiping is very deep-rooted and as a result may force the Soviets to take a stronger position than might otherwise be the case. He said he questions whether the Soviets would be willing to suffer another missile crisis setback considering the very major effects this could have upon the Soviet world position. Putting himself in their shoes, were he a Soviet leader he would be inclined to be sure that the US was presented with threats elsewhere in the world but tied to Southeast Asia, for example, by renewed pressure on Berlin. Such action, the Secretary believed, would raise very difficult alliance problems. The US would be blamed. The Secretary said he would be pleased to be proven wrong, but be doubted it. He thinks the study may have been too optimistic concerning Soviet policy, though we would do everything possible on the diplomatic side to avoid a confrontation with the Soviets. Nevertheless, the longer the hostilities continue, the bigger the problem with the Soviets will become.

2. The Secretary went on to say that the second major problem that bothered him was the time factor. He pointed out that the US is concerned with the need “for something to support in Vietnam.” The US effort would be very difficult in Southeast Asia if the political position in Vietnam erodes. However, the same might well be applied to the other side. There would be a great advantage to an all-out effort in South Vietnam, perhaps in September, if this could bring the other side to the conclusion that there was too little left for it to support in South Vietnam; too little from which to construct a viable political position. With a basis in military success, a concurrent peace offensive would give us a possibility of effective action before the other side makes the major decision to ask for more support.

3. Thirdly, the Secretary said that the problems of the use of nuclear weapons was perhaps understated in the paper. He noted that the use of nukes is not a line of action which we are going to abandon. He pointed out that the US has been careful not to foreclose this possibility, particularly in the Pacific against China. However, this problem may affect our whole position in the world and could even be influenced by domestic attitudes. The gravity and difficulty of the decision should be recognized.

4. Finally, the Secretary said he was pleased to see that a State-DOD group had been set up to take a longer, more careful look at the problem and that this should be helpful.

5. Secretary McNamara stated that his understanding was that the study was directed at the longer range problem and in this connection he would hope to have more analyses of the way the Communist Chinese are likely to move in their foreign policy, especially in Asia. From this we would be able to derive how the US should move in response. He cited India and Japan as two key areas. Mr. Vance commented in response to Mr. McNamara that the Senior Policy Group (Vance-Wheeler-Thompson) had decided that such a look was not practical in the initial short-range effort, but quite agreed that the longer range study should encompass such considerations.

6. In response to Mr. McNamara’s question, General Spivy said the longer-range study was due for completion next June, but with internal wrap-ups on various actions from time to time. He commented that the study is not a planning document per se, but an independent look at the problem. Mr. McNamara asked if an outline of the longer-range study could not be developed. General Spivy indicated that an initial outline is available (and passed out copies)³ noting that the outline is still being revamped. Mr. Yager said that the outline is considered as a checklist of points to be covered at this stage.

7. The Secretary stated that some of the matters covered in the outline are already operational and others may become so even before next summer, when the report will be completed. It might therefore be most useful if the study group were to look at certain specific problem areas more immediately. For example, if one were to try to influence Peiping toward accepting a more peaceful coexistence attitude then certain problems such as those presented by the India-Pakistan conflict are not very helpful. On the other hand, in Africa things are going very well and we might wish to capitalize on our position there. He said he could think of nothing more important in our longer range relations with Communist China than getting the Kashmir dispute settled so that India and Pakistan can live peacefully. Mr. McNamara agreed fully, and suggested an immediate effort by a very small group to get down on paper in about ninety days some of the more important considerations. It is less important that this be a completed and fully coordinated job, than that it reflect the thoughtful work of a limited number of good minds. Mr. Bundy agreed. He said we need in hand not an interdepartmental coordinated draft but a useful analysis.

8. The Secretary stated that it might be useful for him to dictate the thoughts on his mind as to how events, as he sees them developing, might affect the longer-range problem. He emphasized that this would be a casually dictated paper over a weekend, stressing questions and problems which trouble him, rather than a directive. General Wheeler commented that this would be excellent and just what the study group needed. Mr. McNamara also agreed.

9. Ambassador Thompson agreed that the Secretary’s offer would be very useful and suggested that Mr. McNamara, General Wheeler and others might wish to do the same. He commented that the problem is vast. For example, he cited as just one possibility the consideration that China and the Soviet Union could some day get back together again. Leadership in the various countries will eventually change and particularly if the US suffers severe setbacks in Vietnam this could attract the Soviets and Chinese together. The implications of this should be considered. Another thought that he had was the possible utility of attempting to bring pressure on China through the use of wheat, capitalizing on their difficult food problem. In this connection, he noted the problem of the dearth of good intelligence on China, commenting for example that we had little information on Chinese atomic capabilities. He stated he personally doubts that it will be significant soon, though he anticipates an attempt by the Chinese to make maximum use of the political potential of their having become a nuclear power.

