Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

92. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, July 6, 1965, 4 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• U—Mr. Ball
• G—Ambassador Thompson
• FE—Mr. Bundy; Mr. Dean
• S/P—Mr. Yager; Mr. Goodby
• G/PM—Mr. Kitchen; Mr. Weiss; Col. Lewis

SUBJECT

• China Study²

1. The purpose of the meeting was to exchange views with the Secretary on the above subject study.

2. Ambassador Thompson reviewed the activities leading to the study, the organizational arrangements for supervision, and the major policy issues brought to light by the study.

3. The Secretary commented that the study appeared not to have taken into account sufficiently the total capability of the other side to react in other areas to a crisis in Southeast Asia. He cited Berlin as an example. In the event of Soviet pressure in Berlin he foresaw a possible worldwide adverse reaction, but particularly on the part of our European allies, on the grounds that the U.S. had precipitated the European crisis. It was pointed out that the consensus in the intelligence community was that the Soviets preferred to handle one crisis at a time in view of the escalatory potential of concurrent widely spaced crises. Moreover, Ambassador Thompson thought the Soviets would have available a wide range of opportunities to retaliate against the U.S. in Southeast Asia, e.g. against U.S. naval forces, without the same degree of danger that a direct confrontation with the U.S. in Europe would inevitably involve. The Secretary responded that there is considerable latitude with respect to Berlin within which the Soviets could bring pressure before the problem got out of hand.

4. The Secretary indicated his agreement with Ambassador Thompson that the study tends to underestimate the forces which might impel the Soviets to earlier and more extensive participation in a Southeast Asian crisis. He asked what the reactions of our Ambassadors were to this question, especially that of Ambassador Kohler. Ambassador Thompson and Mr. Weiss quoted from Ambassador Kohler’s letter³ which strongly argued that the study had underestimated probable Soviet involvement.

5. In connection with Far Eastern attitudes, Mr. Kitchen cited the view of Ambassador Reischauer that even a prolonged conventional war in Southeast Asia is likely to have an adverse effect on U.S. objectives in Japan. Mr. Weiss added that some of our overseas representatives feel that the Japanese are totally out of sympathy with U.S. policy in Southeast Asia. They reason from their own experience in attempting to conquer China that it is a losing proposition. Moreover, the Japanese, as do other Asians, doubt the ability of the Chinese to extend their sovereignty over all of Southeast Asia. They believe the area is too vast and the indigenous populations too hostile to permit this. Thus the Japanese dislike seeing a deepening U.S. involvement. The Secretary responded that it is misleading for the Japanese to argue that their experience was so unsuccessful. At least until Japan made the mistake of attacking the U.S. it was not doing too badly in Asia.

6. Turning to the matter of the longer-range ChiCom study, the Secretary stated that the Study Group should work on alternative hypotheses. This would recognize that some changes are inevitable, e.g., changes in present ChiCom leadership. What happens if China continues to be militant? How do we proceed? On the other hand, what happens if China moves toward peaceful co-existence? Are there other alternatives? In essence, the Secretary believes we should not tie a review of policy to one assumption. Ambassador Thompson agreed and commented that we should not overlook the influence of changes in the USSR. The Secretary went on to cite other variables that need consideration, including the effect of population growth; the ability to arm and feed an increased population; the effect on Chinese policy if attitudes hardened against them, e.g., in Africa or somewhere else; the impingement of Chinese and Japanese policy; and the effect of Sukarno passing from the scene. In concluding these comments, the Secretary asked that he be furnished recent intelligence studies of worldwide Communist party reactions to the Sino-Soviet split. Finally, the Secretary suggested that the long-range study be checked out with McGeorge Bundy. Mr. Yager indicated that he had already been in touch with the White House staff.

7. The Secretary indicated that he wished a meeting to be established with Mr. McNamara and McGeorge Bundy to discuss the China Study. He asked that they be given an opportunity to look at the “Resume” and the “Critical Policy Issues” papers⁴ before the meeting. Ambassador Thompson agreed to set up the meeting.⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, ORG–STATE. Top Secret. Drafted by Seymour Weiss and Colonel William F. Lewis of G/PM. The meeting took place in Rusk’s office. Filed as an attachment to a July 29 memorandum from Thompson to McNamara enclosing papers that he thought Rusk would want to discuss “at our meeting on problems arising out of the China confrontation study.”
2. Not attached to the source text. A copy of the study, prepared by a State-Defense study group, entitled “Communist China (Short Range Report),” April 30, is filed as an attachment to a May 4 letter from Thompson to Ambassador Kohler in Moscow, requesting his comments. (Ibid.) For a summary, see Attachment B, Document 94.
3. Kohler’s May 22 letter commenting on the study is filed as an attachment to a June 9 memorandum from Thompson to Rusk. (Department of State, Central Files, ORG 1 OSD-State) Letters of May 24 from Rice and May 28 from Reischauer are also attached. A June 4 letter from Maxwell Taylor conveying his views and those of U. Alexis Johnson is filed as an attachment to a June 16 memorandum from Thompson to Rusk. (Ibid.) JCS comments are set forth in JCSM 437–65, June 7. (Ibid.)
4. The papers to which Rusk was referring are filed with a May 26 memorandum from Thompson to Rusk. (Ibid.) For revised versions, see the attachments to Document 94.
5. See Document 99.