94. Information Memorandum From the Acting Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs (Thompson) to Secretary of State Rusk1
Washington, July 15, 1965.
SUBJECT
- 1.
- Pursuant to your request I have proceeded with the arrangements for a
meeting on the above subject. The exact date is not yet settled because
of uncertainties and conflicts in the schedules of the senior
participants in the meeting but I expect that a mutually satisfactory
date can be set after Secretary McNamara returns from Viet Nam. In addition to yourself,
the Secretary of Defense, and Mac
Bundy, I have alerted Bus Wheeler and Cy
Vance (who together with me formed the Board of Directors
for the China Study), Bill Bundy and John
McNaughton.
- 2.
- I have also made available to Defense and to Mac Bundy a list of “Critical Policy
Problems” (Attachment A), a resume of the China Study (Attachment B),
and a precis of the views which we received from Kohler, Reischauer, Rice and
Taylor/Johnson (Attachment C).2
- 3.
- You may find it useful, as a means of orienting the discussion, to
establish at the outset the purpose for convening the meeting. In this
connection, I see the following objectives:
A. A Discussion of the “Critical Policy Problems.”
It appears to me that these issues are intrinsically of great significance
and to the extent that they are deemed valid, it would be extremely useful
to have both an understanding of their nature and a consensus about their
significance at the top levels of the government. My own impression, I am
bound to make clear, is that both field comments and the study itself seem
to suggest that further escalation of our military operations against the
DRV (as opposed to prosecuting the war
in the RVN) would not have the result of
winning the war in which we are presently engaged but would seriously risk
changing the character of the war, possibly to the point where the costs are
out of proportion to the gains. By and large, it seems to me that the
comments on the study which we have received from key U.S. Missions abroad
have indicated a preference for the thesis that “the war must be won in the
South.” Obviously, this issue has been through the crucible of debate many
times but perhaps not with the advantage of the “look down the road” which
is furnished by the Study Group’s report.
B. Discussion of Next Steps.
- (1)
-
Long Range Study.
The short range study laid no claims to being a definitive analysis
of the problem, nor does it purport to represent a plan of action
for the future. We are, of course, committed to undertake a longer
range study, in which State will take a leading role, of US-Chinese
relations looking through 1975. You may wish to solicit views as to
areas of investigation which that study might seek to analyze.
- (2)
-
Short Range Politico-Military Planning.
It was my feeling in initiating the China Study that pressures
inevitably force too much of a concentration on very immediate
objectives and courses of action without permitting the full
recognition of longer range implications and without necessarily
permitting a relating of individual actions to a comprehensive,
long-range politico-military concept. A rather provocative, but
trenchant, observation made in the Report epitomizes the concern I
think we all share:
[Page 185]
“With or without a decision on our part to increase the level
of such military pressure, the history of past conflicts
worldwide suggests that there is some danger that punitive
military operations may acquire a momentum of their own and
may be allowed to continue beyond the point of any real
military or political utility.”
To the extent that the discussion of the study, and more specifically,
consideration of the “Critical Policy Problems” and the comments from the
Missions identify points which you, the Secretary of Defense and Mac Bundy deem to be significant, you may
wish to suggest that these points be taken into account in our current and
continuing Southeast Asia politico-military planning.
An INR memorandum responding to your request
for the results of recent intelligence studies of world-wide Communist party
reactions to the Sino-Soviet split is at Tab D.3
Attachment A
CRITICAL POLICY PROBLEMS
1. Degree of Soviet Involvement.
With respect to Soviet interests in Southeast Asia, it has been pointed
out that the Chinese did not invent nor have they been in the past the
principal supporters of the doctrine of national liberation. The Soviets
are equally committed to the concept of wars of national liberation.
The study however appears to underestimate the degree of Soviet
involvement and of Soviet reaction to U.S. actions, particularly in the
stage where U.S. military operations are confined to the DRV, and consequently overestimates the
possibility of reaching a tacit understanding between the U.S. and
USSR to avoid a major conflict as
each side seeks to defend its own interests. Because of the public
commitment which the USSR has made to
defend the interests of North Viet Nam, escalation or even continuation
of our attacks on North Viet Nam will make it increasingly difficult to
maintain any serious dialogue with the USSR for the purpose of trying to influence it to moderate
its support of that regime. Moreover, the type of assistance which
Moscow has already supplied Hanoi could lead to a confrontation with the
United States. As the amount of equipment increases, the possibility of
mutual miscalculation or accident also increases.
[Page 186]
In general, the assumption that Soviet involvement would be minimal has
the effect of making the military equation less difficult for the U.S.
If a major Soviet involvement of materiel and perhaps of volunteers was
in prospect, the effect this would have on the size, nature and
consequences of the U.S. commitment, is a matter not explored by the
study.