10. General Wheeler commented that they are making a major effort in the intelligence community to lay out what we do and what we do not know. For example, he thinks that there is a need for a study in depth on the Chinese economy. He said that the DIA project on the military economy showed a greater capability than what most of the “economists” have been saying. He said doubtless this reflects a dual economy in China, one for peace and one for military use, but that we need a better analysis. Mr. McNamara tended to disagree, stating that he believes a report could be drawn up now. He doubts, for example, that a study in depth of the economy would have much affect upon the results of such a report. In the relatively short run of from five to seven years, China will be able to skim from the top of its economy base whatever is needed for military purposes.

11. Ambassador Thompson said he is struck by the concern of the present Chinese leadership with the possible disaffection of the next generation of Chinese leaders. He believes that the present leadership is taking precisely the wrong measures by insisting on more rigid indoctrination. We might well look at the possibility of capitalizing on this.

12. The Secretary said that we should look at the possibility of a food crisis in China and how the US might capitalize on that. He wondered whether a study by the Department of Agriculture might be useful. Ambassador Thompson said Agriculture had done some studies, but he finds them rather incredible. They tend to show that the Chinese could easily expand their agriculture and feed their population, but this was based on the assumption that US agricultural methods could be used. This was the big hooker. The Secretary agreed that this is a questionable assumption. Ambassador Thompson suggested that perhaps a study independent of the Agriculture Department might be useful.

13. The Secretary asked if the Study Group were in touch with Professor Taylor and his group at the University of Washington. He commented that they were doing work on the economy of China. The response was negative, but that the contact would be made. General Spivy commented that ISA is contracting with IDA for a long run study on China, the information from which would be of interest to the study group.

14. The Secretary suggested that one device which might be used would be to develop a loose leaf study. On some parts we might be able to write useful pieces immediately, developing the other parts as more information becomes available.

15. Mr. Bundy asked if CIA had been involved in the study. It was pointed out that they had been.

16. Ambassador Berger stated that two additional problems particularly interest him. One has to do with the possible admission of Communist China to the UN, and the range of problems which that would present. He suspected that this is a matter which we will have to face up to in the not distant future. The second issue is the possibility of Indonesia being taken over entirely by the PKI.

17. The Secretary stated that the central question, as he sees it, is the need to influence a half-dozen key people in China on the question of how China is doing, and whether its present policy is or is not on the right track. Such actions as the recognition of China by France or its future admission into the UN would, of course, be very bad in that it would persuade the Chinese that they were being successful. Unless other things demonstrate to the Chinese that they are not on the right track we will be faced with much greater danger in the future, not to mention that which we face today.

18. Mr. McNamara agreed, saying in addition that if the US takes positions in opposition to the Chinese which it cannot successfully back up, this only makes things worse. Mr. Bundy agreed, stating there is no point in opposing the Chinese in areas where we do not have the power to influence events.

19. The Secretary pointed out that successful opposition to the Chinese would create a terrific burden. He noted that it required a trillion dollars in NATO defense budgets to stop the Russians in Europe (but noted parenthetically that they still risked the Cuban missile adventure). It is going to require a major decision on the part of the US and its allies to stop the Chinese. Mr. McNamara agreed but stated that as a government we have not really faced the problem of generating sufficient power to convince the ChiComs of their error.

20. Ambassador Thompson raised a question as to how our studies and analysis might be used outside of the US, perhaps in some sanitized version. He stated that he has been impressed as to the lack of serious thought about the Chinese problem on the part of our allies and others. Mr. McNamara agreed and pointed out that since others do not think about the problem, and he doubts the US ability to stop the Chinese unless others are prepared to help, he wonders whether we will not have to say this to them at some point. This applies especially to India and Japan.

21. The Secretary stated that he thought the meeting had been useful and that it perhaps provided sufficient guidance for the next steps to be taken.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, POL 1–3 CHICOM. Top Secret; Limdis. Drafted by Weiss and Lewis. A note on the source text reads: “S Clearance not required on Memo for the Record. EJStreator.” Another record of the meeting is in a September 21 memorandum for the record prepared by Yager and Hightower, dated September 21. (Washington National Record Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1265, China Reds 092 China Study)
2. See Documents 92 and 94.
3. Not found, but see Document 161.