Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968, Volume XXX, China

96. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–7–65

Washington, August 5, 1965.

POLITICAL PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS IN COMMUNIST CHINA

The Problem

To analyze Communist China’s most significant political problems and to estimate its political character over the next few years.

Conclusions

A. The dedicated, narrowly doctrinaire men who rule China initially gained the support of the Chinese people by swiftly unifying a country in chaos. But their adventurist “Great Leap Forward” program failed disastrously, substantially reducing popular faith in the leadership and popular support of its programs. Despite their failures, the dwindling group of elderly leaders remain determined to carry through political and social programs that will produce a modernized China, and a “new Communist man.”

B. This policy is the work of a remarkably small and stable group of men. Mao and his lieutenants have, over the past three decades, avoided major internal schisms and refused to admit younger blood into their ranks. In recent years the leadership has turned inward upon itself; it has virtually dispensed with formal party meetings and congresses while cloaking its operations in ever greater secrecy.

C. The party can exact obedience and compliance, but, despite its recurrent campaigns, the people attempt to improve their material lot and to avoid politics. These attitudes have widely infected the lower levels of the party apparatus as well. The regime is currently engaged in massive campaigns to “reform” or weed out errant party cadres and to “educate” the people to accept the regime’s collectivist programs. It has announced that it will launch another production upsurge, but this is likely to differ significantly from the ill-fated Great Leap Forward. The outlook is for increased tensions.

D. Mao is 71, and most of his dozen or so closest lieutenants are in their 60s. Mao’s departure probably will not split the leadership, and policy is likely to continue along present doctrinaire lines. His successors will not have Mao’s authority, however, and this may in time open the door to the growth of factionalism inside the party.

E. Mao’s lieutenants will be succeeded in their turn by a generation of party veterans, now in their 50’s. Although these men give no evidence of a broader, more moderate viewpoint, they will have to deal with a host of accumulated pressures and may perforce be more flexible and pragmatic. At least for the next several years, however, political and social problems within China are unlikely to prevent economic and military development or to force a softening of Chinese foreign policy.

[Here follows the Discussion portion of the estimate.]

1. Source: Department of State, INR/EAP Files: Lot 90 D 110, NIE 13–7–65. Secret; Controlled Dissem. According to a note on the cover sheet, the estimate was submitted by the Director of Central Intelligence and prepared by the CIA and the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense, and the National Security Agency. All members of the U.S. Intelligence Board concurred on August 5, except AEC and FBI representatives, who abstained on the grounds that the subject was outside their jurisdiction.