Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

95. Memorandum From James C. Thomson, Jr., of the National Security Council Staff and the President’s Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson¹

Washington, August 5, 1965.

SUBJECT

• Ray Cline’s Talks with Chiang Kai-shek

Ray Cline, CIA’s Deputy Director for Intelligence and formerly Taipei station chief, visited Taiwan this week at the urgent personal request of Chiang Kai-shek.² Cline had two long talks with the Gimo, the first in the presence of our Chargé, the second one alone on August 3 for five hours at the Gimo’s mountain retreat.³

Chiang’s aim was to use Cline, whom he trusts, in order to communicate a “message” directly to you. (Chiang feels that more normal “diplomatic channels” have distorted and disregarded his views in recent years.)

The Gimo’s message, in brief: The Chinese Communists and their Vietnamese allies are about to engage the U.S. in a long ground war of attrition which we cannot hope to win; Chiang stands ready to provide troops to Vietnam if we want them; but most important, he urges that now is the time for an amphibious Chinese Nationalist landing on the South China (Kwangtung) coast in order to cut Peking’s supply lines to Vietnam and to begin the reconquest of the mainland. The Gimo believes that it is now or never; the Sino/Soviet dispute assures that the U.S.S.R. will not intervene, and the Chinese Communists have not yet achieved a sufficient nuclear buildup to deter a Nationalist invasion.

Regardless of our views on such undertakings, the Gimo asks that we do some coordinated strategic planning for such a move. He intends to spell out his proposals more fully in a letter to you that will be carried by his son Chiang Ching-kuo, the Defense Minister, when he comes to Washington in late September.

Ray Cline comments that the Gimo was more emotional than the situation warrants and probably fears that his control of Taiwan will weaken unless he appears to be doing something active about fighting the Chinese Communists. Hence the revival of the “counter-attack” theme. In balance, Cline’s visit seems to have provided a boost to the Gimo’s ego—and a healthy escape-valve for his pent-up feelings that the U.S. had written him off.

• JCT Jr.
• McG B

1. Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 13. Secret. A handwritten note on the source text reads: “For information only.” A handwritten “L” on the source text indicates that the President saw it.
2. Wright reported Chiang’s request for Cline’s visit in telegram 16 from Taipei, July 7, and commented that he thought the request meant that Chiang wanted to use an alternate channel to send a policy proposal to Washington and recommended against such a visit. (Department of State, Central Files, POL CHINAT-US) Telegram 31 to Taipei, July 13, cleared by Bromley Smith and Rusk, stated that Cline should accept Chiang’s invitation but not until after Wright’s departure and that the visit should be portrayed as having a reporting rather than a policy context. (Ibid., INR/IL Historical Files, Roger Channel Telegrams, Taipei)
3. [text not declassified] telegram [text not declassified], August 1, conveyed a message from Clough to Bundy reporting Cline’s first meeting with Chiang. (Ibid.) [text not declassified] telegram [text not declassified], August 3, transmitted a message from Cline summarizing his meeting that day with Chiang. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, China, Vol. XIII) A second message from Cline with a more detailed account of the meeting is filed as an attachment to an August 4 memorandum from Walter Elder to McGeorge Bundy. (Ibid.)