278. Memorandum From Donald S. Macdonald of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Director of the Bureau (Hughes)1
SUBJECT
- Mr. Bundy’s Meeting with Mr. Colby, August 17, 1967,2
PARTICIPANTS
- Messrs. Bundy, Berger, and Habib for EA; Messrs. Colby and Ford for CIA; Mr. Stuart for INR/DDC; and Mr. Hamilton of EA for Laos item
China
Mr. Ford [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] reported that the current mood of the GRC leadership is one of pessimism growing out of frustration. The GRC prediction of a divided leadership on the mainland has come true—by chance—and the US is not interested in taking advantage of it. The uncertainty of status within the UN is continual. Communist China’s nuclear power is growing and the Gimo feels strongly that the Communists intend using it against Taiwan. Because of the Vietnam war, the US is paying less attention to the defense of the Taiwan Strait. Yet the GRC has no alternative to the US for support.
While the fact of dependence on the US is accepted by the Gimo and other GRC leaders, the resultant pessimistic and somewhat resentful atmosphere is not an easy one in which to work. The [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] is effectively closed out of planning for maritime excursions and agent operations against the mainland. Nevertheless, knowledge of these activities comes to the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] through a number of sources.
The fact that unilateral GRC collection against the mainland is ineffective makes the GRC dependent [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. A number of highly sophisticated operations are being carried on with full GRC cooperation. At the same time, however, the GRC shows its independence whenever it can. Recent operations in cooperation with Koreans, renewed interest in the Yunnan border areas, and intelligence liaison with the South Vietnamese are illustrations of this attempt to assert independence.
In reply to Mr. Bundy’s question concerning Taiwanese nationalist sentiment, Mr. Ford characterized Taiwanese nationalism as insignificant [Page 596] politically because there is no organized movement—nor is there likely to be, because of close GRC surveillance of prospective leaders. Mr. Ford characterized GRC control methods as an astute combination of force and shrewd political moves.
Mr. Stuart asked Mr. Ford if, in view of difficulties with the GRC over phasing out of a joint collection operation last year, he could forecast how the GRC would react to withdrawal of an additional project in which the GRC played the major role. Mr. Ford said that he would regard the closing down of an additional operation as politically unwise and a threat to some of the more sophisticated—and more useful—joint operations unless the withdrawn project were to be replaced immediately by another in which the GRC would participate actively. The GRC otherwise would seize upon the withdrawal as an indication of a change in US policy toward Taiwan, and probably as a move in the direction of coming to terms with Communist China.
[Here follows discussion of unrelated subjects.]