With respect to U.S. actions against Communist China, the study does say
that “in the event of U.S. attacks against South China, the USSR would probably feel compelled to
provide the ChiComs, after some period of delay, with military
equipment, e.g., advanced fighters and missiles.” “Soviet first line
aircraft and SAMs might have a critical
effect on control of the air over the DRV and China.” A threat to the existence of a Communist
regime in Peiping would probably force the Soviets to become involved
militarily to a highly dangerous degree: “An objective that includes the
destruction of the Communist regime in China would be most costly and
would carry grave risks of general war with the USSR.” This would illustrate a situation in which military
activities would have far out-run fundamental U.S. national security
interests.
2. The Nature of the Communist Chinese Threat.
While the Chinese are utterly opposed to the U.S. presence in Southeast
Asia, they expect to use subversion and infiltration of supplies to
achieve their objectives, and not direct military force unless their own
immediate lines of defense are threatened. The study does not indicate
what, if any, level and intensification of U.S. military operations in
North Viet Nam will bring the Chinese into the war but it does indicate
that at some point Chinese interests and prestige will become
increasingly committed to some sort of participation. It has been
suggested that the Communist Chinese might become actively involved in
the war if the Communist regime in North Viet Nam were threatened, if
Chinese borders were placed in jeopardy, or if large Chinese Nationalist
forces were brought to the Southeast Asia mainland.
One form of Chinese intervention, well prior to any land action, might be
the commitment of fighters from Chinese bases to the air defense of the
DRV. The Study suggests that the
U.S. would be at a serious disadvantage if it failed to neutralize bases
from which the Chinese fighters were employed. It is hard to believe
that such an attack on China could result in anything other than the
signal for war with that country. Indeed, a special NIE recently completed estimates that if
the Chinese actually commit their aircraft to defend the DRV from Chinese bases they must be assumed
to be prepared to fight a major conflict with the U.S. Already we have
reports that the Chinese are evacuating various executive offices and
factories from certain cities and are also installing large numbers of
AA units in key areas apparently in
anticipation of an escalation of conflict to the Chinese mainland.
[Page 187]
3. The Use of Nuclear
Weapons.
The study suggests that military requirements for nuclear weapons will be
especially acute in two circumstances: (1) if the ChiComs/DRV launched a massive invasion of
Southeast Asia before U.S. forces were deployed there in large numbers;
(“It is quite likely that the U.S. would be faced with the decision to
use nuclear weapons … perhaps the second or third day of the invasion.”)
(2) if the U.S. were to bombard Communist Chinese military or industrial
facilities on any military significant scale; (“The comparable effects
of a conventional attack are very much less because the time required to
achieve the same level of destruction is very much longer, thus,
permitting repair of damage …”). There is an inference in the study that
planners are also counting heavily on the psychological effects of
nuclear weapons to break the ChiCom will to resist. However, the report
emphasizes that the use of nuclear weapons by the U.S. would produce an
“overwhelmingly adverse reaction from U.S. allies as well as the
Communist world and the uncommitted powers” and that “lasting resentment
against the U.S. might be generated.” It is suggested that U.S. use of
nuclear weapons might mean the loss of key military bases in the Far
East, the disassociation of NATO
countries from U.S. actions in Asia, and the reduction or termination of
the U.S. presence in many parts of the non-aligned world.
While it seems highly improbable that the Soviets would turn over nuclear
weapons to the Chinese, and at least in the relatively short run the
Chinese will not have an inventory of their own, it is not quite so
inconceivable that the Soviets might support the Chinese with their own
nuclear arsenal by some expedient method. Though this would obviously be
very dangerous for the Soviets, they might feel forced to it, and might
even devise techniques which were sufficiently ambiguous, such as
provision of Soviet volunteers with nuclear capability, which the
Soviets might calculate would avoid a direct confrontation with the U.S.
In any event, if the enemy did have nuclear weapons for use in the
theater, for example, against U.S. and allied bases and forces, is it
entirely clear that introduction of nuclear weapons would even be
militarily advantageous to the U.S.?
4. Escalation of Political Objectives.
The study lays considerable stress on the upward pressure on U.S.
objectives which would result from a major military confrontation with
Communist China (e.g., “initial U.S. objectives … would appear wholly
inadequate to the large-scale hostilities going on and some adjustment
would have to be made.”) One objective which is frequently mentioned is
the reunification of Viet Nam. Others mentioned are the destruction of
ChiCom nuclear facilities, the ChiCom industrial base, and even the
elimination of the Communist regime in Peiping. “But enlarged objectives
also mean enlarged costs, and perhaps a war in Asia which might be
[Page 188]
decisive only when large-scale
strategic nuclear attacks against China were carried out.” Since
military domination of China by the U.S. seems impractical in military
terms, would almost assuredly involve war with the Soviet Union, and
seems otherwise to present enormous problems for the U.S., consideration
should be given to such questions as how readily we should be prepared
to expand political objectives, how insistent we should be on
maintaining limited objectives in the face of major hostilities, and
whether, in fact, we should not insure that military operations do not
create an undesired upward pressure on national objectives.
Attachment B
RESUME
The China confrontation study was undertaken on March 8 under the direct
supervision of Mr. Vance, General
Wheeler and Ambassador
Thompson. It was completed on
April 30. The staff work was done by a State/DOD/JCS team under the
direction of Lt. General Spivy, newly appointed head of J–5. The study
is largely focused on the military implications of a rising crescendo of
hostilities with the Red Chinese, the scenarios in some cases being
intentionally forced in order to bring out the aforementioned military
implications.
The study assumes that the broad political objective of the US in the Far
East is to seek the containment of Communist China, working over the
longer run and as occasion permits for a softening of the present
militant approach of the Chinese Communist leadership. Within this broad
framework, the group examined the more immediate and specific political
objectives which the US might wish to pursue, assuming that under
alternative potential contingency situations the US could find itself
faced with the possibility of a military confrontation with Communist
China. The study was to examine these political objectives in relation
to existing and projected military plans and capabilities. Points of
particular concern were to be how to discourage Soviet support for the
ChiComs in event of hostilities; how to keep the level of hostilities as
low as possible consistent with attainment of objectives; the proper
role for our nuclear capability; and what political and military
adjustments were indicated by the study.
Essentially the study moves through five basic military situations,
starting from the position in which we found ourselves in Southeast Asia
in March 1965, through a major nuclear war with the Chinese.
[Page 189]
- In Situation A, US air attacks (2500 sorties) on military targets
well removed from urban industrial areas have not produced the
results we desire. A number of military installations have been
destroyed or damaged; about 20% of the DRV’s ammunition storage capacity has been destroyed;
and the movement of supplies south of the 20th parallel has been
restricted. Despite this limited impact, the bombings have had a
cohesive effect on the populace of North Vietnam and there has been
no significant reduction in DRV
supply and support of the continuing Vietnam operations. Therefore,
the US elects to increase the scale and scope of bombing within
North Vietnam, to include peripheral industrial targets, such as
selected electric power plants.
- Situation B represents one step up the ladder of escalation. At
this point, a total of 4500 sorties have been flown by US/RVN forces which include the increase
in scale and scope as a result of Situation A. However, the Viet
Cong have intensified their activity and expanded their control
despite the increased bombing; ChiCom volunteers are now operating
in North Vietnam with limited numbers of aircraft (50–70) and
surface to air missiles; and Soviet missile technicians have manned
the SA–2 SAM installation in the
vicinity of Hanoi. The US response is to increase the level of
bombing again, including more general attack of industrial targets
and all categories of transportation, but excluding Hanoi; deploy to
South Vietnam the remainder of the Marine division which has
elements already there, one Army Division, and one Free World
Division (presumed to be ROK); and
develop plans and prepare to blockade North Vietnam.
- In Situation C, the US response described in Situation B has
checked deterioration of the military and political situation in
South Vietnam and the DRV gives some
indications of wavering. At this point, ChiCom aircraft operating
from bases in Hainan and South China engage the US/GVN aircraft which are bombing North
Vietnam, and large numbers of ChiCom ground forces are deployed in
North Vietnam. The USSR has
continued to send “volunteer” units to set up and man missile sites.
It has announced also the forming of a “volunteer” division which it
implies will be sent to North Vietnam if the US does not halt
aggression and agree to negotiations.
The postulated US response in Situation C is to: increase military
activity against the Viet Cong; include targets in Hanoi in air attacks;
bomb ChiCom air and naval bases on Hainan Island and in South China, as
well as the DRV ports; and mine ports of
DRV, in South China, and on Hainan.
Additional naval units are introduced into the South China Sea and two
Army divisions are deployed to Thailand.
The marked improvement in South Vietnam assumed to have been produced by
the measures taken by the US in Situation C, causes Communist China and
the DRV in Situation D to launch a major
attack at the
[Page 190]
beginning of the
dry season. This involves operations by 22 divisions in South Vietnam,
Laos and Thailand. Rather than postulating a US response in this
situation, the study examined the political and military implications of
a variety of courses of action.
The final situation (Alternative Situation A) departs from the forced
escalation of Situation A through D by assuming ChiCom/DRV initiation of large scale ground attack
prior to the significant build-up of friendly forces which is assumed
had been achieved in Situation D as by-product of progressive
escalation. Thus the situation when the attack commences is assumed to
be that at the outset of the study, i.e., Situation A. The treatment in
Alternative Situation A generally parallels that in Situation D: an
examination of the political and military implications of a variety of
courses of action.
Both Situation D and Alternative Situation A include assessment of the
impact of nuclear weapons on ground and air operations. Some interesting
comparisons of nuclear and non-nuclear force requirements for the same
operations appear in summary charts opposite pp IV–60 and IV–80.4
